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Recent Potential Chinese Collection Activity Targeting DoD Installations

An investigative journalism piece published 04 September in the Wall Street Journal brought newfound attention to a phenomenon that has been experienced by Department of Defense (DoD) installations for a number of years: increasing suspicious activity involving Chinese nationals. These Chinese nationals (sometimes referred to as “gate crashers”) have repeatedly attempted to gain access to DoD installations. In many of these cases, Chinese nationals claim to be tourists, claim to be lost, or claim to be attempting to access businesses located onboard the installation (such as gas stations or restaurants). In a few cases, Chinese nationals have disregarded gate guards’ commands and proceeded onto installations without permission or have otherwise trespassed and been discovered on installation property. A common concern across all of these cases is the potential for espionage collection.1

This paper will provide a brief overview of China’s approach to espionage and national security laws that allow the Chinese government to compel its citizens to assist in espionage. The paper will then examine the recent phenomenon of potential Chinese collection activity targeting DoD installations through the lens of three recent case studies.

China engages in a wide-ranging “whole of society” approach to espionage that leverages private businesses and citizens in addition to traditional espionage efforts and cyberattacks. To this end, China’s government has implemented national security laws that can compel Chinese nationals to act as non-traditional collectors. In particular, Article 7 of the 2017 National Intelligence Law specifies that “all organizations and citizens shall, according to the law, provide support and assistance to and cooperate with the State intelligence work, and keep secret the State intelligence work that they know.” An interpretation by a Swedish business law firm concluded that the 2017 National Intelligence Law “applies to all Chinese citizens, and because [the 2017 National Intelligence Law] does not appear to have an explicit geographical limitation, it could be construed to apply to all Chinese citizens even when residing outside of China.”2

While it is unclear whether individual Chinese citizens are being compelled to conduct espionage against the DoD, China has long utilized non-traditional collectors (loosely defined as individuals who are not part of a formal intelligence agency, yet still act in support of a foreign government) in U.S. academia and business settings in order to steal sensitive research and trade secrets. Non-traditional collectors may include businesspeople, students, professors, and conference attendees. The sheer number of these individuals provides the Chinese government with a wide pool of potential sources of information who may also draw limited suspicion due to legitimate business/academic reasons to access sensitive information.

In February 2022, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Christopher Wray stated that the Bureau was opening a China-related counterintelligence investigation every 12 hours on average. Many of these cases involved espionage activities targeting U.S. businesses and academia. Based on this pattern, it is likely that China also utilizes non-traditional collectors in espionage activities targeting the DoD to some degree.3

Case Studies
The following case studies highlight specific events (or clusters of events) related to potential Chinese collection activity targeting DoD installations. These case studies were primarily selected due to the availability of open source media reporting surrounding each event (or cluster of events). A number of additional incidents could have resulted in significant espionage concerns; however, it is likely that details surrounding such incidents would be sensitive and/or classified, with reporting restricted to official government channels.

The potential collection activity detailed in the following case studies includes suspicious photography, possible probing of security, and other concerns that may appear relatively minor in nature. However, the aggregation of numerous disparate pieces of information could provide an adversary such as China with valuable intelligence regarding DoD installations, personnel, and operations (to include information which could be utilized in follow-on espionage efforts).

2019 Virginia Military Base Incident
According to open source media reporting, in September 2019, two (2) Chinese embassy officials and their wives drove onto an unspecified military base in the Norfolk, VA area that hosts special operations forces. In the incident, the Chinese individuals arrived at the installation’s gate, but were denied access by a gate guard, who instructed them to turn around and exit the installation (a standard procedure). Instead of following these instructions, the vehicle proceeded further onto the installation, until they were reportedly stopped by fire trucks. Once detained, the individuals claimed to not have understood the English instructions and stated that they had simply gotten lost.4,5

