Introduction

The U.S. Navy faces critical backlogs in the production, repair, and maintenance of warships because of issues facing the nation’s shipbuilding industry, which impact readiness and increase risk. At the same time, China is expanding its shipbuilding capacity by increasing the number of shipyards and making them dual use for commercial and military production. The result is a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) that is numerically superior to the U.S. Navy and is catching up in terms of technology and capability. Should tensions across INDOPACOM become a kinetic conflict, China’s shipyard model will provide significant advantages in the repair of damaged warships.

Comparison of U.S. and Chinese Naval Shipyard Infrastructure and Capacity.

Issues that hinder the U.S. Navy’s production, repair, and maintenance of warships are varied. They stem from a limited number of shipyards and contractors, each specializing in specific vessel classes. Some issues include limited competition and redundancy, inconsistent defense budgets and shifting U.S. Navy requirements, supply chain issues (including rising material costs due to inflation), lack of skilled labor force to meet production requirements and increasing costs of labor, reliance on raw materials and components from overseas, and lack of coordination among stakeholders.^[1],[2],[3]

The result of limited contractors and shipyards affect nearly every class of U.S. Navy warship. The Block-IV Virginia Class attack submarine and Constellation Class guided missile frigate programs are approximately three (3) years behind schedule. The USS Enterprise, the Navy’s next Ford Class Aircraft Carrier, is between 18 to 26 months behind schedule. The first Columbia Class ballistic missile submarine is between 12 to 16 months behind the planned delivery date. Reports indicate that 40% of the 49 available U.S. Navy submarines were waiting shipyard level maintenance in 2023 due to lack of capacity. Such examples will only increase as the fleet continues to age.^[1],[2],[3]

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti stated that the U.S. Navy needs to be ready for the possibility of war with China by 2027, just two (2) years from now. There is no quick solution to the production, repair, and maintenance issues faced by the U.S. Navy. For the U.S. Navy to remain a credible strategic deterrent and remain prepared for peer-to-peer conflict, significant investments in shipyard capacity will be necessary. These investments include streamlining design and procurement processes, attracting and training a skilled workforce, ending reliance on overseas supply chains, and building new shipyards.^[1],[2],[3]

Reports indicate that China has the largest Navy in the world and now has 370 ships and submarines operational in its Navy, which is up from the 340 ships estimated in 2022. While the U.S. Navy has plans to keep the fleet consistently greater than 300 ships, they have averaged 10 ships lower than procurement plans since 2017. Since 2003, the Navy has also sustained less than 300 warships. During this same time period, China has increased fleet capacity by 150 ships. China’s rapid naval growth is largely the result of extensive civil-military cooperation. Over the last few decades, China invested in shipbuilding infrastructure, becoming the number one shipbuilding nation in the world. Unlike U.S. shipyards, Chinese shipyards are dual use, producing both civilian and military vessels. China’s political and economic systems avoid the political budgetary infighting often associated with U.S. defense budgets. This allows China to plan the development and construction of new warships with little to no disruptions in the process. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) set conditions for China to better secure its supply chains including rare earth minerals necessary for advanced technological systems onboard modern warships. The result is a numerically superior Chinese Navy that is rapidly catching up to the U.S. Navy in advanced technology.^[4],[5]

In July 2024, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) amendment requested funding for the purpose of private and public shipyard investments. This funding is essential to maintaining the fleet and continuing with research and development efforts. The authorization bill, which includes the amendment, created a course of action for Congress and was signed into law in December 2024. Lawmakers have also worked to pass language to be used in legislation to surge production of amphibious ships. These actions work to continue production, along with keeping workers and factories active. As China expands its naval capacity, the U.S. must continue to pass legislation in order to be prepared in the upcoming years.^[4],[5]

Lack of Skilled Labor Available to Support U.S. Naval Shipyards’ Needs

In order to increase American ship production, the Navy has looked toward reactivating idled facilities. However, a skilled labor force is needed. In order for a shipyard to succeed, human capital is essential, and adequate preparations must be considered. Modern shipyards do not offer a guarantee of work after current needs are met and force workers to find other employment once their work is over. This cycle fails to facilitate expansion efforts and impacts the overall U.S. shipbuilding industry.^[3]

Considering the rapid growth of Chinese naval power and tensions over Taiwan, recent findings of substandard construction practices at the U.S. Navy’s largest shipyard are concerning. U.S. shipbuilding, which is segregated into civilian and military shipyards, does not have the capacity to compete with the number of Chinese shipyards that all serve a dual civilian-military use. Many U.S. Navy shipbuilding and maintenance programs are behind schedule because of supply chain issues and a lack of skilled labor since the COVID-19 pandemic. Quality control issues can lead to long-term maintenance issues and maritime mishaps, which only exacerbate the backlog in the U.S. Navy’s shipyards and diminish its readiness and credible deterrence to hostile nations.^[6],[7],[8]

For example, the U.S. Navy and Department of Justice (DOJ) are investigating faulty welds onboard Virginia and Columbia class submarines, as well as Ford class aircraft carriers reported by the Newport News Shipyard. The House Armed Services Committee is conducting a separate investigation. While most of the substandard welds were identified on vessels under construction in the shipyard, a small number of in-service Virginia class submarines are also affected.^[6],[7],[8]

Newport News Shipyard is owned by Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), the largest U.S. Navy shipbuilding contractor. Quality assurance teams at the shipyard identified issues with welds that developed into a larger investigation, which found the same issues across multiple vessels. The initial investigation conducted by HII revealed that welders knowingly violated procedural standards, which prompted the company to notify the U.S. Navy and the DOJ. The investigation did not find evidence of malice.^[6],[7],[8]

This is not the first issue with welding quality assurance at Newport News Shipyard. The Navy concluded that welders used the wrong filler material in non-nuclear pipping on Virginia class submarines in 2007. A shipyard inspector admitted to falsifying inspection reports in 2009, resulting in nine (9) submarines and four (4) aircraft carriers requiring reinspection by the Navy, which took years to complete.^[6],[7],[8]

The lack of skilled labor at shipyards is attributed to various factors including a lack of access to training, undesirable working conditions, negative associations with the shipyard industry, reliance on private shipyards, COVID-19 impacts, and competition with other skilled trades. These factors all have an impact on each other and the lack of skilled shipyard labor as a whole. Moving forward, mitigations must be implemented including indirect actions, direct actions, and future research.^[9]

Direct actions to address this issue include recruitment and training initiatives. Indirect actions include premium pay and industrial work mitigations. Future research should focus on the topics of business case analysis on the shipyard workforce, sustaining the shipyard industry, and business case analysis on private versus public shipyards. With the closure of public shipyards, the need for private employment increased. This privatized employment, while in a higher demand, is a less stable career option. With the closures, the number of federal employees decreased. More research is needed to explore the reliance on a contract workforce by the U.S. Navy and impacts of public shipyard closures. If these issues are addressed effectively, on-time naval asset delivery delays will be reduced, and national security measures will be supported.^[9]

Supply Chain Issues Negatively Effecting U.S. Naval Shipyard Capacity

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, global supply chains have experienced severe disruptions due to lockdowns, border closures, and transportation restrictions. These interruptions have delayed the delivery of essential materials and components required for shipbuilding leading to significant setbacks in naval shipyard operations. The pandemic also caused a surge in demand for goods like electronics and household items, diverting resources away from other industries and increasing the strain of supply shortages. These challenges have collectively strained the shipbuilding industry, making it difficult to maintain production schedules and meet project deadlines.^[10],[11]

The U.S. reliance on foreign sources for intermediate inputs and critical minerals has further exposed vulnerabilities within its supply chains. Countries such as China, Canada, and Mexico are major suppliers of these essential materials. Disruptions in these regions whether due to geopolitical tensions or trade disputes can significantly impact U.S. production capabilities. The dependence on foreign sources for critical minerals such as rare earth elements and industrial diamonds has been a particular concern as these materials are crucial for advanced manufacturing processes. The ongoing geopolitical landscape has heightened these risks, making it imperative for the U.S. to seek alternative and more resilient supply chains.^{[12],[13],[14]}

Rising costs due to inflation have compounded the challenges faced by U.S. naval shipyards. High inflation rates driven by increased demand, supply chain disruptions, and rising energy costs have resulted in higher prices for raw materials and components needed for shipbuilding. Transportation costs have also surged due to higher fuel prices and logistical challenges, which further increase the overall cost of production for shipyards. Additionally, rising energy costs have impacted manufacturing and transportation expenses. These issues have led to delays in shipbuilding projects and increased operational costs. To address these challenges the Navy is working on stabilizing demand, investing in workforce development, and implementing multiyear procurement contracts to ensure more predictable workloads for shipbuilders. These measures aim to enhance the resilience of naval shipyards and ensure the timely completion of critical projects.^{[13],[14],[15]}

Inconsistent U.S. Defense Budgets and Shifting U.S. Navy Requirements

The U.S. defense budgetary process, particularly the practice of continuing resolutions (CRs), creates significant challenges for defense contracts and project completion. CRs are stopgap measures that fund government operations at the previous fiscal year’s levels when a new budget hasn’t been approved leading to funding constraints and delays in initiating or continuing projects. This is particularly problematic for the Navy which needs to rapidly integrate new technologies to stay ahead of advancing Chinese naval capabilities. The uncertainty and instability caused by CRs make it difficult for defense contractors to plan and execute projects efficiently resulting in increased costs and project delays. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense often postpones contracts and nonessential training early in the fiscal year during CRs, which leads to lost time and increased costs. These inefficiencies result in the hinderance of the Navy’s ability to modernize its fleet with the latest technologies.^[16],[17]

Inflation increases these issues by driving up the cost of skilled labor. As the cost of living rises, workers demand higher wages to maintain their standard of living, which puts pressure on employers to offer competitive wages and benefits. This is particularly challenging for the defense industry which faces labor shortages and high demand for skilled workers with specialized expertise. Additionally, inflation affects the costs of health benefits, training, development, equipment, and supplies, further increasing the overall expenses of defense projects. These rising costs add to the difficulty of completing contracts on time and within budget. The combination of budgetary instability and rising labor costs creates a challenging environment for the Navy to keep pace with technological advancements and maintain its competitive edge against rapidly advancing Chinese naval capabilities.^[18],[19]

Results of U.S. Naval Shipyard Difficulties

Should the U.S. become involved in its first major naval conflict since World War II, production and repair capacity likely will not meet requirements. For perspective, the U.S. Navy increased the number of ships eight-fold to 6,768 ships between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the end of WWII, all while repairing battle damaged vessels. The U.S. shipbuilding system is not prepared for such an increase, should a kinetic conflict occur.^[1],[2],[3]

