Introduction

Over the past 20 years, the United States military has accumulated the most combat experience of any armed force in the world. Foreign powers in competition with the U.S. are aware of this operational advantage and actively seek to close the experience gap. Many Department of Defense (DoD) servicemembers who joined the military early in the Global War on Terror have either retired or will be retiring soon. They are being recruited by other nations and corporations with lucrative job offers that leverage their experience both on and off the battlefield. In many cases, the companies they are working for appear to be American or affiliated with countries allied with the U.S. However, veteran servicemembers may also be taking jobs with nation-state threat actors.

Historical Context

Historically, the U.S. has supported other nations prior to wars with diplomatic, economic, and military assistance. Active and veteran personnel have a history of supporting, advising, and training foreign militaries. For example, in 1914, before the U.S. entered World War I, Americans began crossing into Canada to receive military training and volunteer to fight for foreign militaries, including the French Foreign Legion. After Japan attacked China in 1937, Americans served as observers, advisors, and recruiters for foreign air forces. There were also DoD and Department of State civilian employees and contractors who assisted with logistics, policymaking, and training for the fledgling Republic of Vietnam before American involvement in the war.^[1],[2],[3]

The current wars in Ukraine and Israel have seen veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces traveling overseas to take part in these conflicts. American veterans have also supported foreign nations on their own through various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), volunteer efforts, initiatives aimed at humanitarian aid, community development, and educational programs.^{[4],[5],[6],[7],[8],[9]}

A Legal Perspective

Before a retired or veteran servicemember can begin working for a foreign government, they are required to receive approval from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. This is covered under the Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and federal law. The Emoluments Clause states that, to preserve national security and prevent conflicts of interest, this approval is required before the servicemember takes a job with a foreign government. The filing and approval requirements must be followed closely, or the DoD may withhold benefits and retirement pay. Statutory enforcement is limited, and there is still a lack of internal policing on this matter. Individuals are expected to act in a manner that would not risk operational security, but they are not required to report their work after the initial background investigation. As a result, once former servicemembers acquire approval permitting them to work for foreign powers, the U.S. Government has no awareness of what may be shared. This creates an obvious and difficult-to-detect national security risk.^{[10],[11],[12]}

Often, former servicemembers work for U.S. companies that support foreign governments or corporations and educational institutions that are controlled, owned, or operated by a foreign government. This requires the same waiver process by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the servicemember’s military branch. In this manner, hundreds of retired servicemembers have received approval to work for foreign governments.^{[10],[11],[12]}

There are several other laws that apply to foreign military service. The Neutrality Act of 1794 prohibits persons within the jurisdiction of the U.S. from enlisting in foreign militaries. Violations of the Neutrality Act are punishable by fines, imprisonment of not more than three (3) years, or both. While the law applies to those within the U.S., it does not apply to those who enlist while they are in another country. Treason (18 U.S.C. 2381) would apply to a U.S. citizen who supports a foreign entity at war or in conflict with the U.S. American citizens can be expatriated for voluntarily committing acts designated by Congress. Voluntary service in the armed forces of a foreign state is an expatriating act, resulting in the loss of U.S. citizenship if those armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or the individual. serves as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. Notably, these laws have rarely been enforced.^[10]

During the Global War on Terror, including the War in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military became dependent on civilian contractors at levels never before seen. By October 2020, 43,800 contractors were serving in the CENTCOM area of operations, compared to 15,000 DoD personnel. Many contractors were prior servicemembers who had already deployed and who returned under lucrative contracts as instructors, security personnel, and technical support. However, some contractors have decided to work for other nations, not all of whom are allied with American interests.^[13],[14]

Virtually all retirees and most veterans have clearances prior to beginning work for a foreign entity. This creates an opportunity for unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Clearance holders are responsible for safeguarding classified information, including its transmittal, destruction, storage, distribution, handling, and accounting thereof. Once veterans are no longer associated with the department or agency that granted their clearance, there is no oversight or reporting process for the U.S. government to track mishandlings or unauthorized disclosures. Even if a robust system were in place, it would likely be reactive in nature as preventative measures would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Veterans also have broad experience and skillsets that may or may not be explicitly classified, but these tactics, techniques, and procedures can be leveraged by foreign nations and used against American interests.^[15]

Case Study: U.S. Veterans in Middle East

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contracted many American veterans of the Global War on Terror to advise and train its personnel. Between 2015 and 2022, some 280 military retirees sought federal authorization to work there. At the time, requests to work for the UAE exceeded those for any other nation in the world. Many were retired General and Flag Officers. There were also an estimated hundreds more veterans already employed by the UAE and by state-owned companies. Most of these veterans did not serve until retirement and did not have to seek federal permission. They are often given double or triple what similar jobs would have earned in the U.S.^[16]