Open source media reporting indicated that the embassy officials were secretly expelled from the U.S. just a few months later, with at least one of the officials believed to be an intelligence officer operating under diplomatic cover. Anonymous U.S. military officials quoted in media reporting believed that the incident was a test of security and theorized that a more senior intelligence officer could have been sent on a subsequent mission onto the base if security was perceived to be inadequate.4,5

While the installation was not specified in media reporting, the Norfolk, VA area is home to a dense concentration of DoD assets and personnel, particularly the U.S. Navy. Media reports alluding to the presence of special operations forces could indicate a nexus to Naval Special Warfare units (such as the Navy SEALs), which are publicly known to be located at installations in the Norfolk, VA area. The U.S. Navy’s capabilities are likely a priority collection target for Chinese intelligence actors due to rising tensions involving Taiwan and the South China Sea, as well as the role U.S. naval forces would play in a regional conflict.6

2019-2020 Naval Air Station Key West Incidents
Naval Air Station (NAS) Key West (located in Key West, FL) was the subject of a potential espionage incident in December 2019 perpetrated by Liao Lyuyou, a 27-year-old Chinese native. During the incident, Liao took photos of government installations and sensitive military equipment after illegally accessing the base. Bystanders/witnesses warned Liao that the area he had entered was restricted, but he continued to trespass and take photos. After being confronted by military personnel, Liao claimed he only wanted to take pictures of the sunrise. He then gave the responding personnel permission to search his camera, where photos of several government buildings were found, including the installation’s Truman Annex. After being arrested on 26 December 2019, Liao pleaded guilty to illegally entering a restricted area. He was sentenced to 12 months in prison.7,8

Just a week later, on 04 January 2020, two (2) men were arrested for a similar incident at NAS Key West. 25-year-old Jielun Zhang and 24-year-old Yuhao Wang (both of whom are Chinese nationals) faced charges of illegally entering a restricted area (the same charge faced by Liao in the preceding incident). Zhang was ultimately sentenced to 12 months in prison, while Yuhao was sentenced to nine (9) months in prison. According to the U.S. Attorney’s office, the men approached the gate at NAS Key West’s Sigsbee Annex but had no military identification. After being turned around and instructed to leave the facility, instead the men stayed onboard the installation for an additional 30 minutes. After security forces obtained consent to see the cameras and cell phones that the two (2) men possessed, they found images of U.S. military structures on Fleming Key, along with images of the Sigsbee Annex property.7,8

NAS Key West is potentially an alluring target for espionage efforts due to various notable tenants, to include Joint Interagency Task Force-South (headquartered at the Truman Annex photographed by Liao), as well as various missions such as supporting training for aviation and special operations units. In recent years, China has expanded its military/intelligence footprint in the Caribbean, particularly in Cuba, which is located less than 100 miles from Key West, FL. As a result, China would likely seek to collect information on DoD assets throughout the region that would be in position to counter any Chinese military/intelligence activities, to include NAS Key West.9,10

Recent Alaska Incidents
Recent potential Chinese collection activity targeting DoD installations in Alaska (a strategic location due to increasing competition in the Arctic) highlights China’s possible interest in the area’s assets. Chinese citizens claiming to be tourists have reportedly made multiple recent attempts to gain access to military facilities in Alaska. For example, open source media reports highlight incidents at the Army’s Fort Wainwright in Fairbanks, Alaska, including a case where a vehicle with Chinese citizens attempted to pass guards at a security checkpoint. Once the vehicle was stopped and searched, a drone was found inside, and the Chinese nationals claimed they were lost tourists. Reports also note that there have been incidents where Chinese nationals arrived stating they had a reservation at an on-base hotel, including recently at Fort Wainwright.1,11

According to the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, China looks to expand its influence in the Arctic through economic, diplomatic, scientific, and military activities. Alaska and the greater Arctic region host many DoD facilities and assets that may be the target of Chinese “gate crashers.” In addition to Fort Wainwright, Alaska is home to two (2) other large military bases, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richard in Anchorage and Eielson Air Force Base near Fairbanks, and several smaller installations. Additional DoD assets in Alaska include the Air Force’s F-22s and F-35s, radars and missiles that could defend against nuclear attack at the Army’s Fort Greely, and Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak.11,12,13