The challenges faced by U.S. naval shipyards have resulted in significant delays and cost overruns in shipbuilding programs. The construction of new guided-missile frigates at Marinette Marine, for example, has been delayed with the first frigate now scheduled for delivery in 2029, three (3) years later than planned. Similarly, the Columbia-class submarine program and the Virginia-class attack submarine program are experiencing delays and cost overruns. These setbacks, combined with an increase in vessels awaiting repairs and routine maintenance, have strained the Navy’s overall readiness as ships are not available for deployment when needed. Notable examples include the USS Boxer (LHD-4) and the USS James E. Williams (DDG-95) both of which are currently undergoing maintenance at General Dynamics NASSCO-Norfolk.^{[19],[20],[21],[22]}

These delays and backlogs hinder the Navy’s ability to deter threats particularly from China’s rapidly advancing naval capabilities. China’s shipbuilding industry has outpaced the U.S. producing ships at a much faster rate. The U.S. Navy’s reduced readiness compounded by issues such as maintenance delays for the San Antonio-class amphibious transport docks and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers means it may struggle to respond effectively to potential conflicts or threats in critical regions such as the Indo-Pacific. This situation underscores the urgent need for stable funding, efficient shipyard operations, and a skilled workforce to maintain a competitive edge and ensure national security.^{[20],[21],[22],[23],[24]}

The combination of budgetary instability as highlighted by the reliance on continuing resolutions and rising labor costs due to inflation further increases these challenges. Skilled labor shortages and increased costs of living, health benefits, training, development, equipment, and supplies make it more difficult to complete contracts on time and within budget. The Navy’s ability to rapidly integrate new technologies is also hindered affecting its overall readiness and ability to deter emerging threats. Addressing these vulnerabilities is crucial to safeguarding national security and maintaining the U.S. Navy’s ability to project power and maintain international stability.^{[14],[16],[22],[23],[24]}

[1] Panella, C. (2024, November 17). Weak shipbuilding could be the US Navy’s Achilles’ heel in a war with China. Business Insider. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/us-shipbuilding-problems-could-be-navys-achilles-heel-china-war-2024-11.

[2] Kim, J. (2024, September). The Case for a Fifth Naval Shipyard. U.S. Naval Institute. Retrieved from https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/september/case-fifth-naval-shipyard.

[3] Pitrof, T. (2024, September). The Shipyard Shortage Is a People Problem. U.S. Naval Institute. Retrieved from https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/september/shipyard-shortage-people-problem.

[4] Reuters. (2024, December 18). What is most significant in the Pentagon’s China military report?. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-most-significant-pentagons-china-military-report-2023-10-21/.

[5] Roaten, M. (2023, January 26). ANALYSIS: Shipyard Capacity, China’s Naval Buildup Worries U.S. Military Leaders. National Defense Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/1/26/analysis-shipyard-capacity-chinas-naval-buildup-worries-us-military-leaders.

[6] Lagrone, S. (2024, September 26). DoJ Notifies of Suspected Faulty Welds on Subs, Aircraft Carriers at Newport News Shipbuilding. U.S. Naval Institute. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2024/09/26/doj-notified-of-suspected-intentionally-faulty-welds-on-subs-aircraft-carriers-at-newport-news-shipbuilding.

[7] Lagrone, S. (2024, September 27). Lawmakers to Investigate Faulty Sub, Carrier Welding at Newport News Shipbuilding. U.S. Naval Institute. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2024/09/27/lawmakers-announce-investigation-into-faulty-submarine-carrier-welding-at-newport-news-shipbuilding-ships-affected-in-low-single-digits-officials-say.

[8] Ziezulewicz, G. (2024, September 27). Lawmakers demand answers over reports of faulty Navy ship welding. Navy Times. Retrieved from https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2024/09/27/lawmakers-demand-answers-over-reports-of-faulty-navy-ship-welding/.

[9] Cirone, A., Glaeser, N., Kadlec, C. (2023, March). Root Cause Analysis Of Labor Shortages In The Skilled Trades Supporting Navy Shipyard Maintenance And Modernization. Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository. Retrieved from https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/9ca7083c-b6b5-46ba-a78f-19f3ec4c534b/content.

[10] Marine Insight. (2024, April 4). US Navy’s Biggest Shipbuilding Projects Delayed Due to Labour Shortages & Disrupted Supply Chains. MI Network. Retrieved from https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/us-navys-biggest-shipbuilding-projects-delayed-due-to-labour-shortages-disrupted-supply-chains/

[11] Construction Week. (2022, December 20). Raw Materials Cost: Inflation From a Supply Chain Perspective. Retrieved from https://www.constructionweekonline.com/business/raw-material-costs-inflation-from-a-supply-chain-perspective.

[12] U.S. Geological Survey. (2017, April 12). Risk and Reliance: The U.S. Economy and Mineral Resources. USGS. Retrieved from https://www.usgs.gov/news/featured-story/risk-and-reliance-us-economy-and-mineral-resources

[13] Santacreu, A. (2021, May 13). Investigating the U.S. Reliance on Foreign Suppliers. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Retrieved from https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2021/may/investigating-us-reliance-foreign-suppliers

[14] Ricadela, A. (2023, December 8). Supply Chain and Inflation: Issues and Impacts. Oracle. Retrieved from https://www.oracle.com/scm/supply-chain-inflation/

[15] Luckenbaugh, J. (2025, January 16). SNA News: Navy Trying to Stabilize Shipbuilding Demand Signal. National Defense Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/1/16/sna-news-navy-trying-to-stabilize-shipbuilding-demand-signal

[16] Young, S. and Gilmore M. (2019). Operating Under a Continuing Resolution: A Limited Assessment of Effects on Defense Procurement Contract Awards. Rand Corporation. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1086181.pdf

[17] U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2021, September 13). Defense Budget: DOD Has Adopted Practices to Manage Within the Constraints of Continuing Resolutions. GAO. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-541.

[18] Industry Insights. (2025, January 5). Inflations Impact on Retaining Skilled Workers in Construction. Retrieved from https://ironcloudcreative.com/blog/inflations-impact-on-retaining-skilled-workers-in-construction/

[19] Marine Insight. (2024, August 12). U.S. Navy Faces Worst Shipbuilding Struggles in 25 Years Due to Labor Shortages and Rising Cost. MI News Network. Retrieved from https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/u-s-navy-faces-worst-shipbuilding-struggles-in-25-years-due-to-labor-shortages-rising-costs/

[20] Grady, J. (2024, May 7). GAO Tells Senate Panel U.S. Shipyards Are Major Readiness Concern. U.S. Naval Institute. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2024/05/07/gao-tells-senate-panel-u-s-shipyards-are-major-readiness-concern

[21] Luckenbaugh, J. (2024, October 2). Navy Investing in Industrial Base to Fix Sub Schedule, Cost Overruns. National Defense Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/10/2/navy-investing-in-industrial-base-to-fix-sub-programs-cost-schedule-challenges

[22] Eckstein, M. (2024, April 2). U.S. Navy Ship Program Faces Years-Long Delays amid Labor, Supply Woes. Defense News. Retrieved from https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/04/02/us-navy-ship-programs-face-years-long-delays-amid-labor-supply-woes/

[23] DredgeWire. (2024, November 20). Weak Shipbuilding could be the U.S. Navy’s Achilles’ Heel in a War with China. Retrieved from https://dredgewire.com/weak-shipbuilding-could-be-the-us-navys-achilles-heel-in-a-war-with-china/

[24] Slayton, N. (2023, February 5). The Navy’s Maintenance Troubles are Getting Worse. Task and Purpose. Retrieved from https://taskandpurpose.com/news/navys-maintenance-troubles-gao-report/

Introduction

The alliance between the countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) has transitioned from one of economic cooperation to a geopolitical force that challenges Western dominance. Initially formed to facilitate collaboration among emerging markets, BRICS has gradually expanded its scope into political and security discussions. While not a formal military or intelligence alliance, cooperative efforts among member states suggest an evolving strategic framework. This white paper will examine BRICS’s military potential, economic advantages, intelligence collection concerns, and potential geopolitical implications for Western security.^[1],[2],[3]

The G7 versus BRICS

The G7 and BRICS represent two (2) distinct economic and political blocs with contrasting approaches to global governance. The G7 comprises advanced industrial nations and prioritizes financial stability, market-driven policies, and institutional frameworks that shape the global economy. Its influence extends across international financial institutions, trade agreements, and security alliances. Conversely, BRICS is primarily comprised of emerging economies. BRICS provides an alternative to the Western-led financial order while emphasizing economic cooperation among developing nations. The bloc seeks to challenge the dominance of Western financial institutions by promoting multipolarity in global decision-making and advocates for reforms in international governance structures.^[4],[5],[6]

The advantages of the G7 lie in its established financial institutions, technological advancements, and ability to maintain stability in global markets. Economies like the United States, Japan, and Germany lead technological innovation and trade policies, keeping the G7 dominant in shaping international regulations. However, its shortcomings include limited representation of emerging markets and a perceived Western-centric approach to global economics. BRICS offers benefits in economic inclusivity by granting developing nations a stronger voice in global affairs. Its initiatives, such as the New Development Bank (NDB), provide alternative funding mechanisms that reduce reliance on Western financial institutions.^[4],[5]

The geopolitical impact of both blocs remains a critical point of contention. The G7’s strong military alliances and security partnerships allow the group to exert influence on global conflicts, yet it faces challenges in maintaining diplomatic credibility among non-Western nations. BRICS, while advocating for a multipolar world order, risks deepening ideological divides between emerging and developed economies. As BRICS continues to expand its political and economic influence, its success will depend on its ability to foster mutually beneficial collaboration among its members while addressing internal disparities. Similarly, the G7 will likely adapt to global economic shifts and ensure its influence remains relevant amid rising competition from emerging economies. The interaction between these two (2) blocs will continue to shape international policy, economic stability, and geopolitical alliances.^[4],[5],[6]

Economic and Political Influence

The BRICS alliance presents significant economic advantages by offering an alternative platform for emerging economies to shape global financial policies. Unlike the G7, which consists of advanced industrial nations, BRICS represents a diverse mix of rapidly growing markets. Collectively, BRICS markets contribute substantially to Global Domestic Product (GDP), with their trade accounting for over 25% of global GDP and approximately 40% of the world’s population. Through initiatives like the NDB and South-South Trade, BRICS nations finance infrastructure projects without the restrictive conditions imposed by Western financial institutions. BRICS countries are also advocating for the de-dollarization in international trade, opting instead for local currencies and alternative financial mechanisms that could reshape the global economic order and reduce vulnerabilities associated with Western monetary policies.^[7]

Figure 1 – How BRICS compares to the G7 GDP^[5]