Improvements in the martial proficiency of the UAE’s military may have helped the country to send troops into civil wars in Yemen and Libya. These conflicts led to questions about human rights violations. The armed forces of the UAE have imprisoned journalists, human rights activists, and other critics in show trials widely condemned by the international community. At the same time, U.S. veterans were being authorized by the Department of State and DoD to work for the UAE, the Emiratis joined OPEC efforts to reduce global oil production, contrary to American interests. UAE has also been scrutinized by the Justice Department for allegedly interfering in U.S. elections and politics. In 2022, a U.S. intelligence report showed that the UAE made extensive efforts to influence U.S. politics via lobbying firms and to exploit lax and unenforced disclosure laws.^{[16],[17],[18]}

Case Study: China Seeks U.S. Military Experience.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to aggressively recruit U.S. veterans. The PRC aims to recruit personnel to “train the trainer” and bolster its doctrinal shortcomings. China’s last major military campaign was approximately 45 years ago, during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, in which its air and naval forces played little to no role. Pending a possible major military conflict in Taiwan, China understands that its key military forces have not had any combat experience or any effective overhaul in doctrine and tactics in decades. Despite its buildup of forces and the looming possibility of an invasion of Taiwan, Beijing continues to struggle with air operations, pilot proficiency, and tactics that would help it to circumvent U.S. forces, should they directly support Taiwan. This makes the experience of veteran U.S. pilots a much-desired skillset that is essential to overcoming experience gaps.^{[19],[20],[21]}

In June 2024, the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing coalition released a joint threat bulletin highlighting the PLA’s recruitment of current and former military personnel from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and other Western countries to help improve China’s military capabilities. Air operations personnel, flight engineers, and former military pilots are the most in-demand targets. According to the coalition of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., the PLA uses private firms or professional networking sites to conceal their relationship, paying exorbitant salaries, and offering recruits the opportunity to fly “exotic aircraft.” China also sends its servicemembers to private defense and aerospace companies worldwide. These entities, such as the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA), Beijing China Aviation Technology Co. (BCAT), Paramount Group, and Stratos, train in a multitude of disciplines in land, air, and sea operations.^[22],[23]

A recent extradition ruling in Australia involving a former U.S. Marine highlights China’s initiative to gain insight into American military tactics and deploy a more robust fleet of aircraft carriers amid increasing aggression toward Taiwan and tensions in the South China Sea. In May 2024, an Australian magistrate ruled that a former U.S. Marine, a naturalized Australian citizen, could be extradited to the U.S. to face charges related to training Chinese military pilots. In October 2022, the former servicemember was arrested by Australian federal police for training Chinese military pilots to land on aircraft carriers between November 2009 and November 2012. According to a 2017 indictment, he conspired with the TFASA to export defense services. Open-source reporting indicates that potential charges in the U.S. include money laundering and breaking arms control law.^{[19],[24],[25],[26]}

Outlook

Historical precedence for U.S. veterans supporting militaries and wartime efforts of other nations date back to the nation’s founding. The Global War on Terror saw a sharp rise in the widespread use of contractors, creating an environment where American veterans commanded high salaries in the U.S. and abroad. The terrorist groups in that conflict were not and are not near-peer competitors. There was less concerns of the illicit sharing of information and experience with other nations. However, this new era of great power competition has near-peer nation-state militaries seeking to challenge the U.S. as the last remaining superpower.

While technology, equipment and doctrine can all be developed, experience can only be earned. The U.S. military has paid the high price to earn the most combat experience in the world. Foreign actors will continue to aggressively seek out this knowledge and experience to close the gap with the U.S. military. The large amounts of money involved creates a potential conflict of interest, with American military experience being sold to the highest bidder. The legally and ethically gray area created by contractors over the last two (2) decades has fostered confusion about support for foreign governments. Greater oversight and enforcement of current laws can ensure that information is not being shared with foreign governments that are or may become competitors to the U.S. As a cleared contracting firm, RMC’s team is trained to meet and exceed the information and operational security requirements to protect the information of our government and commercial clients.  RMC’s Intelligence and Climate Analysis Division will continue to monitor relevant developments and the implications for U.S. national security.

[1] (U) The National World War I Museum. (n.d.) The Volunteers: Americans Join World War I, 1914-1919. Retrieved from https://www.theworldwar.org/exhibitions/volunteers-americans-join-world-war-i-1914-1919.

[2] (U) National Archives and Records Administration. (n.d.) A Prelude to War: The Flying Tigers. Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/a_people_at_war/prelude_to_war/flying_tigers.html.

[3] (U) Nelson, A. (2013, July). Just Good Advice: The American Advisors in the Vietnam War. The University of Southern Mississippi. Retrieved from https://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1187&context=honors_theses.