The DoD has increasingly invested resources in Alaska and transferred assets to the region over the past few years, highlighting the U.S.’ objective of enhancing the capabilities required to defend American interests in the Arctic. For instance, in June 2022, the Army activated the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Wainwright and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson to execute expeditionary operations within the Indo-Pacific theater, conduct Multi-Domain Operations in the Arctic, and defend critical infrastructure in support of homeland defense. Furthermore, the U.S. has invested hundreds of millions of dollars to expand the port at Nome to harbor large vessels in Western Alaska, potentially servicing Coast Guard and Navy vessels in the Arctic Circle. Lastly, the DoD engages in military exercises in Alaska, including Northern Edge. This large-scale, biannual military exercise, which took place recently in May 2023, involved thousands of U.S. servicemembers, five (5) ships, more than 150 aircraft, and joint, multinational, and multi-domain operations with United Kingdom and Australian servicemembers. These assets and operations are likely highly appealing targets for adversaries such as China.11,12,13,14,15

Some of the incidents detailed in this paper are likely low-level intelligence collection by individuals who may be acting in support of the Chinese government (to include potentially being compelled to support the Chinese government by law). It is also possible that some recent incidents involving Chinese nationals involve legitimate misunderstandings. Some operatives, civilian or otherwise, may be caught, but it can be difficult to prove that they are engaged in espionage. Even those who are confronted are able to gather details on an installation’s security posture by engaging in probing activities. A few may even be able to retrieve intelligence that becomes actionable when combined with information gathered through other intelligence collection avenues. It is incumbent upon DoD installations to maintain a vigilant security posture and take even seemingly innocuous encounters seriously, as China’s “whole of society” espionage campaign against the U.S. and the DoD will almost certainly continue to increase in the coming years.


1. Lubold, G. (2023, September 4). Chinese Gate-Crashers at U.S. Bases Spark Espionage Concerns. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from

2. Mannheimer Swartling. (2019, January). Applicability of Chinese National Intelligence Law to Chinese and non-Chinese Entities. Retrieved from

3. Williams, P. (2022, February 2). Full interview: FBI Director Wray on efforts to halt China’s spying. NBC News. Retrieved from

4. Pearman, M. (2019, December 16). 2 Chinese officials suspected of spying on local military base. WAVY. Retrieved from

5. Cole, D. (2019, December 16). New York Times: US ‘secretly expelled’ Chinese officials who entered ‘sensitive’ military base. CNN. Retrieved from

6. United States Naval Special Warfare Command. (n.d.). NSW Guidebook. Retrieved from

7. Flores, R., & Weisfeldt, S. (2020, June 5). 3 Chinese nationals sentenced to prison for taking photos at Florida naval base. CNN. Retrieved from

8. Lolo, S. (2020, June 4). 3 Chinese nationals sentenced to prison for illegal photography at Key West naval base. 12 News. Retrieved from

9. Commander, Navy Region Southeast. (n.d.). NAS Key West. Retrieved from

10. Xue, X. (2023, June 29). Analysts: China’s plans for Cuba may go beyond spy base. VOA. Retrieved from

11. Vanden Brook, T. (2023, May 31). Suspected Chinese spies, disguised as tourists, tried to infiltrate Alaskan military bases. USA Today. Retrieved from

12. The White House. (2022, October). National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House. Retrieved from

13. Baker, M. (2022, March 27). With Eyes on Russia, the U.S. Military Prepares for an Arctic Future. The New York Times. Retrieved from

14. Ellis, T. (2023, June 8). Fort Wainwright apprehended ‘Chinese spies,’ Sullivan says. Alaska Public Media. Retrieved from