Figure 2 – How BRICS Countries Compare in Population and Economy; 2023^[2]

Aside from economic collaboration, BRICS has evolved into a powerful political force that challenges Western-dominated institutions and advocates for a multipolar global governance model. The alliance allows its member nations with opportunities to negotiate economic and political strategies independently from Western financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank. BRICS reduces the dependency on Western economies by emphasizing cooperation among its emerging markets and fostering financial self-sufficiency, while strengthening regional development efforts.^[2],[8]

Politically, BRICS enhances the influence of its members by fostering diplomatic initiatives that challenge Western-centric policies. Its expansion efforts allow developing nations to assert their interests in international affairs and ensure that their perspectives are considered in global decision-making forums. As opposed to the G7, which often reflects the priorities of established Western economies, BRICS advocates for governance reforms that address the concerns of emerging markets. By promoting trade, security, and environmental policy cooperation, the bloc empowers underrepresented nations and enables them to counter unilateral policies imposed by dominant global powers.^[5],[8]

Despite its advantages, BRICS faces internal challenges that complicate its effectiveness as a unified bloc. Coordinated policymaking is challenging because member nations have stly different economic models, political systems, and strategic interests. China’s economic dominance within the group creates imbalances that affect decision-making policies and resource allocation while Russia’s geopolitical stance often complicates diplomatic efforts. Additionally, the absence of a formal governance mechanism limits BRICS’ ability to function as a cohesive political entity, restricting its ability to implement significant global policies effectively.^[9]

As BRICS expands its reach, it also presents risks associated with global instability. The alliance’s efforts to de-dollarize trade and finance could disrupt financial markets and affect international currency stability and trade flows. Its deepening relationship with authoritarian regimes raises concerns about potential tensions with democratic nations and security frameworks. Furthermore, BRICS’s growing influence introduces ideological divisions that could increase political polarization and make global cooperation more challenging.^[1],[7]

The most significant concern regarding BRICS’s economic and political influence is the potential to create a fragmented world order. If BRICS successfully develops parallel institutions rivaling existing Western-led organizations, global governance could become divided, increasing economic uncertainty and geopolitical competition. Its engagement with nations facing Western sanctions, such as Russia and China, further exacerbates international tensions and could potentially provoke countermeasures from established global powers. As BRICS continues to grow, its future will depend on whether it fosters cooperation or deepens ideological divides between emerging and established nations.^[1],[9],[10]

The Foreign Nation-State Military Prospect of BRICS

The military prospects of BRICS as a foreign nation-state alliance remain complex. The bloc is not a formal military coalition, but increased defense cooperation among member countries is well documented. Russia and China, two (2) of the most militarily advanced nations within BRICS, have increased joint military exercises and defense technology exchanges, which have signaled a potential shift toward deeper security collaboration. India has engaged in defense dialogues with its BRICS partners while maintaining their strategic autonomy and balancing its relationships with their Western allies. The expansion of BRICS by including Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), further raises questions about its future military posture and its countering of Western influence in global security affairs. While BRICS does not currently function as a unified military alliance, its growing defense partnerships and geopolitical positioning suggest it could evolve into a more structured security bloc, challenging traditional Western-led military frameworks such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).^[1],[4],[11]

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a vital geopolitical and security framework for Eurasia that enhances military coordination among its key members, such as Russia, China, and India. Established in 2001, the organization has gradually expanded its mission beyond economic and political collaboration to encompass defense-related efforts. Joint military drills, labeled as “Peace Mission exercises,” enable real-time coordination in counterterrorism operations, intelligence-sharing, and strategic defense planning. Russia and China are the primary military powers within the bloc and frequently conduct cyber defense exercises, simulated warfare scenarios, and advanced weapons development programs to strengthen their strategic alignment. While India actively participates in SCO-led defense initiatives, ongoing tensions, like its border disputes with China, have complicated deeper military cooperation. Despite these complexities, India continues to utilize the SCO as a platform for security discussions while maintaining its autonomous stance.^[12]

Although SCO encourages defense interoperability, its ability to function as a cohesive military alliance is strained by diplomatic sensitivities and conflicting national interests. Russia and China advocate for greater security integration, while India remains cautious in balancing its partnerships with both Western allies and SCO member states. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is a critical intelligence-sharing mechanism that strengthens surveillance, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism operation efforts. However, imbalances in military procurement, defense policies, and geopolitical strategies limit the bloc’s ability to operate as a unified defense entity similar to NATO. Adding to the complexities, including new members such as Iran, introduces further issues in aligning security interests. Despite these obstacles, the SCO remains an influential force in regional military cooperation that reinforces Eurasian security strategies and serves as a potential counter to Western-led defense alliances.^[12]

Figure 3 – Shanghai Cooperation Organization Members and Dialogue Partners; 2023^[12]

Mosi II, a joint exercise designed to strengthen naval cooperation and interoperability, took place in February 2023. Russia, China, and South Africa conducted joint maritime drills along the Indian Ocean coast near Durban and Richards Bay, South Africa. The exercise focused on disaster management, anti-piracy maneuvers, and air defense operations. The Russian Navy deployed the Admiral Gorshkov, a Project 22350-class guided missile frigate equipped with Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles designed for multirole operations equipped with advanced stealth technology, other long-range strike capabilities, and antisubmarine warfare systems, alongside a tanker ship. China contributed a destroyer, a frigate, and a support ship, while South Africa fielded a frigate and two (2) auxiliary vessels. The drills marked the second such exercise following November 2019’s Cape Town-based operation, signaling closer defense ties between the three (3) nations.^[13],[14]

The exercise drew political controversy, particularly within South Africa. Opposition groups criticized the participation alongside Russia, accusing the ruling African National Congress (ANC) of favoring Moscow despite claims of neutrality. The timing of the drills coincided with the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, raising diplomatic concerns. South Africa’s Defense Ministry defended its involvement emphasizing the military benefits of joint security cooperation and maritime knowledge exchange. Viewed by some as a counterbalance to Western-led maritime alliances, the Mosi II exercise highlighted the growing complexity of global military partnerships amid shifting geopolitical landscapes.^[13],[14]

Another example of BRIC member joint exercises, “The Maritime Security Belt 2025,” took place in the Gulf of Oman and involved naval forces from Russia, China, and Iran, and observer nations such as South Africa, Oman, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. The drills were designed to enhance maritime security and counterterrorism and encourage naval interoperability, marking the second joint operation following a 2018 iteration. Russian, Chinese, and Iranian warships assembled at Iran’s Chabahar Port before launching the sea phase operation, which included hypersonic missile tests, air defense drills, and simulated hijacking scenarios. Russia deployed frigates and corvettes, including the Admiral Gorshkov, armed with Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles. China contributed destroyers and frigates from its Naval Escort Task Force, and Iran mobilized multiple vessels from both its Navy and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN). The exercise also focused on joint operations in shipboard security, countering unmanned aerial and surface threats, and coordinating multinational naval maneuvers. The exercise showcased a deepening military coordination between Russia, China, and Iran, raising concerns about evolving strategic alignments in Eurasian and Indo-Pacific security affairs.^[15]

BRICS as a Foreign Intelligence Entity Against the U.S. and G7

From an intelligence perspective, BRICS members have demonstrated cyber capabilities, counter-surveillance strategies, and data-sharing agreements that could impact Western intelligence operations. China and Russia are known for their advanced cyber espionage programs and have collaborated on AI-driven intelligence gathering, satellite surveillance, and electronic warfare technologies. Additionally, BRICS’s push for de-dollarization and alternative financial mechanisms could limit Western intelligence agencies’ ability to track financial transactions, reducing transparency in global economic monitoring. BRICS does not function as a formal intelligence entity, but its strategic partnerships, military collaborations, and cybersecurity initiatives suggest a growing intelligence network that could challenge the dominance of U.S. and G7 intelligence frameworks.^[16],[17]

BRICS nations like China and Russia have developed advanced cyber and intelligence capabilities and frequently engage in operations targeting Western governments and corporations. These activities range from cyber espionage, data theft, and disinformation campaigns to AI-driven intelligence gathering and electronic warfare. China has invested heavily in satellite surveillance, cyberwarfare units, and AI-powered intelligence systems, while Russia has refined its hacking operations, cyber sabotage techniques, and influence campaigns. Both nations have collaborated on cybersecurity frameworks and actively share tradecraft and intelligence methodologies to counter Western surveillance and digital dominance. The Digital Silk Road initiative spearheaded by China aims to establish secure digital infrastructure across BRICS nations and reduce reliance on Western technology while enhancing data sovereignty and cyber resilience. Russia continues to leverage its military intelligence units, such as the GRU, to conduct covert cyber operations, often targeting NATO and Western financial institutions.^{[17],[18],[19]}

The intelligence node between China and Russia has evolved into a strategic partnership with both nations exchanging cyberwarfare techniques, surveillance technologies, and counterintelligence strategies. Russia’s GRU and SVR intelligence agencies have collaborated with China’s Strategic Support Force, focusing on military-technical espionage and cyber-enabled influence operations. Additionally, the Foreign Policy Research Institute has highlighted how China and Russia strategically employ information operations to undermine Western alliances like NATO by using disinformation campaigns and online propaganda.^{[17],[18],[19]}

Additionally, BRICS members Russia and China have been actively working to establish a financial system independent of Western control or scrutiny while also aiming to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar and circumvent economic restrictions imposed by Western institutions. One (1) of the key initiatives in this effort is the development of digital currencies like Russia’s digital ruble and China’s digital yuan. Both are designed to facilitate cross-border transactions without using Western financial networks like The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). The introduction of BRICS Pay, a decentralized payment system, further strengthens the bloc’s ability to conduct international trade using national currencies and digital assets, effectively bypassing Western financial oversight. These efforts directly challenge U.S. economic influence as they undermine the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency and limit the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a political tool.^{[20],[21],[22]}

BRICS’s financial strategies raise concerns about sanctions evasion, economic disruptions, and the potential for alternative financial networks that operate outside Western or G7 regulatory frameworks. The digital ruble is positioned as a tool to help Russian businesses continue international transactions despite sanctions and to offer a stable alternative to traditional banking systems. Additionally, BRICS nations are exploring blockchain-based financial tools that could enhance transaction security and anonymity, making it more difficult for Western intelligence agencies to track financial transactions and trends. As BRICS asserts its financial independence, American and G7 intelligence efforts will likely focus on monitoring these developments and assessing their impact on global financial stability.^{[20],[21],[22]}