[4] (U) Southards, C. (2023, November 29). Ukraine, Israel, Yemen…American Veterans Increasingly Serving in Overseas Conflicts. Department of California American Legion. Retrieved from https://calegion.org/ukraine-israel-yemenamerican-veterans-are-increasingly-serving-in-overseas-conflicts/.

[5] (U) Cook, E. (2024, February 22). Americans Can Now Join Ukraine’s National Guard Zelensky Says. Newsweek. Retrieved from https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-americans-fighters-military-russia-zelensky-1872314.

[6] (U) Israeli Defense Forces. (n.d.) How to Join Us and Voluntary Programs. Retrieved from https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/how-to-join-us-and-voluntary-programs/how-to-join/.

[7] (U) Fautre, W. (2024, March 29). HRWF. Retrieved from https://hrwf.eu/world-the-role-of-ngos-to-protect-civilians-in-armed-conflicts/.

[8] (U) Stowe, C. (2022, July 11). U.S. – Vietnam Relations, the Legacy of War, and the Role of NGOs. GlobalWA. Retrieved from https://globalwa.org/2022/07/u-s-vietnam-relations-the-legacy-of-war-and-the-role-of-ngos/.

[9] (U) Team Rubicon. (2020, January 13). Veteran-Led Disaster Response and Humanitarian Group Team Rubicon Commemorates “A Decade of Service and Grit”. PR Newswire. Retrieved from https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/veteran-led-disaster-response-and-humanitarian-group-team-rubicon-commemorates-a-decade-of-service-and-grit-300985302.html.

[10] (U) Congressional Research Service. (2022, March 28). U.S. Nationals and Foreign Military Service. CRS. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12068.

[11] (U) Mitchell, E. (2023, June 20). Senators Introduce Bill Restricting Retired Troops’ Work for Foreign Governments. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4059497-senators-introduce-bill-restricting-retired-troops-work-for-foreign-governments/.

[12] (U) Kness, R. (2017, June 30). Working for a Contractor or Foreign Government after Military Service. ClearanceJobs.com. Retrieved from https://news.clearancejobs.com/2017/06/30/working-contractor-foreign-government-military-service/.

[13] Cancian, M. (2021, August 30). In Afghanistan, Contractors were Unsung Heroes of US Efforts. Breaking Defense. Retrieved from https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/in-afghanistan-contractors-were-unsung-heroes-of-us-efforts/.

[14] (U) Mazzarino, A. (2023, May 16). The Unseen Soldiers of America’s Privatized Wars. The Nation Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/world/private-contract-soldiers/.

[15] (U) Congressional Research Service. (2023, February 2). The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21900.

[16] (U) Whitlock, C and Jones, N. (2022, October 18). UAE Relied on Expertise of Retired U.S. Troops to Beef up its Military. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/uae-military-us-veterans/.

[17] (U) HRW. (2021, January 13). UAE: Reality of Abuses Contradicts Tolerance Rhetoric. HRW. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/uae-reality-abuses-contradicts-tolerance-rhetoric.

[18] (U) Middle East Eye. (2022, November 13). US intelligence report claims UAE ‘meddled in American politics’. MEE. Retrieved from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-meddled-american-politics-us-intelligence-report-claims.

[19] Perez, Z. (2024, June 07). US, Allied Intel Agencies Warn Pilots to Avoid Chinese Recruitment. Military Times. Retrieved from https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/06/07/us-allied-intel-agencies-warn-pilots-to-avoid-chinese-recruitment/.

[20] Gin, C. M. (2016). How China Wins: A Case Study of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. US Army Command and General Staff College Press. Retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/how-china-wins.pdf.

[21] Lillis, K. B. (2024, June 05). US and Allies Warn China is Intensifying its Efforts to Recruit Western Military Pilots. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/05/politics/us-and-allies-warn-china-recruit-pilots/index.html.

[22] Novelly, T. (2024, June 06). China is ‘Aggressively Recruiting’ Pilots from the US and NATO Countries, Intelligence Agencies Warn. Military.com. Retrieved from https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/06/06/china-aggressively-recruiting-pilots-us-and-nato-countries-intelligence-agencies-warn.html.

[23] The National Counterintelligence and Security Center. (2024, June 5). Safeguarding Our Military Expertise: Foreign Companies Continue to Recruit Current and Former Western Service Members to Bolster the PRC’s Military. DNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/products/Safeguarding_Our_Military_Expertise.pdf.

[24] Bennett, B. (2024, June 5). U.S. Cracks Down on Former ‘Top Gun’ Pilots Found to Be Training China’s Air Force. Time. Retrieved from https://time.com/6985561/top-gun-pilots-china/.

[25] Whiteman, H. (2024, May 24). Ex-US Marines fighter pilot loses bid to block extradition to the United States over China training allegations. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/24/australia/daniel-duggan-us-extradition-hearing-intl-hnk/index.html.