15. Department of Defense. (n.d.). 11th Airborne Division. Department of Defense. Retrieved from

Geopolitical Impacts of Climate Change: An Overview

The geopolitical implications of climate change are wide-ranging, creating not only local and regional instability, but also impacts seen on the international stage, creating security concerns. Climate-driven conflicts can occur all around the globe, however they tend to concentrate in areas where economic and political security are low. Increasingly frequent and severe floods, droughts, and other extreme weather events create resource scarcity, causing thousands of migrants to leave their homes and congregate in resource-rich areas. Lack of resources is a major driver of human migration and displacement, creating large geopolitical challenges for countries struggling with resource scarcity. This paper will examine four geographical regions with specific examples of the geopolitical implications of climate change. By examining these case studies, an emphasis on the global, interconnected nature of politics and climate is clearly formed.

Case Studies
The following regional case studies were selected to illustrate the geographic diversity and global impacts of climate change on geopolitics. The origin of climate-related issues, geopolitical repercussions, and local success and failures will all be discussed. However, the below regions should not be considered an all-inclusive list, as the impacts of climate change on geopolitics span the globe.

Middle East
Within the Middle East, climate conditions are regularly hot and arid. The region is home to 12 of the world’s 17 most water stressed countries. Agriculture depends on irrigation from major rivers and water sources. The changing climate has begun to elongate droughts and extreme weather events, forcing people of lower socioeconomic status to migrate to urban areas or other regions of the world, like Europe, to ensure their economic stability. The Middle East is warming at twice the global average. Limited resources are also a large driving factor in climate-related conflict and creates conditions conducive to the recruitment citizens into terrorist organizations. Lack of fresh water, desertification, extreme oil prices, and unreliable food production systems that are within or around countries in conflict or post-conflict transitions increases instability and violence.1,2,3

The Middle East and greater Mediterranean region have known conflict since ancient times, driven largely by the geography where three continents come together with the major powers of Europe, Asia and Africa. Competition for resources and power through two World Wars, the Cold War, and the Global War on Terror has left the region scarred and divided in terms of politics, social issues, and economic development. The already hot and dry climate and general lack of economic resources leaves the region more vulnerable to the ramifications of climate change compared to other parts of the world. Political instability makes efficient use of limited resources, especially water, difficult. This may be one reason that organized and modern farming practices utilized in developed nations is virtually non-existent in the region. The water stress of the region makes these modern farming practices more important. Climate change may decrease agricultural productivity, increasing the region’s reliance on food imports.4

Instability is used as a driving factor in resource management and prolonged resource scarcity at the hands of corrupt or insurgent governments, paving the way for terrorist organizations to monopolize scarce resources and further engage in violence. The violence, instability, and lack of basic resources are all factors driving emigration from the region by the millions in the last decade. Approximately 46% of the 30.6 million migrants leaving the Middle East and North Africa in 2019 stayed within the region with Saudi Arabia (3.4 million), Jordan (3.3 million) and Lebanon (1.7 million) taking in the most migrants. In the same year, the United States accepted approximately 1.3 million migrants from the Middle East and North Africa. Turkey accepted the largest number of migrants at approximately 4 million, followed by France at 3.3 million, and Germany at 1.3 million each. European nations are becoming weary of migration as the continent grapples with the effects of large-scale African migration and refugees from the war in Ukraine.5,6

Energy resources are also a significant source of geopolitical conflict. Advances in technology are making renewable energy sources more viable, however the emerging technologies cannot support global energy and transportation needs. Oil, natural gas, and coal still account for 86% of global energy consumption. The middle east accounts for nearly half of easily accessible oil worldwide and one-third of natural gas. Energy production drives economic development in the region which will be adversely affected by the transition to renewable energy long term. In the short term, the war in Ukraine leaves the EU looking for alternative energy sources outside of Russia. China, now the world’s largest net importer of oil, is investing in oil and gas exploration projects throughout the Middle East. The need to move these resources from the Middle East to the rest of the world creates tension along historic trade routes. The Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Suez Canal, and other choke points on shipping lanes see frequent naval exercises and geopolitical posturing amongst world powers. China’s Belt and Road Initiative along these trade routes strategically places Chinese government influence in resource-rich regions. Countries participating in the initiative often find themselves indebted to China for the infrastructure projects China provides.7,8