BRICS has strategically expanded its global influence networks by strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and African states, positioning itself as the opposition to American and G7 geopolitical strategies. The bloc’s recent expansion welcomed Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE. This expansion reflects a broader effort to consolidate influence across the Middle East and Africa. China and Russia actively engage in intelligence-sharing agreements, military collaborations, and economic partnerships with these nations, further developing the multipolar world order. Saudi Arabia’s addition to BRICS is another step towards shifting away from the exclusive reliance on U.S.-led financial and security frameworks, while Iran’s participation strengthens alternative trade and defense networks. BRICS nations have also leveraged African partnerships to secure critical resources, infrastructure investments, and intelligence cooperation, reinforcing their ability to challenge Western dominance in global governance. BRICS’s expanding diplomatic reach enables it to gather intelligence effectively and influence regional security policies to counter Western intelligence efforts. BRICS’s engagement with the Middle Eastern and African nations strengthens its ability to shape regional security frameworks, particularly in energy, counterterrorism, and defense technology transfers. As BRICS expands its footprint, its intelligence networks will likely evolve into a more structured framework that will challenge traditional Western intelligence dominance^.[23],[24]

Conclusion

The economic rivalry between BRICS and the G7 continues to shape global financial dynamics. Both blocs are vying for influence over international trade and monetary policies. As of 2024, the BRICS nations collectively account for approximately $30.7 trillion in GDP, representing 29% of the global economic output, while the G7 maintains a position of $45.9 trillion, or 43% of global GDP. However, the projected growth rate for BRICS far exceeds those of the G7, with India and China accounting for most expansion efforts, potentially narrowing the economic gap by 2050. BRICS’s push for de-dollarization, alternative financial systems, and digital currencies threatens the G7’s control over global financial transactions and reduces Western oversight of international trade. The bloc’s increasing resource independence via adding Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE strengthens its ability to challenge Western economic dominance in energy markets and commodity trade. As of now, BRICS lacks any formal form of a military alliance like NATO. For BRICS to become a structured military alliance like NATO, it must establish a formal security framework. This framework could include collective defense commitments, centralized command structures, and standardized military doctrines among its member states. The alliance would also need to expand bilateral military collaborations into multilateral training exercises, create a joint defense council, and integrate cyber warfare and intelligence-sharing mechanisms. However, such a transformation would pose a significant security risk for the G7 as Russia and China would most likely dominate a BRICS-led security pact. This could challenge Western geopolitical influence, disrupt surveillance operations, and expand arms development beyond NATO oversight. Additionally, BRICS’s economic independence being driven by the de-dollarization and alternative financial networks would reduce the Western leverage in global financial monitoring, making economic sanctions less effective. If BRICS successfully establishes a structured defense alliance, it could intensify the strategic competition with the G7 and increase political fragmentation.

[1] Patrick, S., Hogan E. et al. (2025, March 31). BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants. Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en

[2] Ferragamo, M. (2024, December 12). What is the BRICS Group and why is it expanding? Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding

[3] Garcia, Ana. (n.d.) Three Perspectives of BRICS Analysis. The American University in Cairo. Retrieved from https://bricspolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/BRICS-Analysis-compactado.pdf

[4] Adebisi, A. (2023, August 11). BRICS vs G7: Head-to-Head Comparison and Statistics. Investing Strategy. Retrieved from https://investingstrategy.co.uk/financial-news/brics-vs-g7-head-to-head-comparison-and-statistics/

[5] Rao, P. (2025, January 15). Charted: How BRICS Stacks Up Against the G7 Economies. Visual Capitalist. Retrieved from https://www.visualcapitalist.com/charted-how-brics-stacks-up-against-the-g7-economies/

[6] Conte, N. (2023, October 23). Charted: Comparing the GDP of BRICS and the G7 Countries. Visual Capitalist. Retrieved from https://www.visualcapitalist.com/charted-comparing-the-gdp-of-brics-and-the-g7-countries/

[7] World Reporter. (2025, April 14). How BRICS Nations Are Reshaping Global Trade Patterns and Reducing Dollar Dependence. World Reporter. Retrieved from https://worldreporter.com/brics-nations-reshaping-global-trade-patterns/

[8] Das, U. (2024, November 05). BRICS daringly autonomous model for financial sovereignty. Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. Retrieved from https://www.omfif.org/2024/11/brics-daringly-autonomous-model-for-financial-sovereignty/

[9] Cossa, R. and Marantidou, V. (2014, November 19). Cooperation among BRICS: What Implications for Global Governance. Pacific Forum CSIS. Retrieved from https://pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/issuesinsights_vol15no4.pdf

[10] Muna, A. (2025, January). BRICS and the Global South: Redefining Power in a Multipolar World. BIPSS. Retrieved from https://bipss.org.bd/pdf/BRICS%20and%20the%20Global%20South_Abida%20Farzana.pdf

[11] Erkol, B. (2024, February 22). Will BRICS Become The New Warsaw Pact. Foreign Analysis. Retrieved from https://foreignanalysis.com/will-brics-become-the-new-warsaw-pact/

[12] Helms, S. (2024, January). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Army University Press. Retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2024/Shanghai/

[13] Chenglong, J. (2023, February 20). China, Russia, South Africa to hold 2^nd joint naval exercises. China Daily. Retrieved from https://asianews.network/china-russia-south-africa-to-hold-2nd-joint-naval-exercises/

[14] Lesedi, S. (2023, February 23). Exercise MOSI II underway in South Africa. Military Africa. Retrieved from https://www.military.africa/2023/02/exercise-mosi-ii-underway-in-south-africa/

[15] Mahadzir, D. (2025, March 12). Russia, China and Iranian Warships Drilling Together in the Gulf of Oman. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2025/03/12/russia-china-and-iranian-warships-drilling-together-in-gulf-of-oman

[16] Jiang, M. and Belli, L. (2024). Digital Sovereignty in the BRICS Countries. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://cyberbrics.info/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Digital-Sovereignty-in-the-BRICS_-Structuring-Self-determination-Cybersecurity-and-Control.pdf

[17] BRICS Today. (2025, February 28). The Digital Silk Road: Cybersecurity and Tech Alliances in the BRICS Bloc. Retrieved from https://bricstoday.com/the-digital-silk-road-cybersecurity-and-tech-alliances-in-the-brics-bloc/

[18] Galeotti, M., Eftimiades, N. and Herd, G. (2021, December 14). Russia and China’s Intelligence and Information Operations Nexus: Implications for Global Strategic Competition. George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies. Retrieved from https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/clock-tower-security-series/strategic-competition-seminar-series/russia-and-chinas-intelligence-and-information-operations-nexus

[19] Stradinger, J. (2024, November 5). Narrative Intelligence: Detecting Chinese and Russian Information Operations to Disrupt NATO Unity. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Retrieved from https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/11/intelligence-china-russia-information-operations-against-nato/

[20] Congressional Research Service. (2018, February 8). Digital Currencies: Sanctions Evasion Risk. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10825/IF10825.3.pdf

[21] FINCRIME CENTRAL. (n.d.). Russia’s Tools For Sanctions Evasion: The Digital Ruble and BRICS Currency Plan. Retrieved from https://fincrimecentral.com/russia-digital-ruble-brics-evade-sanctions/

[22] Ciccomascolo, G. (2025, March 27). BRICS Pushing Forward With Digital Cross-Border Payment System, Russia’s Finance Minister Confirms. CCN. Retrieved from https://www.ccn.com/news/business/brics-digital-cross-border-payment-system-russia-finance-minister/

[23] Zaccara, L. and Battaloglu, N. (n.d.). BRICS Membership: Gulf States’ Strategic Pivot in Shifting Global Dynamics. Gulf International Forum. Retrieved from https://gulfif.org/brics-membership-gulf-states-strategic-pivot-in-shifting-global-dynamics/

[24] Pillai, K. and Savio, T. (n.d.). The Latest BRICS’ Expansion, But Probably Not the Last. The International Affairs Review. Retrieved from https://www.iar-gwu.org/blog/iar-web/the-latest-brics

Introduction

The relationship between land development and military growth has an extensive history worldwide. Military land acquisition and development can create tension between community members and installation personnel. The U.S. Navy Dairy Farm Solar Proposal in Gambrills, Maryland, is a recent example. Since both agriculture and the military demand large areas of land for operations, disagreements may arise with landowners who may feel displaced and attribute their concerns to the expanding military presence.

History of Military Land Acquisition and Relationships with Communities

Located in Gambrills, Maryland, the U.S. Naval Academy Dairy Farm occupies 857 acres. Originally purchased in 1909 by the Navy, the property is now managed by Naval Support Activity (NSA) Annapolis. The land’s original purpose was as a farm to supply the Brigade of Midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy with dairy products. At one time the farm sustained a staff of 15 individuals, around 300 cows, and provided 700 to 1,000 gallons of milk a day. The dairy farm milked around 175 to 250 Holstein cows and raised replacement calves. As of 1997, operations halted to reduce management costs, and Anne Arundel County now leases the farm.^[1],[2],[3]

Before the land was converted into a dairy farm, the U.S. Naval Academy used public sources to obtain milk. However, in the early 1900s an outbreak of typhoid fever affected the milk supply, prompting the Naval Academy to become self-sufficient and operate their dairy farm for nearly 90 years. A Naval officer managed the dairy and closely followed industry sanitary regulations. The farm consisted of 62 buildings, including a pasteurization building, cow barns, storage buildings, silos, chemical storage, grain elevators, feeding troughs, machine sheds, and homes for farm workers. The milk was originally packaged in glass bottles and eventually changed to paperboard milk containers in the 1970s.^[3],[4]

In 1967, the issue of whether the USNA should operate its own dairy farm was brought to the attention of Congress. Local milk producers filed complaints with their representatives about the presence of government-subsidized competition. While these concerns were present, the dairy farm improved community relations by hosting events for the public, including seasonal farm events, corn mazes, schools and group tours, and the Anne Arundel 4-H Dairy Leasing Club operation. However, the Department of Defense (DoD) suggested selling the farm due to continued community opposition and budget cuts. The House Armed Services Committee denied this effort and wrote an order into the Military Authorization Act of 1968 to keep the farm operational. The farm eventually closed in the late 1900s because of economic concerns. Afterward, the Navy-owned land was leased to Anne Arundel County and was later subleased as a private farm. Since that time, the land has been leased to multiple tenants, including the Horizon Organic Farm and Maryland Sunrise Farm.^[3],[4],[5]

As in the example above, military land acquisition can significantly shape economic and social dynamics in the community. These dynamics can simultaneously present the installation and the community with opportunities and obstacles. Generated employment opportunities, the businesses drawn to the area that cater to military personnel and their families, enhanced civic engagement, and the strengthening of public safety and disaster responses may all contribute to economic and social stability. Alternatively, acquisition may include land use changes, pollution, and subsidized competition. Community land use changes can also alter urban planning efforts and local geography.^[6]

Looking forward, increased environmental sustainability initiatives could provide a strong starting point for collaboration between the military and community members. By providing other energy generation technologies, like active farming and agrivoltaics, developers can help benefit installations and the community. Installations can also integrate available cultural resources, development activities, and environmental policy management requirements. As with the Naval Dairy Farm solar revamp, the community should continue to actively participate in future projects and discussions to improve efficiency. This transformation can lead to modified land use patterns, construction of training/operations facilities, and infrastructure expansion.^[6],[7]

Another example of military land acquisition and solar farm construction occurred in Georgia at SUBASE Kings Bay. As of 2015, the Department of the Navy (DoN) and Georgia Power signed a real estate outgrant moving forward with plans for large-scale solar generation at the installation. The plan was to create a 42 MW direct current (DC) facility to bolster DoN energy security and the portfolio of Georgia Power, along with decreasing fossil fuel demand. Since opening in 2016, the solar facility has provided cost-effective renewable energy for the installation and local community. This project has successfully improved solar power in the area, bolstered community investment, and strengthened bases in Georgia.^[8],[9]

The overarching theme surrounding these projects and possible encroachment issues involves the availability of suitable and expansive land. Encroachment near military installations is not a new problem, it is often seen when installations are not able to expand due to land restrictions. Both the military and communities require land to support their needs. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, these tracts of land are often farmlands. The yellow markings in Figure 1 demonstrate that the land around the dairy farm is comprised of deciduous forest, lightly developed land, woody wetlands, and grass/pasture areas.