[26] Needham, K. (2024, May 24). Former US Marine pilot can be extradited, Australian magistrate rules. Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2024-05-24/former-marine-pilot-extradition-13960410.html.

Introduction

Climate is directly linked to the history of human development. Humanity thrives in areas rich in resources and climates conducive to the cultivation of necessities. Changes in climate can cause scarcity of resources. The stress on populations, economies, and governments increases the potential for conflict. Often, these conditions involve emerging or depressed societies that are unable to cope with the negative effects of climate change, leaving room for extremist groups to develop. Climate change can cause regional instability that helps extremist group exploit the misery that follows.

Regional Instability Caused by Climate

The climate-security nexus posits that climate change and kinetic conflict can create a continuous cycle where each impacts the other. Climate change typically intensifies conflicts that are already present, which can limit a population’s ability to relocate from the effects of a changing environment. Because they are unwilling or unable to leave, threat actors can use the scarcity of resources to exert control over vulnerable populations. This combination of environmental stressors and extremism has a significant negative impact on community resilience.[i]

Economists generally recognize three (3) causes of resource scarcity. The first occurs when supply chains are not able to meet an increased demand. Population growth increases demands for food, water, shelter, and medical supplies. The second occurs when the demand remains the same, but there is a decreased availability of resources. The third occurs when human factors cause resource scarcity, such as supply chain disruptions, government ineptitude, or conflict. Climate can be a direct cause of resources scarcity. Most climate adverse areas rely on agriculture, livestock farming, fishing, and trade for their livelihood. Climate change impacts cropping patterns, grazing routes, and planting times for farmers in these communities. Climate variability, coupled with a community’s inability to adapt and an increasing population size, lead to an ecosystem that cannot sustain the people living there. Climate also plays a factor in the strength and increased occurrence of natural disasters, which can disrupt supply chains. The concurrent resource scarcity causes a rise in the prices of essential goods while local economies are already struggling. This leads to a reduction in income and revenue, further impeding a local population’s ability to obtain essential goods and services.[ii]^,[iii]

Disease is often associated with climate adverse regions. Food scarcity, lack of quality healthcare, and changes in climate create environmental conditions conducive to pathogen vectors that all increase the likelihood of outbreaks in vulnerable populations. The spread of disease can increase the demand for already scarce resources, especially those associated with medical care.[iv]

Climate adverse areas often face high levels of poverty, low socioeconomic development, and governmental neglect. A government’s inability to provide relief leads to tension with the population, which can easily turn into civil unrest. Protests and riots, however justifiable, may elicit a violent response from law enforcement and the military. Extremist groups often emerge from these conflicts and exploit these conditions.[v]

Terrorist Group Exploitation of Climate Crises

Terrorist and other non-state threat actors may exploit the climate crisis by exacerbating resource scarcity and exploiting weak governance structures to gain power and influence. This furthers their goals and makes counterterrorist operations more difficult as local populations become more sympathetic to their ideology.

Eight (8) of the 15 countries most exposed to climate risks have United Nations peacekeeping missions or ongoing special missions. As stated earlier, climate-related issues cause a scarcity of resources, and fragile economies become further depressed. Those who are unemployed or struggling to survive become attracted to extremist organizations, who provide food, shelter, and jobs for their members. Local populations can become radicalized by propaganda, which becomes more attractive under ineffectual local governance. This recruitment and radicalization process often targets the young, who are more likely to be attracted to the zealotry of terrorist organizations.[vi]

Often, five (5) critical tactics are used to undermine trust in local governments: kinetic attacks, propaganda, exploitation of grievances, disruption, and recruitment. Terrorist groups target civil institutions, public officials, or community spaces with violence, instilling fear, and demonstrating the government’s inability to protect its citizens. They disseminate propaganda both online and through traditional media to spread disinformation and highlight government failures. They exploit existing grievances, such as economic inequality or perceived injustices, to portray the government as indifferent or oppressive. Furthermore, they target essential services and/or infrastructure to cause chaos. Lastly, they recruit disillusioned individuals by offering an alternative to the perceived corruption or incompetence of the government.[vii]

Extremist organizations often attempt to gain control of scarce resources, not only for their own use, but also to curry favor with or exert control over vulnerable populations. These actions may increase local support or just delegitimize the government, who may not be able to adequately respond. Some notable examples include:

• After the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and again after floods that killed approximately 1,600, Pakistani militant Islamist groups provided relief aid including food and water to locals. These actions came amid criticism of the Pakistani government’s slow and inadequate response.[viii]
• In 2015, ISIS seized the Ramadi Dam in Iraq, allowing them to control water flow down the Euphrates River. ISIS reduced the flow as much as 50% at times to demonstrate their capability and use it as leverage in the region. Had ISIS decided to destroy the dam, the resulting floods could have caused significant damage and loss of life.[ix]
• In 2017, after Typhoon Kai-tak killed at least 32 people in the Philippines, Maoist rebels attacked a Philippine Army convoy carrying relief aid to rural parts of the country. The attack highlighted the difficulty of the government to secure rural areas and provide aid.[x]

Case Study: Boko Haram Exploitation of Lake Chad

Over the last few decades, declining water levels, warmer temperatures, drought, decreasing rainfall, and diminishing pastureland have cultivated conditions that exacerbate conflict and violence in the Lake Chad Basin’s area. Lake Chad’s area decreased from more than 26,000 km² to 1,350 km² from the 1960s to 2014, depleting much of its wildlife. Furthermore, the Sahel region’s temperatures are rising 1.5 times faster than the global average, while the area is experiencing decreasing average annual rainfall and water levels in the two (2) major rivers that flow into Lake Chad. While the lake’s resources have diminished and the region suffers reduced livestock production and crop yields, the area is experiencing a significant population surge. Lake Chad currently supports over 30 million people in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, but population growth predictions estimate that 80 million livelihoods could depend on the lake by 2030. The rapid demand for water for drinking, sanitation, cooking, and other activities, combined with climate change’s impact on the lake, has exacerbated environmental degradation, poverty, food insecurity, and unemployment. As of March 2024, there are four (4) million food-insecure individuals and 499,000 severely malnourished children in the region.5^,[xi]^{,[xii],[xiii]}

Research surrounding the humanitarian crisis suggests that Boko Haram capitalizes on the environmental instability and competition for scarce resources in the Lake Chad region. Boko Haram, which uses the name “Jama‘atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da‘awati wal-Jihad” (JASDJ; Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad) and the “Nigerian Taliban,” was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department in November 2013. While the group operated in various forms since the late 1990s, Boko Haram slowly started to gain operational capabilities when the former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau, claimed leadership of the group in July 2010. In 2014, the group gained increased international attention after kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in Borno State, Nigeria, and engaging in frequent attacks against Christians, security and police forces, the media, schools, and politicians. In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).[xiv]^,[xv]

Boko Haram takes advantage of social unrest and conflict by recruiting disenfranchised people who encounter obstacles with climate-induced adversity and competition for resources. Water scarcity from population surge and lake degradation, combined with population migration, has led to violence and tensions between communities, migrants, farmers, and ethnic groups throughout the Lake Chad Basin. Boko Haram exploits these tensions by offering financial incentives, offering a sense of belonging, taking advantage of weakened local governance and security apparatuses, and perpetuating violence in vulnerable areas. For example, Boko Haram recruits young people suffering from poverty and unemployment to engage in drug and human trafficking operations and smuggle small arms and light weapons. These illicit activities further sustain the group’s operations and perpetuate violence in inter-ethnic and farmer-herder conflicts.11^,12^,14

A study published by Marine Corps University Press titled “Changing Hydrography, Violent Extremism, and Climate-Conflict Intersection” highlights the relationship between conflict and environmental changes in the Lake Chad Basin area. Data collected by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a nonprofit that gathers reported information on internal conflict, and NASA satellite imagery around Lake Chad highlight armed conflict events in places previously submerged by the open water of Lake Chad. According to the study, almost two (2) dozen ACLED incidents from 2009 and 2019 would have been located on open water had they taken place in 1973. The study also illustrates increasing conflict activity within 100 miles of Lake Chad’s open water between 2009 and 2019.[xvi]

Outlook

Extremist organizations will continue to take advantage of the geopolitical conditions created by resource scarcity caused by changing climates. Research shows increases in radicalization and recruitment across climate adverse regions worldwide. To gain power and influence, extremist organizations will fill power vacuums left by governments unable to provide basic necessities and control scarce resources. Perhaps, in time, it will be possible to predict shifting climates, understand the effects, and provide support to vulnerable populations before resource scarcity enables extremist organizations to thrive. RMC’s Intelligence and Climate Analysis Division will continue to monitor relevant climate and geopolitical developments in order to analyze potential impacts to client assets, personnel, and operations.

Sources

[i] Beauregard, J. (2020, September 19). Understanding the Climate Change-National Security Nexus: The Three Faces of Climate Security. Modern War Institute at West Point. Retrieved from https://mwi.westpoint.edu/understanding-the-climate-change-national-security-nexus-the-three-faces-of-climate-security/.

[ii] Master Class Staff. (2023, January 18). Resource Scarcity: Three Causes of Resource Scarcity. Master Class Articles. Retrieved from https://www.masterclass.com/articles/resource-scarcity.