Africa experiences the effects of climate change differently depending on the region. Across the continent, in 2020, one in five people faced hunger. Droughts in sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa, coupled with extreme flooding in West and Central Africa, creates unstable and uninhabitable conditions for millions of people. Recently, drastically changing weather patterns have caused flooding in parts of the Horn of Africa, forcing local populations to relocate. West Africa has been identified as a climate change hotspot, as the region’s crop yields diminish and create large impacts on food security. As resources are consistently scarce across many of the 52 countries that make up the continent of Africa, displaced persons are traveling north and crossing the Mediterranean Sea in hopes of reaching Europe. Limited resources create a perfect storm for armed conflict and terrorist organizations. Violence in many of these areas are due to both resource competition and a lack of governmental oversight and regulation, mostly related to corruption.9,10,11

Governmental forces or non-state armed groups have been implicated in human rights abuses in over 15 armed conflicts across Africa. Although the Central African Republic, Guinea and the International Criminal Court have opened trials in some cases, atrocities often go unpunished. Seeking justice for such crimes is difficult given the regularity with which local leaders manipulate elections and legal processes. Additionally, harassment and violence against journalists, activists and political opponents suppresses free speech and solidifies tyranny. Further complicating these issues is the presence and spread of foreign terrorist fighters, mercenaries (including Russia’s Wagner Group), and the influence of opposing international governments including the U.S., European countries, Russia, and China. Armed conflict has created a myriad of internally displaced people, refugees, and migrants to flee the violence, repression, poverty, and environmental factors.12

The level of migration into Europe has the European Union negotiating new policies on how to process asylum seekers. Italy and Greece are on the front lines of Mediterranean migration north, and while some EU nations are offering support, others are against receiving asylum seekers. This is especially true of Poland and Hungary who are currently hosting significant numbers of refugees from the war in Ukraine. As part of the current EU agreement (which has not had a final vote) countries would have the option of receiving migrants after a vetting process or paying 20,000 Euros for each migrant they do not accept.13

Moreover, conflicts such as the war in Ukraine have a grave impact on the receipt of critical resources, such as wheat, to East Africa. Twenty-five African countries import more than 1/3 of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine, while Benin in West Africa receives 100% of their wheat from Russia, and Somalia in East Africa receives 70% of their wheat from Ukraine and 30% from Russia. Russia recently reimposed their blockade of Ukrainian grain exports. Due to the instability the war has caused in supply chain, millions of people in Africa face extreme hunger and famine. The number of food insecure people worldwide has doubled in the past two years from 135 million to 276 million with more than half a million people living in famine conditions. This is an increase of 500% compared to 2016 levels. The G7 have pledged assistance to address food insecurity in Africa and there is some discussion of U.S. and allied navies potentially escorting Ukrainian grain shipments across the Black Sea.14,15

Although Africa has significant energy reserves, a lack of refining capacity means that resources must be exported overseas for refining and imported back into Africa. Worldwide economic issues and inflation exacerbate the issue causing a spike in African energy prices. African healthcare systems were stretch to the limit during the global pandemic are struggling to recover and resupply. Additionally, the World Bank recently issued warnings that developing countries owe record amounts of debt to wealthier nations, banks, bondholders, and China in particular. The G7 is considering backing off their previous commitments not to finance natural gas projects overseas. This may be the result of Europe’s changing views on importing Russian natural gas as Europe looks for other sources of energy.14