Figure 1 – Land Use in Gambrills, Maryland^[10]

Figure 2 – Gambrills, Maryland Land Use Breakdown^[10]

Solar Farm Revamp Proposal

As of 2024, the Navy has made the land available for lease for the planned solar facility project. The end goal of the mixed-use energy generation project is to maximize overall energy generation. The Navy has taken steps to convert the 857-acre Gambrills property into an effective solar farm that would offset the electrical demand of NSA Annapolis and work toward the overarching goal of a net-zero Naval Academy. The Navy first conducted the request for information (RFI) period in February 2024 and gathered various ideas to move forward with the project, including concepts in solar energy generation and agrivoltaics. As of 12 September 2024, NSA Annapolis completed the request for proposal phase (RFP) to meet larger DoD Carbon Free Electricity (CFE) goals. Proposals were reviewed through the end of October 2024 and the Phase Two submission process lasted through January 2025.^{[11],[12],[13]}

The Navy has begun to review the Phase Two proposals. After this review, the Navy will select an appropriate developer whose proposal has similar environmental goals. Prior to reviewing these proposals, the Navy must complete an environmental assessment in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. This assessment will evaluate the project’s potential impacts on natural resources. After the assessment is completed, the chosen developer will sign a lease agreement. The project may be delayed further if a suitable developer is not selected. Overall, the renewable energy source has not been identified and the projected timeline for the project is uncertain, with construction possibly years away. It is uncertain what this will mean for the current leases and businesses that occupy the property at this time.^[14]

Possibility of Continued Public Pressure

As the solar farm project has progressed, the community has expressed some pushback. Citizens, many of them farmers, believe this loss of farmland may impact the entire community. Many are not opposed to solar energy or solar panels in general, they are just skeptical of how much the project may cost and how it may intensify agricultural production loss in the county. Uncertainty over land use can also be seen in previous military examples in the area, including Greenbury Point, which is a Navy property located in Anne Arundel County that is managed by NSA Annapolis. The area serves as a natural resources conservation space that simultaneously supports the installation’s mission and is a popular recreation spot for citizens. The land has remained open to the public, while supporting the installation’s needs. The land use of both the dairy farm and Greenbury Point bring up similar logistical concerns regarding shared land between the installation and the community.^[15],[16]

With concerns growing as the dairy farm project proceeds, continued public pressure is likely, which increases the possibility of protest activity. During Navy information sessions for the project, community members have critiqued the vagueness of the proposal and still have unanswered questions. For example, co-owner of De Novo Farm states that their business, and others in the community, depend on the green space to conduct lessons, boarding, training, and breeding. The community will have another opportunity to voice concerns during the public review process, where they can comment on the proposal.^[15],[17]

Community Implications Moving Forward

Future implications may include a decrease in profitable farming land, possible unrest, and a strained relationship between military personnel and the community. While the Navy plans to keep the community involved in this process, citizens are still asking for more clarity on decisions regarding the land. Moving forward, information sessions will be an important forum for citizens, local officials, and military personnel to share updates and concerns.

[1] Naval District Washington. (n.d.). U.S. Naval Academy Dairy Farm. Naval District Washington. Retrieved from https://ndw.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Annapolis/Operations-and-Management/Dairy-Farm/.

[2] Anne Arundel County Maryland. (n.d.). Dairy Farm. Anne Arundel County Maryland. Retrieved from https://www.aacounty.org/county-council/council-districts/district-5/district-5-blog/dairy-farm.

[3] Moore, S. (2019, September 19). Early 1900s: When the Navy ran a dairy farm. Farm and Dairy. Retrieved from https://www.farmanddairy.com/columns/early-1900s-when-the-navy-ran-a-dairy-farm/575536.html.

[4] Naval History and Heritage Command. (2023, January 24). Milk Carton from the United States Naval Academy Dairy Farm. Naval History and Heritage Command. Retrieved from https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/artifacts/Ashore/naval-academy/milk-carton–usna-dairy-farm.html.

[5] Enright, M. (2024, October 11). Navy Moves to Next Phase of Dairy Farm Solar Project. Lancaster Farming. Retrieved from https://www.lancasterfarming.com/farming-news/dairy/navy-moves-to-next-phase-of-dairy-farm-solar-project/article_c50eeece-872d-11ef-9487-abd6c85ba671.html.

[6] Editorial Team. (2024, July 19). The Impact of Military on Local Communities: An In-Depth Analysis. Total Military Insight. Retrieved from https://totalmilitaryinsight.com/impact-of-military-on-local-communities/.

[7] NAVFAC. (n.d.). Naval Academy Dairy Farm Renewable Energy Initiative Information Session & Community Conversation. NAVFAC. Retrieved from https://ndw.cnic.navy.mil/Portals/75/NSA_Annapolis/Documents/NSAA%20Dairy%20Farm%20Public%20Meeting_6AUG24.pdf.

[8] Department of the Navy. (2015, July 13). Navy and Georgia Power Ink Deal to Build 42 MW Solar Farm at SUBASE Kings Bay. Department of the Navy. Retrieved from https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2265286/navy-and-georgia-power-ink-deal-to-build-42-mw-solar-farm-at-subase-kings-bay/.

[9] Department of the Navy. (2016, September 19). SUBASE Kings Bay Celebrates Opening of 42 MW DC Solar Facility. Department of the Navy. Retrieved from https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/2256346/subase-kings-bay-celebrates-opening-of-42-mw-dc-solar-facility/.

[10] RMC. (n.d.). Landcover Summarizer. Retrieved from https://portal.geo.nga.mil/portal/apps/experiencebuilder/experience/?id=5921eed3776a466f864bf6e1faf92282.

[11] Enright, M. (2024, August  2). Planned Solar Facility on Former Navy Dairy Farm Has Ag Industry Concerned. Lancaster Farming. Retrieved from https://www.lancasterfarming.com/farming-news/news/planned-solar-facility-on-former-navy-dairy-farm-has-ag-industry-concerned/article_cb133334-4ea2-11ef-8b0b-cfb0ac43f267.html.

[12] Enright, M. (2024, October 11). Navy Moves to Next Phase of Dairy Farm Solar Project. Lancaster Farming. Retrieved from https://www.lancasterfarming.com/farming-news/dairy/navy-moves-to-next-phase-of-dairy-farm-solar-project/article_c50eeece-872d-11ef-9487-abd6c85ba671.html.

[13] Naval Support Activity Annapolis. (2024, May 17). Press Release. Naval Support Activity Annapolis. Retrieved from https://ndw.cnic.navy.mil/Portals/75/NSA_Annapolis/Documents/Dairy%20Farm/005-%20Dairy%20Farm%20RFP.pdf.

[14] Matheson, J. (2025, January 27). Plans for renewable energy at former Navy Dairy Farm inch along, questions remain. Capital Gazette. Retrieved from https://www.capitalgazette.com/2025/01/27/plans-for-renewable-energy-at-former-navy-dairy-farm-inch-along-questions-remain/.

[15] Enright, M. (2024, August 7). U.S. Navy Dairy Farm Solar Proposal Draws Deep Skepticism. Lancaster Farming. Retrieved from https://www.lancasterfarming.com/farming-news/news/u-s-navy-dairy-farm-solar-proposal-draws-deep-skepticism/article_e8472c4e-54dd-11ef-a9da-2334731e7682.html.

[16] Serna, Oliver. (2022, August 12). What You Need To Know About Greenbury Point. Respect The Rules And Stay Safe!. Naval District Washington. retrieved from https://ndw.cnic.navy.mil/News/News-Detail/Article/3125600/what-you-need-to-know-about-greenbury-point-respect-the-rules-and-stay-safe/.

[17] Cribbs, J. (2024, August 9). Reps face criticism over solar project. The Delmarva Farmer. Retrieved from https://americanfarm.com/articles/delmarvafarmer/reps-face-criticism-over-solar-project/.

Introduction

In its Made In China 2025 initiative, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) detailed its plan to fully integrate itself into the global manufacturing chain and broaden control of strategic geographic locations. These plans are driving its expansion into the Arctic and Antarctic. On 19 November 2014, the PRC Party Secretary & Director of the State Oceanic Administration stated that China is destined to be a “great polar power” by 2030. China has launched expeditions and established research facilities in both the Arctic and Antarctic, strengthening their influence in polar affairs and shaping the evolving geopolitical landscape. Beyond scientific exploration, China’s growing presence in these remote frontiers aligns with its broader strategic and military objectives. In the Arctic, melting ice sheets pose global challenges, but Beijing also sees opportunities. China leverages scientific and commercial ventures to influence governance, access natural resources, and establish new shipping routes, despite lacking sovereign jurisdiction. Emerging shipping routes could shorten trade transit times and improve regional resource access. However, lacking sovereign territory in the Arctic, China relies on partnerships with other nations to advance its interests.^[1],[2],[3]

China’s expansion into the polar regions, as part of their Science of Military Strategy, reflects a calculated effort to enhance its global influence and military capabilities, posing significant challenges to U.S. national security and the Department of Defense (DoD). Tied to its military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy, China’s Arctic research raises security concerns. Arctic research enhances China’s knowledge of submarine operations, icebreaker navigation, and undersea communication cables, which are crucial for military strategy.^[4],[5]

China’s History and Strategy in the Antarctic

China’s growing presence in Antarctica is part of its broader polar strategy, combining scientific research and geopolitical influence, but it is also advancing the potential for dual-use infrastructure. In 1980, China began preparing for its Antarctic scientific research program, initially sending scientists to participate in foreign expeditions, and signed the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) on 09 June 1983. Since its first Antarctic expedition in 1984, China has methodically expanded its footprint, establishing multiple research stations, deployed advanced icebreakers, and leveraged its role within the ATS to increase its influence. This led to the construction of the Great Wall Station in 1985, located on King George Island off the Antarctic Peninsula. It was China’s first Antarctic research station and served as a logistics and research hub.^[2],[3]

As highlighted in Figure 1, China operates five (5) stations in the Antarctic. The graphic also illustrates the ice height change in meters per year.