[iii] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2024, January 30). Resource Scarcity and the Shifting Dynamics of Global Security. NATO. Retrieved from https://www.act.nato.int/article/resource-scarcity-and-shifting-dynamics-of-global-security/.

[iv] U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. (2021, March). Climate Change and the Developing World: A Disproportionate Impact. U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. Retrieved from https://www.usglc.org/blog/climate-change-and-the-developing-world-a-disproportionate-impact/.

[v] Center for Preventative Action. (2024, February 14). Violent Extremism in the Sahel. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel.

[vi] United Nations Security Council. (2021, December 9). People, Countries Impacted by Climate Change also vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, violence, Speakers Tell Security Council in Open Debate. United Nations. Retrieved from https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14728.doc.htm.

[vii] Ndebele, L. (2022, May 03). ‘A New, Despicable Turn in Violence’ as Insurgents Attack Water Sources in Burkina Faso. News 24. Retrieved from https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/ a-new-despicable-turn-in-violence-as-insurgents-attack-water-sources-in-burkina-faso-20220503.

[viii] Zaidi, S. A. (2010, September 29) Pakistan After the Floods. Carnegie Endowment. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2010/09/pakistan-after-the-floods?lang=en.

[ix] Lossow, T. (2016, January). Water as a Weapon: IS on the Euphrates and Tigris. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2016C03_lsw.pdf.

[x] Reuters staff. (2017, December 18). Philippines says Maoist rebels attacked soldiers on typhoon relief duty. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1EC0JB/.

[xi] Frimpong, O. B. (2020, July). Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Lake Chad Basin: Key Issues and Way Forward. Wilson Center. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/ climate-change-and-violent-extremism-lake-chad-basin-key-issues-and-way-forward.

[xii] Center for Preventative Action. (2024, February 14). Violent Extremism in the Sahel. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel.

[xiii] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2024, March 13). Lake Chad Basin Humanitarian Snapshot. OCHA. Retrieved from https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/ nigeria/lake-chad-basin-humanitarian-snapshot-13-march-2024.

[xiv] Fah, H. (2023, May 15). A Catastrophic Correlation: How Climate Change Influenced Terrorism Around Lake Chad. ASIS International. Retrieved from https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/articles/2023/05/climate-change-and-security/lake-chad-terrorism.

[xv] National Counterterrorism Center. (n.d.). Boko Haram. DNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/ nctc/groups/boko_haram.html.

[xvi] Griffin, T. E. (2020, July 27). Lake Chad: Changing Hydrography, Violent Extremism, and Climate-Conflict Intersection. Marine Corps University. Retrieved from https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/ Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/Lake-Chad/.

Introduction
Military organizations around the world routinely participate large-scale exercises in order to achieve a variety of objectives, making exercises highly appealing targets for espionage collection by adversaries. Moreover, some countries may conduct low-level collection activities against fellow participants. This paper will provide a brief overview of military exercises and the potential for associated intelligence collection activities. Additionally, this paper will examine case studies involving three (3) major exercises through the lens of espionage threats.

Military Exercises and the Espionage Threat
Per the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), exercises are defined as “a military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and execution that is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation.” Some objectives of exercises may include testing new systems/capabilities, training personnel, strengthening alliances, testing interoperability with allies, and geopolitical signaling to adversaries.1

Adversaries may seek to collect against exercises to better understand their likely opponents in the event of conflict. Exercises may reveal valuable insights such as the operational structures, strategy/tactics, and equipment utilization of opposing militaries. Adversaries may deploy technologically-advanced assets such as spy ships, aircraft, and satellites in order to successfully collect this intelligence. In turn, participation in exercises could create opportunities for participants to collect against one another. Such collection activities may include more overt forms of collection such as elicitation or unauthorized photography/videography. However, it is likely that any such activity occurs in a low-level fashion, in order to gain insights without jeopardizing crucial alliances.

Large-scale exercises frequently involve joint forces (incorporating ground, air, and naval units), as well as integration of multinational partners. Exercises can also serve as a useful platform to test new or emerging technologies in a simulated operational environment. The presence of these platforms (which could include stealth technology, unmanned systems, or advanced radars) likely draw the attention of adversaries and friendly collectors alike.