Africa has large reserves of natural resources, especially rare earth minerals. Africa could someday surpass China for rare earth mineral production, making it strategically important to global powers and fueling geopolitical tension in the region. China and Russia have been expanding their influence throughout Africa in recent years, often offering infrastructure projects and military support making countries indebted in virtual perpetuity. As the U.S. and European nations seek to ease the tension of migration, offer help to African nations, and potentially become involved in African energy projects, the great power competition in Africa is likely to become even more heightened.16,17

The implications of climate change in Asia are also highly concerning. Heavy monsoon rains and intense flooding, elongated droughts, and increased temperatures make regions in Asia, such as the South, one of the world’s most vulnerable regions. Extreme weather events occur more frequently there, leaving minimal recovery time for communities. This strains agricultural industries and the freshwater supplies across the continent, forcing millions to migrate, often from rural to urban areas. Mass migration affects infrastructure and resource availability in the cities to which people relocates, willingly or otherwise. The nature of their migration is called “climate mobility.”18,19

Climate mobility describes three (3) forms of population movement, including displacement, where people are forced to leave; migration, wherein they move voluntarily; and, finally, planned relocation, which is enforced by the state. These forms can overlap and may happen simultaneously, making it difficult to monitor trends. There were 38 million instances of displacement in 2021 worldwide, with 14.3 million (37.6%) from the East Asia and Pacific region, which includes those displaced more than once. More than half of these displacements (23.7 million) worldwide and 95% in the East Asia and Pacific region were due to weather. The Southeast Asian countries with the most displacements due to weather in 2021 were the Philippines (5,681,000), Indonesia (749,000), Vietnam (780,000), and Myanmar (158,000). Half were from rural areas, including indigenous communities, and half had already been displaced by weather in the past.20

In South Asia, most weather-related migration is also from rural to urban areas. Weather events like Cyclone Amphan in May 2020 often force populations to leave. In May 2009, Cyclone Aila forced out 2.3 million citizens in India, along with almost a million in Bangladesh. Pakistan’s July 2010 floods damaged or destroyed 1.1 million homes and displaced about 11 million people. Many resettled in urban areas. In 2012, floods displaced 1.5 million in the Indian state of Assam. In dry regions, water shortages have caused farmers, fishermen, and others dependent upon the water supply to migrate to cities. This mass displacement is compounded by the large number agricultural workers and those from densely populated coastal areas.21

Weather-related disasters can be exacerbated by inadequate facilities and infrastructure, which pose risks to human health, particularly in rural areas with limited response capacity. Warm conditions and heavy rainfall are precursors to a myriad of vector-borne diseases. Certain insects such as mosquitos that carry diseases like malaria, dengue fever, and zika become increasingly prevalent, creating a large health hazard for those living in such conditions. An increase in disease causes an increased strain on health and hospital resources, particularly in areas where resources are scarce.18

Central and South America
Climate-related disasters such as extreme weather events, irregular precipitation patterns, deforestation, and high temperatures across Central and South America contribute to high food insecurity and uninhabitable living conditions. It is estimated that 17,000,000 people in Latin America will be forced to relocate within 30 years due to climate related changes in agriculture production and regional stability. As with their counterparts in Asia, these migrants will relocate from areas with less water and inadequate crop yield and from areas affected by rising sea levels and storm surges. This will have implications for climate-sensitive industry, for infrastructure, and for social support systems, particularly in urban areas where climate migrants are likely to settle.22,23

Since 2014, farmers have lost an estimated 70% of their crop during many harvests due to droughts. Recent studies have indicated that, although climate change has not necessarily reduced rainfall, it has increased heat and evaporation and made droughts worse. For example, 2022 was central Argentina’s driest year since 1960, with the region receiving roughly half its average rainfall during the last four (4) months of the year. Low rainfall combined with high temperatures led to widespread crop failure. Agricultural exports for 2023 are projected to further drop 28% compared to 2022. Uruguay also declared an agricultural emergency in October 2022 when 60% of the country’s territory experienced significant drought. Along with natural disasters exacerbated by climate change, crop failure can force residents to relocate to areas where resource stability is prevalent, and critical infrastructure is better able to withstand natural disasters. It also causes migrants from Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and elsewhere to travel to the southern border of the United States to seek asylum. Mass migration affects infrastructure, law enforcement, and the resources of local and national governments along a group’s path. It also creates security concerns in and around areas of congregation and at a group’s final destination.24,25