Figure 1 – Map of Chinese Antarctic Stations^[6]

Zhongshan Station, built in 1989, is situated in East Antarctica’s Larsemann Hill and expanded China’s operational capabilities further inland. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, China had solidified its Antarctic presence, establishing itself as a Consultative Party to the ATS and securing voting rights on Antarctic governance. From 2001 through 2020, China transitioned from scientific research to strategic interests. This was China’s most significant pivot in the region. Kunlun and Taishan Stations, built in 2009, continued their inland-focused research stations, strengthening China’s ability to conduct year-round research and extending its strategic reach. Kunlun Station, built at Dome A, the highest point of the East Antarctic Ice Sheet, has ideal conditions for astronomical observations, climate research, and satellite tracking. Its remote location also raises concerns over potential dual-use applications, such as surveillance and space-based intelligence gathering.^[1],[2],[4]

In early 2024, China completed Qinling Station, its fifth permanent Antarctic research station on Inexpressible Island in Terra Nova Bay in the Ross Sea. This location is strategically significant because it is near McMurdo Sound, which is home to the U.S. McMurdo Station and New Zealand’s Scott Base, which are two (2) of Antarctica’s most important Western research hubs. Its proximity to major Antarctic shipping lanes, which have been cleared of ice by the Xuleong and Xuelong 2 icebreakers, suggests China intends to monitor and engage in long-term regional activities. While officially a scientific research station, Qinling Station’s infrastructure raises concerns about potential military applications, including satellite and electronic surveillance due to its location near key U.S. and allied research stations. Its locations allow for naval logistics support, providing a foothold near important sea routes that may become commercially viable as Antarctic ice melts. The deep-sea research facilities it has could also aid underwater surveillance, submarine warfare research, and oceanographic intelligence gathering.^[1],[6]

Figure 2 – The Icebreaker Xuleong 2 (‘Snow Dragon’),^[7]

Figure 3 – China’s Fifth Antarctic Research Station, Qinling Station^[1]

China is constructing a sixth Antarctic research station on the Amery Ice Shelf in East Antarctica, which is expected to be operational in 2025. The Amery Ice Shelf is a critical gateway for inland Antarctic expeditions, and its location offers strategic advantages for both scientific and potential military applications. When completed, China will have the second-largest presence in Antarctica after the U.S., further solidifying its long-term strategic ambitions in the region. The station could enhance China’s global satellite navigation system (BeiDou), which has applications for civilian and military operations. While the ATS bans new territorial claims, China’s expanding infrastructure suggests it is positioning itself for future negotiations, should the ATS be renegotiated or challenged. Open-source research indicates China has conducted seabed mapping and resource assessments, which could have implications for future Antarctic mineral and energy exploration and exploitation.^[5],[8],[9]

China’s Growing Presence in the Arctic

China has steadily increased its presence in the Arctic, despite not being an Arctic nation. It has pursued a multifaceted strategy to gain influence over Arctic governance, access natural resources, and leverage emerging shipping lanes to advance its economic and strategic interests. By branding itself as a “Near-Arctic State,” China has sought to legitimize its role in Arctic affairs, expanding scientific research, commercial partnerships, and infrastructure projects while also raising concerns over its potential strategic and military ambitions.^[10],[11]

In 2022, geopolitical shifts accelerated as PRC President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed their cooperation, including the Polar Silk Road (PSR), just before Russia invaded Ukraine. Initially announced in 2017, the PSR was seen as a key pillar of Russo-Chinese Arctic collaboration. Climate change is rapidly reducing Arctic Sea ice, making shipping lanes more viable for commercial transit. China views these routes as a shortcut that could significantly reduce shipping times and costs between Asia and Europe. In 2018, the PRC officially incorporated Arctic shipping routes into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).^{[12],[13],[14]}

• The Northern Sea Route runs along Russia’s Arctic coastline, reducing transit times between China and Europe by up to 40% compared to the Suez Canal. China has engaged in joint ventures with Russian companies to gain access to this route.^[12]
• The Transpolar Sea Route is a potential future route running directly across the Arctic Ocean, which would further reduce transit times but is currently too ice-covered to be fully operational.^[12]
• The Northwest Passage runs through Canada’s Arctic waters. However, China does not recognize Canada’s sovereignty over the passage. Beijing has sent research missions to assess the route’s feasibility.^[12]
• The Arctic Bridge Route is a seasonal route connecting the Russian port of Murmansk and the Canadian port of Churchill, Manitoba.^[12]

Figure 4 below illustrates a map of the Arctic Sea routes.

Figure 4 – Arctic Sea Routes^[15]

The links between China’s polar research programs and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have sparked concerns over potential security threats in the Arctic. A key example of this occurred with Sweden, where China established its first overseas satellite ground station at the Esrange Space Center near Kiruna in 2016. In 2020, the Swedish Space Corporation (SSC), which oversees Esrange, chose not to renew its contracts with China due to fears that the facility could support military intelligence and surveillance operations. This decision extended beyond Esrange, affecting China’s access to other SSC-managed ground stations in South America and Australia. However, the exact timeline for contract expirations and whether China’s access to the stations has been completely revoked remains uncertain. DoD leadership has echoed these security concerns. A 2019 DoD report warned that China’s civilian research could contribute to an expanded military presence in the Arctic, while the 2022 U.S. administration’s Arctic strategy highlighted China’s use of scientific activities for dual-use research with military and intelligence applications.^[1],[16]

China’s Science of Military Strategy asserts that military-civilian pursuits are the path to polar power, and implementing dual-use applications of polar science will assist in achieving it. For example, it is believed the polar observation satellites, under the auspices of providing polar ice assessments, are also being used to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to the PLA. Another example of this dual-use is the scientific application of weather balloons to provide data on upper atmospheric conditions, which the PLA also uses for ISR and command and control. Acknowledging these growing concerns, several countries and governmental bodies (Canada, the European Commission) have passed legislation and regulatory measures limiting (or ending) China’s investment in their regional infrastructure. The DoD published the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, nested under the 2022 National Security Strategy, addresses its intentions and potential moves to combat this growing area of concern.^{[10],[17],[18]}

China’s continued expansion into the Arctic has also created a geopolitical destabilizing alliance with Russia. China has long seen Russia as a key entry point into the Arctic, though the latter has historically resisted its growing presence due to national security concerns. Moscow initially opposed China’s observer status in the Arctic Council and restricted its research activities along the Northern Sea Route. However, the war in Ukraine has left Russia increasingly isolated, making it more dependent on Chinese investments in infrastructure and technology. As the Arctic Council faces uncertainty, China has deepened its strategic focus on Russian ports. In 2019, Chinese academics from two (2) state universities conducted studies to identify which Russian key access points along the Northern Sea Route gave the most access to the region. The report ranked 13 Russian ports based on five (5) primary factors: natural conditions, infrastructure, port operation, interior environment, and geographic location. Since the release of the report, Beijing has invested approximately $130 billion in the infrastructure of the ports.^[1],[19]

Conclusion

While China officially frames its Antarctic expansion as purely scientific, the dual-use potential of its research stations, logistical infrastructure, and technological capabilities raises questions about its broader ambitions. The completion of Qinling Station in 2024 and the upcoming sixth research station in 2025 are significant steps in China’s long-term Antarctic strategy, increasing its presence near key geopolitical locations. With growing tensions between Washington and Beijing and concerns over the future of the ATS, China’s Antarctic expansion represents a critical geopolitical development that will shape the future of polar governance, global strategic competition, and scientific research in one of the world’s last frontiers.^[20],[8]

The 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy states that climate change and shifts in the geostrategic environment propel the need for a new approach to the Arctic. China’s growing presence there is driven by long-term strategic objectives that go far beyond scientific research. By leveraging economic partnerships, scientific research, and infrastructure investments, Beijing is actively positioning itself as a major player in Arctic governance, resource extraction, and commercial shipping. However, its ambitions are increasingly met with resistance from Arctic nations, particularly the U.S., Canada, and Nordic countries. They fear China’s Arctic engagement may be a precursor to greater geopolitical and military involvement. As the Arctic continues to thaw, China’s role in shaping the future of the region will be a major point of contention in global politics, one that will likely escalate as competition over resources, trade routes, and strategic influence intensifies.^[10],[21]

[1] Funaiole, M. P., Hart, B., Powers-Riggs, A., Jun, J., & Bermudez, J. S., Jr.. (2024, December 19). China Makes Progress On Its Fifth Antarctic Research Station. Center For Strategic & International Studies. Retrieved from  https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-makes-progress-its-fifth-antarctic-research-station.

[2] Cigui, L. (2014, November 19). From A Polar Power to Great Polar Power. Chinese Ministry of Land & Resources. Retrieved from https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-11/19/content_2780849.htm.

[3] Institute for Security & Development Policy. (2018, June). Made In China 2025. Institute for Security & Development Policy. Retrieved from https://www.isdp.eu/wp- content/uploads/2018/06 /Made-in-China-Backgrounder.pdf

[4] Tianling, X., Yaoling, L., & Wuchao, K. (2020). The Science of Military Strategy. China Aerospace Studies Institute. Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Tra n slations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf

[5] Funaiole, M. P., Hart, B., Powers-Riggs, A., Jun, J., & Bermudez, J. S., Jr..)2023, April 18). Frozen Frontiers: China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions. Center For Strategic & International Studies. Retrieved from https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-polar-research-facility/.  

[6] Blesic, J. (2024, May 15). Chinese Presence in Antarctica as a New Geopolitical Challenge. The Center For Geostrategic Research & Terrorism (Poland). Retrieved from https://cegit.org/chinese-presence-in-antarctica-as-a-new-geopolitical-challenge/

[7] The Arctic Gateway. (2024). Xuelong 2. ArcticPortal.org. Retrieved from https://arcticportal.o  rg/shipping-portlet/icebreakers/snow-dragon.