Case Study: RIMPAC
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is the world’s largest international maritime exercise, bolstering relationships among dozens of participating countries to safeguard sea lanes and secure the world’s oceans. Shortly after its founding in 1971, RIMPAC became a biennial exercise in 1974 due to its expanding scale. Hosted by the U.S. Pacific Fleet, RIMPAC’s 28th exercise (2022) in and around the Hawaiian Islands and Southern California included 26 nations, 38 surface ships, three (3) submarines, nine (9) national land forces, more than 30 unmanned systems, about 170 aircraft, and over 25,000 personnel. In late March 2024, personnel from 29 nations expected to participate in RIMPAC 2024 attended the final planning conference at Naval Base Point Loma Annex, San Diego. The 29th RIMPAC is expected to be executed in summer 2024.2,3,4

Reports over the past decade highlight potential intelligence surveillance activities by U.S. adversaries in the vicinity of RIMPAC activities. In 2014, China’s first time participating in RIMPAC, China sent an uninvited surveillance ship in addition to its four (4) People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships. According to a spokesman for U.S. Pacific Fleet, China’s Dongdiao-class auxiliary general intelligence (AGI) ship (designed to collect electronic and communication data from nearby vessels and aircraft) operated within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) during the exercise. Some experts were confused with China’s decision to send an uninvited spy ship with other PLAN vessels participating in most levels of the operation; however, the former commander of U.S. Pacific Command viewed the move as a positive sign that the Chinese vessel operated within another country’s maritime zones according to international law. Two (2) years later, Russia also sent an AGI ship into international waters off Hawaii during RIMPAC 2016 after not receiving an invite due to its annexation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine. In addition to the spy ship, the Russia destroyer Admiral Vinogradov (DD-572) shadowed the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) for two (2) days during the 2016 exercise.5,6,7,8

In 2018, the U.S. disinvited the PLAN from participating in RIMPAC 2018 in response to China’s militarization of the South China Sea. Nevertheless, U.S. Navy officials indicated that a PLAN AGI ship was spotted off the coast of Hawaii during RIMPAC 2018, causing no disruptions to the exercise. Given China’s continued military activities and the potential risks offering the PLAN to view American naval platforms, tactics, and capabilities up close, China has not been invited back as a RIMPAC participant since 2016.9,10,11

Case Study: Talisman Saber/Sabre
Talisman Saber (or Sabre) is a biennial military exercise held by the U.S. and Australia, along with a number of partner nations. The name of the exercise varies from year to year depending on which country leads the exercise (Saber for a U.S.-led exercise and Sabre for an Australian-led one). The 2023 iteration of the exercise included approximately 30,000 personnel from 13 countries, including regional first-time participants such as Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. The exercise seeks to enhance cooperation among nations in the Indo-Pacific, particularly given increased threats from China.12,13

In the lead-up to the 2023 iteration of Talisman Sabre, a PLAN AGI ship was spotted approaching Australia and specific areas where the exercise was expected to be held. An Australian military officer stated that this type of activity has occurred since 2017. The vessel ultimately proceeded to just outside Australia’s territorial waters in order to monitor the exercise. An Australian maritime patrol plane made contact with the vessel, and the encounter occurred without incident. The same Australian military officer stated that “[China will] passively collect, and we’ll adjust” adding that ”there’s some things we don’t necessarily want to give away and we have methods of being able to employ our forces without giving those more sensitive aspects of our training away”.13,14

In addition to the AGI vessel, China reportedly utilized “hundreds” of its satellites to monitor the 2023 exercise. While open-source details regarding this activity are limited, satellites provide a platform to conduct collection of imagery and signals intelligence. Satellite imagery could reveal details about weapons systems, military formations, and logistics processes. Signal collection could potentially reveal information related to command and control, as well as information on communications, radar, and other systems that operate on the electromagnetic spectrum.15

Case Study: BALTOPS
Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) is an annual military exercise that is conducted in the Baltic Sea region. The exercise typically occurs once a year and has been held since 1972, which makes it one of the longest running multinational maritime exercises in the world. The timing and specific details of each BALTOPS exercise can vary slightly each year depending on logistical and operational considerations. However, participants generally expect the exercise to take place on a regular basis, providing an opportunity for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partner nations to enhance interoperability, strengthen defense capabilities, and demonstrate collective deterrence in the Baltic Sea.16

BALTOPS 23, which took place from 04 June-16 June 2023, comprised of 20 countries which was four (4) more than the previous year. The exercise was comprised of more than 6,000 personnel, including nearly 1,500 sailors, marines, and airmen which was more than twice as many as in 2020. 50 ships, and more than 45 aircraft from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and other NATO allies were able to train and conduct high-intensity defense activities to help enhance capabilities within the alliance. BALTOPS 23 was a significant exercise as it served as Finland’s first joint exercise since becoming a NATO member in April 2023.17,18

During BALTOPS 16 in 2016, two (2) Russian intelligence gathering ships were spotted shadowing U.S. Navy and NATO vessels. While the Russian vessels showed no signs of force or aggression, they came as close as 1 mile from NATO forces. With Russia invading Ukraine in 2022, BALTOPS has served as a major push in tightening the alliance within NATO. Russia almost certainly perceives increased NATO cooperation as a geopolitical threat, which in turn increases the appeal of the exercise as a target for intelligence collection activities.16,19

Outlook
Large-scale military exercises will almost certainly continue to serve as highly appealing targets for intelligence collection. Adversaries will seek to collect on exercises in order to gain valuable insights into military capabilities that they may be likely to face in a conflict situation, while low-level collection may continue to occur among participants. RMC’s Intelligence & Climate Analysis Division continues to monitor relevant developments related to large-scale military exercises, to include potential espionage activities.