The harmful effects of climate change in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Central and South America include famine, mass migrations of persons to resource stable areas of the world, growing violent extremism, and conflicts over resources and the procurement of future resources. These issues create strain on governments and non-governmental organizations who are working to ensure the displaced populations have their basic needs met. Persons fleeing climate-related instability and conflict congregate around areas where such organizations are present, to include U.S. military installations. It is assumed that the installations will provide persons with basic necessities, such as food, water, shelter, and basic emergency health care. This can strain installation resources and affect the installation’s security posture. Moreover, host nations are only able to provide limited resources to such communities, creating strain on supply systems and host nation security forces. Both the short- and long-term effects of climate change will continue to disrupt and uproot civilians around the globe, resulting in notable impacts in the geopolitical realm. RMC’s Intelligence & Analysis Division continues to monitor relevant climate and geopolitical developments in order to analyze potential impacts to client assets, personnel, and operations.


1. Saleh, Salma. (2023, May 02). Topic: Climate Change in the Middle East. Statista.

2. Vohra, Anchal. (2021. August 24). The Middle East Is Becoming Literally Uninhabitable. Foreign

3. Alaaldin, Ranj. (2022, March 18). Climate Change May Devastate the Middle East. Here’s How Governments Should Tackle It. Brookings.

4. Scheffran, J. (2020). The Geopolitical Impact of Climate Change in the Mediterranean Region: Climate Change as a Trigger of Conflict and Migration. European Institute of the Mediterranean.

5. Henkin, S.D. (2022). Climate Change and Terrorism: A Call To Action. National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

6. Harjanto, L and Batalova, J. (2022, January 13). Middle Eastern and North African Immigrants in the United States. Migration Policy Institute.

7. Abouyoub, Y. (2023, February 14). The geopolitics of energy transition in MENA: Mitigating risks, exploring new opportunities. Middle East Institute.

8. McBride, J and Chatzky, A. (2023, February 23). China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative. Council on Foreign Relations.

9. Huber, Chris, and Sevil Omer. (2023, April 24). Africa Hunger, Famine: Facts, Faqs, and How to Help.
World Vision.

10. Millions Face Flooding Threat across West and Central Africa | UN News. (2022, October 28).
United Nations.

11. Shepard, Dan. (2018, December). Global Warming: Severe Consequences for Africa | Africa Renewal. United Nations.

12. Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 12). Africa: Conflicts, Violence Threaten Rights.

13. Sorgi, G and Barigazzi, J. (2023, June 10). What’s actually in the EU’s migration deal? Politico.

14. Which African Countries Are Most Dependent on Russian and Ukrainian Wheat? (2022, March
23). Teller Report.

15. Burrier, E. (2022, June 30). In Africa, Putin’s War on Ukraine Drives Food, Fuel and Finance Crises. United States Institute of Peace.

16. Baskaran, G. (2022, December 29). Could Africa Replace China as the World’s Source of Rare Earth Elements? Brookings Institute.

17. Murphy, D. (2023, February). Strategic Competition for Overseas Basing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Brookings Institute.

18. Siddiqui, Usaid. (2023, July 8). What makes South Asia so vulnerable to climate change? Al Jazeera.

19. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). (2021, December 15). Over 57 million affected by climate disasters across Asia Pacific in 2021. IFRC.

20. McCoy, D. & Soo-Chen, K. (2023, February 28). Climate displacement & migration in South East Asia. Reliefweb.

21. Kugelman, M. (2020, September 30). Climate-induced displacement: South Asia’s clear and present danger. Wilson Center.