[8] The People’s Republic of China. (2024, November 21). Cargo Vessel Sets Sail For China’s 41st Antarctic Expedition. The State Council of The People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202411/21/content_ WS673fcab9c6d0865f4e8ed4d7.html.

[9] The Antarctic Treaty. (n.d.). Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. Retrieved from https://www.a  ts.aq/dev  https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?lang=e

[10] Pechko, K. (2025, January 7). Rising Tensions and Shifting Strategies: The Evolving Dynamics of US Grand Strategy in the Arctic. The Arctic Institute Center For Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/rising-tensions-shifting-strategies-evolving-dynamics-us-grand-strategy-arctic/

[11] U.S. Secretary of Defense. (2024). 2024 Arctic Strategy. U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF

[12] Lamazhapov, E., Stensdal, I., & Heggelund, G. (2023, November 14). China’s Polar Silk Road: Long Game or Failed Strategy?. The Arctic Institute Center For Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-polar-silk-road-long-game-failed-strategy/

[13] Fleck, A. (2023, June 15). The Polar Silk Road. Statista. Retrieved from https://www.statista .com/chart/30201/major-maritime-routes-opening-up-in-the-arctic/

[14] Eiterjord, T. (2023, November 23).  What the 14th Five-Year Plan says about China’s Arctic Interests. The Arctic Institute Center For Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved from https://www. thearcticinstitute.org/14th-five-year-plan-chinas-arctic-interests/

[15] Drycrz, C. (2017, December). Safety of Navigation in the Arctic. Polish Naval Academy. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-Northwest-Passage-the-Northeast-Passage-and-the-Northern-Sea-Route-and-the_fig6_321687663

[16] Parsonson, A. (2025, January 4). Swedish Military to Serve as Anchor Customer for Esrange Space Center?. European Spaceflight. Retrieved from https://europeanspaceflight.com/swedish-military-to-serve-as-anchor-customer-for-esrange-space-center/

[17] U.S. House of Representatives. (2024, October 16). Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Congress of the U.S. House of Representatives. Retrieved from https://selectco mitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/10.16.24_PRC%20dual%20use%20research%20in%20the%20Arctic__.pdf

[18] Pezard, S., Chindea, I. A., Aoki, N., Lumpkin, D., & Shokh, Y. (2025, January 23) China’s Economic, Scientifc, & Information Activities In The Arctic – Benign Actvitites or Hidden Agenda. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2823-1.html.

[19] Zhang, J. (2024, December 9). Russia Clears Path for China in the Arctic. Geopolitical Intelligence Services. Retrieved from https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/china-arctic-russia/

[20] The Antarctic Treaty. (n.d.). The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. Retrieved from https://www.ats.aq/e/protocol.html

[21] Menchew, B., Mahle, L., Ghosh, P., & Sistla, M. (2024, December 10). Polar Infrastructure And Science For National Security: A Federal Agenda To Promote Glacier Resilience And Strengthen American Competitiveness. Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved from https://fas.org/pub lication/polar-infrastructure/

Introduction

RMC’s White Paper “China-Cuba Relations: Recent Developments and Implications for U.S. National Security” in June 2023 detailed the diplomatic relations and economic cooperation between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Cuba. As the paper highlights, China’s investments in Cuba’s economy and infrastructure, military cooperation between the two (2) nations, and joint intelligence efforts present potential national security implications for the U.S. Over the past 18 months, China has continued investment and influence activities in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The U.S. and its allies are concerned that the PRC is utilizing its economic leverage and relationships with nations in LAC to pursue geopolitical objectives, potentially expand its military capabilities, and bolster authoritarian regimes. The following White Paper highlights China’s growing influence in LAC by offering investment examples in Peru, Brazil, Mexico, and The Bahamas and associated U.S. national security concerns.

Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean

Since taking power in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping has launched significant infrastructure projects worldwide as part of China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI). Xi’s vision of this “New Silk Road,” a reference to the original Silk Road during the westward expansion of China’s Han Dynasty, includes developing a significant network of railways, energy pipelines, highways, and streamlined border crossings westward and southward. At the same time, China’s leader seeks to establish a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road by investing in port development worldwide to accommodate increasing maritime trade. Many scholars and analysts recognize that the BRI’s effort to bolster “connectivity and communication” with states in Eurasia and Africa is a primary component of China’s strategy to advance its economic and political ties with the rest of the world.^[1],[2]

A few years after launching the initiative, China’s President Xi referred to Latin America as a “natural extension of BRI.” LAC is home to valuable raw materials and agricultural goods, such as petroleum, soybeans, and lithium, and provides potential international shipping connectivity across the Pacific Ocean. As a result, the People’s Republic of China has increasingly engaged in trade, investment opportunities, and development projects with various nations in the region over the past 20 years. Furthermore, China looks to accrue soft power in LAC through educational and cultural exchanges and technological advancements.^{[1],[2],[3],[4]}

From 2003 to 2022, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled $187.5 billion in LAC. While data highlights the decreasing value of Chinese investment in LAC in recent years, Chinese interest in information and communication technology (ICT), renewable energy, and other emerging industries is increasing. In addition, China remains committed to infrastructure investments at ports throughout the region, including flooding LAC with crane exports. Chinese customs data reveals that crane exports to Latin America increased by 47% year-on-year from January to October 2024.^[5],[6],[7]

Experts studying malign Chinese influence worldwide remain concerned about Chinese technology corporations, such as Huawei and ZTE, exponentially capturing LAC’s telecommunications markets.  Huawei’s success in LAC is attributed to leveraging China’s foreign policy and diplomatic ties, the company’s quality customer service, and building access networks at low cost or free of charge in remote, mountainous, and rural areas where developing telecommunications infrastructure is expensive. While Huawei equipment cannot be sold or imported in the U.S. as of November 2022 due to national security concerns, the company now works with every large mobile and internet service provider in LAC. Also, the company is rapidly developing LAC’s 5G infrastructure. Experts fear that long-term dependencies on 5G developed by Huawei could amplify the CCP’s surveillance initiatives and control over the region’s communications, infrastructure, and sensitive technology. Though China’s economic interests are the primary driver for its activities in LAC, some analysts indicate that the PRC also seeks to expand its political influence in the region to counterattack the U.S.’s containment of China’s rise. In addition, China looks for governmental support in LAC for its positions on Taiwan, human rights, internet governance, and other affairs.^{[8],[9],[10],[11]}

Peru

In November 2024, China continued expanding its investments and influence in Peru. From 15 to 16 November, Chinese President Xi Jinping, U.S. President Joe Biden, and leaders worldwide attended the 2024 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Summit in Lima. During the two-day summit, China and Peru updated their free trade agreement (FTA), which was initially signed in 2009. While the two (2) countries engaged in almost $36 billion in bilateral trade last year, Peru’s foreign minister indicated that the updated agreement would increase commerce by at least 50% between the nations. Earlier in November, China and Peru also agreed to a memorandum of understanding to increase bilateral cooperation on food security, food product regulation, and education.^[12],[13]

China has significant mining and infrastructure projects in Peru, including the $3.6 billion Port of Chancay. The Chinese-funded megaport inaugurated on 15 November 2024 anticipates decreasing trans-Pacific transit times and logistics costs. Furthermore, the port is the first location in South America with the capacity to host carrier ships too large to fit through the Panama Canal. According to open-source reports, Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries supplies the port’s automated cargo cranes, while China-based shipping company Cosco will operate the port exclusively. Analysts highlight that the Port of Chancay’s location could significantly impact supply chains. For example, Peru is South America’s second-largest producer of raw copper, a critical resource for manufacturing electronic and clean-energy technologies. China has invested $11.4 billion in the Peruvian mining sector, where most resources are devoted to ensuring access to copper.^[12],[14]

Some security experts, including General Laura Richardson, the former Commander of U.S. Southern Command, warn that the Port of Chancay presents potential security risks to the Homeland. According to General Richardson, the port could be a dual-use facility for China’s Navy. While China states the project is motivated by commercial interests, the U.S. remains concerned that the port could enhance China’s military capabilities due to its size, depth, and strategic location.^[14],[15]

Brazil

In November 2024, China and Brazil took significant steps in strengthening economic ties. Following the G20 Leaders’ Summit hosted in Brazil, that country’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva hosted Xi Jinping for a state visit. On 20 November, China and Brazil signed 37 agreements on trade, technology, and the environment. While Brazil declined to join China’s BRI, Brazil “recognized the relevance” of the BRI in one (1) of the agreements and looks to pursue smaller bilateral deals with China. The package of 37 agreements also included a deal between China Development Bank and Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). China Development Bank loaned BNDES an equivalent of $690 million USD (¥5 billion) to support a variety of projects and expand alternatives to the U.S. dollar.^{[12],[16],[17]}

The idea of reducing reliance on the American dollar is also a priority of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) economic coalition. In 2015, the BRICS coalition established the New Development Bank. The newly-founded bank represents an alternative to Western-backed initiatives such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. During President Lula’s visit to China in April 2023, former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff was sworn in as head of the New Development Bank. According to Rousseff, the New Development Bank has allocated about $6.1 billion to Brazil since its inception to December 2023, financing 21 projects.^{[18],[19],[20]}

The relationship between China and Brazil is primarily economic, although the two (2) nations have engaged in various military cooperation agreements since mid-2000. Chinese companies have invested about $71 billion in Brazil from 2007 to 2023, more than any other nation in Latin America. In addition to concerns surrounding China’s increasing economic presence, open-source research analysis highlights potential risks associated with China’s satellite cooperation with Brazil. From 1984 to 2022, the two (2) nations signed 24 bilateral diplomatic agreements formalizing cooperation in the satellite sector. Furthermore, since China launched the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite program’s first collaboratively developed satellite in 1999, the two (2) countries have worked together to launch six (6) satellites and seek to launch a seventh in early 2025. According to some U.S. national security experts, space facilities accessible to China in the region could potentially be utilized to intercept data transmitted by Western satellites. Furthermore, space facilities in the Western Hemisphere could potentially offer China telemetry or communication in support of kinetic attacks.^{[21],[22],[23]}

Mexico

On 14 February 1972, Mexico and China established diplomatic and trade relations. Chinese direct investment in Mexico began in the late 1990s and accelerated in the 2010s as part of China’s global economic strategy. China targets Mexico’s manufacturing sector, capitalizing on the nation’s proximity to the U.S., skilled labor, and tariff-free access to North American markets through the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). China also benefits from Mexico’s strategic position along key North American trade routes. However, many Mexican citizens view the PRC as a competitor, since both China and Mexico are established manufacturing exporters. Therefore, Mexico has not signed China’s BRI and is not a participant in the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). However, China’s investments in Mexico, particularly in infrastructure and manufacturing, align with some BRI goals. These investments bolster Chinese companies’ supply chain resilience, reduce costs, and mitigate geopolitical risks.^{[24],[25],[26],[27],[28]}