Sources

1. U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Retrieved from https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/AD1029823-DOD-Dictionary-of-Military-and-Associated-Terms-2017.pdf.

2. U.S. 3rd Fleet Public Affairs. (2023, December 5). U.S. 3rd Fleet Hosts RIMPAC Mid-Planning Conference. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Retrieved from https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3620775/us-3rd-fleet-hosts-rimpac-mid-planning-conference/.

3. U.S. 3rd Fleet Public Affairs. (2022, August 5). RIMPAC 2022 Concludes. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Retrieved from https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3118534/rimpac-2022-concludes/.

4. Llanos, M. (2024, March 28). U.S. 3rd Fleet Hosts RIMPAC Final Planning Conference. Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. Retrieved from https://www.dvidshub.net/news/467305/us-3rd-fleet-hosts-rimpac-final-planning-conference.

5. LaGrone, S. (2014, July 18). China Sends Uninvited Spy Ship to RIMPAC. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2014/07/18/china-sends-uninvited-spy-ship-rimpac.

6. Harper, J. (2014, July 29). PACOM chief: China spying on RIMPAC brings ‘good news.’ Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/pacom-chief-china-spying-on-rimpac-brings-good-news-1.295829.

7. LaGrone, S. (2016, July 06). Russian Spy Ship Now Off Hawaii, U.S. Navy Protecting ‘Critical Information.’ USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2016/07/06/russian-spy-ship-now-off-hawaii-u-s-navy-protecting-critical-information.

8. Eckstein, M. (2016, July 17). RIMPAC 2016: Russian Destroyer Shadowed USS America Near Hawaii. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2016/07/17/russ_des_hawaii_uss_america.

9. Eckstein, M. (2018, May 23). China Disinvited from Participating in 2018 RIMPAC Exercise. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2018/05/23/china-disinvited-participating-2018-rimpac-exercise.

10. LaGrone, S. (2018, July 13). Navy: Chinese Spy Ship Monitoring RIMPAC Exercise, Again. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2018/07/13/navy-chinese-spy-ship-monitoring-rimpac-exercise.

11. Werner, B. (2018, May 24). China’s Past Participation in RIMPAC Didn’t Yield Intended Benefits of Easing Tensions. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2018/05/24/33834.

12. U.S. Department of Defense. (n.d.). Talisman Sabre 23 reflects U.S., allies’ commitment to Indo-Pacific. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3476514/talisman-sabre-23-reflects-us-allies-commitment-to-indo-pacific/

13. McGuirk, R. (2023, July 21). US navy secretary says Australian multination military exercise demonstrates unity to China. AP News. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/talisman-sabre-australia-military-exercise-639e698f091b58abfe886f80f5a6dc44.

14. Greene, A. (2023, July 23). First image emerges of RAAF’s encounter with Chinese spy ship during Talisman Sabre. ABC News. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-07-24/first-image-of-australian-encounter-with-chinese-spy-ship/102637528.

15. Hundreds of Chinese satellites spying on US-Australia military exercises. (2023, August 21). WION. Retrieved from https://www.wionews.com/world/hundreds-of-chinese-satellites-keep-watch-over-us-australia-military-exercises-626928.

16. U.S. Navy. (2023, May 30). U.S. Sixth Fleet, Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO to Kick Off BALTOPS 2023. U.S. Navy. Retrieved from https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3410239/us-sixth-fleet-naval-striking-and-support-forces-nato-to-kick-off-baltops-2023/.

17. Moore-Carrillo, J. (2023, June 16). US, NATO wrap up joint exercises in the Baltics, Europe’s High North. Military Times. Retrieved from https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2023/06/16/us-nato-wrap-up-joint-exercises-in-the-baltics-europes-high-north/.

18. NATO. (2023, June 07). NATO ships participate in exercise BALTOPS 23. NATO. Retrieved from https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2023/-nato-ships-participate-in-exercise-baltops-23#:~:text=Participating%20nations%20include%20Belgium%2C%20Canada%2C%20Denmark%2C%20Estonia%2C%20Finland%2C,T%C3%BCrkiye%2C%20the%20United%20Kingdom%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States..

19. Tomlinson, L. (2016, June 16). Russian Spy Ships ‘Shadowing’ US Navy During Large NATO Exercise, Navy Admiral Says. Fox News. Retrieved from https://www.foxnews.com/world/russian-spy-ships-shadowing-us-navy-during-large-nato-exercise-navy-admiral-says.