22. Phillips, Gregory. (2022, April 26). How climate change is changing Latin America. Duke Today

23. World Bank Group. (n.d.). Internal climate migration in Latin America. World Bank Group. 983921522304806221/pdf/124724-BRI-PUBLIC-NEWSERIES-Groundswell-note-PN3.pdf.

24. Bermeo, S. & Speck, M. (2022, September 21). How climate change catalyzes more migration in Central America. United States Institute of Peace.://

25. Fraser-Baxter, S.E. (2023, February 16). New study investigates the role of climate change in South American drought. Imperial College London.

Human Impacts on Geological Events

Geological hazards are likely to see changes in their frequency and severity in the near future. Much of this can be attributed to human causes. In this paper, the Intelligence & Analysis Division will examine the ways in which various geological hazards are influenced by human activity, to include earthquakes, sinkholes, erosion, and landslides. 

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The Wagner Group’s Attempted Coup in Russia

In this paper, RMC’s Intelligence & Analysis Division will examine the paramilitary Wagner Group’s attempted coup in Russia. While the group ultimately retreated within the week, the ramifications of these actions were global. The history of the group, an overview of the recent coup attempt, and the impacts to the geopolitical and security landscape will be analyzed. 

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China-Cuba Relations: Recent Developments and Implications for U.S. National Security

In the June 2023 edition of the White Paper Series, the Intelligence & Analysis Division examines recent developments involving the China-Cuba relationship. In recent weeks, open source media reporting has raised the issue of an alleged Chinese signals intelligence collection facility on Cuba. Moreover, the two nations are reportedly discussing the creation of a joint military training facility. This paper briefly examines the history of the China-Cuba relationship, details regarding the aforementioned developments, and the implications for U.S. national security.

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The Use and Consequences of AI: An Overview

In the May 2023 edition of the White Paper Series, the Intelligence & Analysis Division examines recent developments related to the proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies. While AI technologies can be leveraged for productive purposes (such as business innovation and advanced defense systems), they can also be utilized by malicious actors (to include the spreading of misinformation/disinformation). This paper provides a brief overview of AI uses and consequences as they pertain to RMC’s current and prospective clients.

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Technical White Paper: Climate Risk Assessments

In the April 2023 edition of the White Paper Series, the Intelligence & Analysis Division details one of its newest capabilities: the Climate Risk Assessment (CRA). This paper details the organizational need for the CRA process, as well as the elements of said process as conducted by RMC. The CRA is designed to assess climate-related hazards in order to increase the resiliency of an organization’s assets and operations, as well as promote sustainable planning for the future.

Japan Strengthens Defense Strategy: An Overview

In the March 2023 edition of the White Paper Series, the Intelligence & Analysis Division examines Japan’s new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program, all of which were released in December 2022. This paper examines the regional threat environment, the implications of these policies/initiatives for Japan’s defense, as well as implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Modernizing Supply Chain Risk Management

This paper is designed to provide analysis of relevant, publicly available information regarding the current supply chain
threat landscape and its impact on organizations worldwide. This product provides a foundational perspective on the
evolution of supply chain risk based on the analysis of current trends and analyst expertise and is not intended to provide
a detailed blueprint for establishing a holistic SCRM program.

Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP): An Examination

In the February 2023 edition of the White Paper Series, the Intelligence & Analysis Division examines unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP). Though mysterious airborne objections have been observed and recorded for thousands of years, recent technical, logistical, and scientific developments have shed new light on UAP events and their potential sources. Of late, the U.S. government has undertaken a more detailed examination of UAP. New avenues of reporting, task forces, and independent studies aim to systematically record, organize, and identify these events and their sources. Sometime such identification is done retroactively, showing us the many forms a UAP may take. UAP could have a wide array of sources, from benign weather events to foreign adversary surveillance. For this reason, the study of UAP is vital for both national security and scientific advancement.