Some experts indicate that China’s growing economic influence in Mexico poses significant challenges to U.S. regional dominance, domestic manufacturing resilience, and economic security. For example, the proximity of Chinese-funded manufacturing operations to the U.S., particularly in industries such as computer equipment and electronics, raises critical national security risks. Open-source reports highlight that factories producing semiconductors or telecommunications components near the U.S. border could enable covert surveillance, data theft, or the insertion of compromised technology into critical infrastructure. These fears are amplified when such operations involve components used in U.S. defense systems, cloud computing, or smart technologies integral to national infrastructure. Furthermore, integrating Chinese companies into North American supply chains risks creating dependencies that Beijing could exploit during geopolitical conflicts, disrupting essential goods or imposing economic leverage. China’s strategic investments in Mexico may also diminish the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions and trade policies by providing Beijing with alternative economic footholds in the region.^{[29],[30],[31]}

The Bahamas

China and The Bahamas established formal relations on 23 May 1997. Trade between China and The Bahamas, plus five (5) other Caribbean countries, has grown steadily over the past few decades. In 2022, China’s exports to The Bahamas totaled approximately $405 million, whereas Bahamian exports to China amounted to around $9 million. In addition, China has significantly invested in Bahamian infrastructure over the past 15 years, including a $30 million grant to develop a national stadium, preferential loans to construct a $3 billion megaport at Freeport, and $40 million to create a port off the island of Abaco. On 28 March 2024, the Bahamian Prime Minister endorsed China’s Global Development Initiative and reaffirmed the Bahamas’ commitment to the “One-China” policy.^{[32],[33],[34]}

In 2021, the USNORTHCOM Commander testified before the U.S. Senate about concerns regarding China’s growing influence in the Caribbean, particularly in The Bahamas, as part of its broader strategy to undermine U.S. dominance. For example, while China’s investments have helped to bolster local economic recovery from Hurricane Dorian and the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. officials warn that The Bahamas offers China a strategic foothold near critical U.S. infrastructure. In addition, Huawei has established a dominant presence in The Bahamas’ telecommunications market. In 2014, Bahamas Telecommunications Company (BTC) partnered with Huawei to upgrade the nation’s network to 4G LTE. Similarly, BTC’s main competitor, Aliv, relies heavily on Huawei for its infrastructure. Concerns about Huawei’s near monopoly in The Bahamas gained international attention in 2020, as an open-source report revealed evidence that Huawei equipment supplied to BTC had been used for cyberespionage targeting U.S. citizens.^{[35],[36],[37],[38],[39]}

Conclusion

China is rapidly expanding its economic and political influence in LAC by serving as South America’s top trading partner and a significant foreign direct investment and lending provider in essential industries. As highlighted above, many American security experts remain concerned that Chinese investments in LAC’s critical infrastructure, such as deep-water ports and space facilities, pose potential national security threats to the U.S. As the PRC continues investing in critical infrastructure sectors in the region, some American analysts argue that the United States Congress, in coordination with the Executive Branch, should explore innovative trade, industrial, and development policies that bolster economic cooperation, address supply chain concerns, and enhance U.S. financial and nonfinancial assistance to LAC countries.^[40],[41]

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[2] McBride, J., Berman, N., and Chatzky, A. (2023, February 2). China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.

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[4] Congressional Research Service. (2023, June 23). China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10982.

[5] Pettus, E. L. (2023, October 5). The Expanding Leverage of the People’s Republic of China in Latin America: Implications for US National Security and Global Order. Indo-Pacific Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3540614/the-expanding-leverage-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-in-latin-america-implic/.

[6] Myers, M., Melguizo, A., and Wang, Y. (2024, January). Emerging Trends in Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Dialogue. Retrieved from https://thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Emerging-Trends-in-Chinese-Foreign-Direct-Investment-in-LAC-4.pdf.

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[9] Myers, M. (2023, August 25). China’s Increasing Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-increasing-involvement-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.

[10] Alvarado, P. D. (2024, April). Huawei’s Expansion in Latin America and the Caribbean: Views from the Region. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/sr-529_huaweis-expansion-latin-america-caribbean-views-region.pdf.

[11] Berg, R.C. (2024, February 12). China and Russia engage Latin America and the Caribbean differently. Both threaten US interests. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/china-and-russia-engage-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-differently-both-threaten-us-interests/.

[12] Holmes, S., and Huesa, J. (2024, November 26). China in Latin America: November 2024. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/article/china-latin-america-november-2024.

[13] Aquino, M. (2024, November 11). Exclusive: Peru and China to sign strengthened free-trade agreement in Xi’s APEC visit. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/peru-china-sign-strengthened-free-trade-agreement-xis-apec-visit-2024-11-08/.

[14] Stepherd, C., and Li, L. (2024, November 14). China opens huge port in Peru to extend its reach in Latin America. Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/theaters/americas/2024-11-14/china-peru-port-latin-america-foothold-warship-15849859.html.

[15] Stott, M. (2024, November 4). Chinese warships could use Peru’s big new port, US general warns. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/f6589d13-6014-47d0-8cc5-e98a0b7ad0bc.

[16] Hughes, E. (2024, November 20). Brazil’s Lula welcomes China’s Xi for state visit as ties between countries strengthen. AP. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/brazil-china-xi-lula-b979f2f78530c917b37c47f97f24d96a.

[17] Paraguassu, L. (2024, November 20). Brazil development bank gets $690 million loan from China. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/brazil-development-bank-gets-690-million-loan-china-2024-11-20/.

[18] Associated Press. (2023, April 14). China’s Xi and Brazil’s Lula meet in Beijing to boost ties. NBC News. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-xi-jinping-brazil-lula-beijing-meeting-trading-partners-economy-rcna79732.

[19] Ferragamo, M. (2024, December 12). What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding#chapter-title-0-2.

[20] New Development Bank. (2023, December 8). Brazil Receives USD 1.7 Billion from New Development Bank. Retrieved from https://www.ndb.int/news/brazil-receives-usd-1-7-billion-from-new-development-bank/.

[21] Soliz de Stange, A. (2023, June 14). China and Brazil’s Cooperation in the Satellite Sector: Implications for the United States? Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3428204/china-and-brazils-cooperation-in-the-satellite-sector-implications-for-the-unit/.

[22] Chivvis, C.S. and Geaghan-Beinerm, B. (2023, December 13). Brazil in the Emerging World Order. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/brazil-in-the-emerging-world-order?lang=en.

[23] Ellis, R. E. (2024, February 16). China-Latin America Space Cooperation: An Overview. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/china-latin-america-space-cooperation-an-overview/.

[24] French, H.W. (2024, February 9). Mexico Is America’s Answer to China’s Belt and Road. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/09/united-states-mexico-immigration-border-china-trade-bri/.

[25] Ellis, R.E. (2023, August 11). Mexico’s Engagement with China and Choices for its Future. US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3495410/mexicos-engagement-with-china-and-choices-for-its-future/.

[26] Reuters. (2023, December 5). China and Mexico officials vow to strengthen cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/china-mexico-officials-vow-strengthen-cooperation-2023-12-05/.

[27] Goodman, P.S. (2023, June 20). Why Chinese Companies Are Investing Billions in Mexico. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/03/business/china-mexico-trade.html.

[28] Ezrarti, M. (2024, October 26). Mexico Also Wants To Decouple From China. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2024/10/26/mexico-also-wants-to-decouple-from-china/.

[29] Kuttner, R. (2022, February 1). China: Epicenter of the Supply Chain Crisis. The American Prospect. Retrieved from https://prospect.org/economy/china-epicenter-of-the-supply-chain-crisis/.

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[31] Industrial Cyber. (2024, October 7). Chinese cyberattack reportedly compromised US broadband providers, possibly accessing federal court data. Retrieved from https://industrialcyber.co/threats-attacks/chinese-cyberattack-reportedly-compromised-us-broadband-providers-possibly-accessing-federal-court-data/.

[32] The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). (2024, October). Bilateral Trade Profile: Chain & the Bahamas. Retrieved by https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/bhs.

[33] Griffin, P. J., and Danvers, W. (2021, November 15). A strategic challenge for the US: China and The Bahamas. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/581017-a-strategic-challenge-for-the-us-china-and-the-bahamas/.

[34] Office of The Prime Minister, Commonwealth of The Bahamas. (2024, April 23). Prime Minister Philip Davis’s Remarks for the Official Visit of His Excellency Mao Weiming, Governor of Hunan Province, People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from https://opm.gov.bs/prime-minister-davis-governor-mao-weiming-official-visit-remarks/.

[35] Ward, J. (2023, October 11). US general warns of China’s plan for influence in Bahamas, region. The Nassau Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.thenassauguardian.com/home/us-general-warns-of-china-s-plan-for-influence-in-bahamas-region/article_af712826-0100-530f-8915-153a8a851903.html.

[36] Brown, O. (2024, August 10). China’s Ambassador Strengthening Ties Between The Bahamas And China. Bahamas Chronicle. Retrieved from https://bahamaschronicle.com/chinas-ambassador-strengthening-ties-between-the-bahamas-and-china/.

[37] The Nassau Guardian. (2023, October 12). A strategic challenge for the US: China and The Bahamas. Retrieved from https://www.thenassauguardian.com/opinion/a-strategic-challenge-for-the-us-china-and-the-bahamas/article_5077ad78-a3c0-5a7b-936f-f4bf279b5273.html

[38] Foreign Affairs Committee. (2022, November 14). China Regional Snapshot: The Caribbean. Retrieved from https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-snapshot-project-the-caribbean/#:~:text=China%20is%20a%20member%20of,Tobago%2C%20Guyana%2C%20and%20Suriname.

[39] Ellis, R.E. (2023, August 2). PRC Engagement in The Bahamas. US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3495418/prc-engagement-in-the-bahamas/.

[40] Roy, D. (2023, June 15). China’s Growing Influence in Latin America. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri.

[41] Zhang, P. (2024, May). Pepe Zhang provides testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/testimony/pepe-zhang-provides-testimony-to-the-us-china-economic-and-security-review-commission/.

Introduction

In February 2024, RMC’s White Paper “Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) and the Force Protection Threat to DoD” outlined the potential uses, characteristics, and capabilities of sUAS. As highlighted in the paper, the Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledges that an adversary employing sUAS could challenge American military advantage and degrade the Joint Force’s freedom of maneuver across multiple domains. At the same time, civilians and private organizations use drones for filmmaking, law enforcement, utility inspections, emergency response, agriculture, and delivery. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), forecasts highlight the possibilities for as many as 1.92 million small recreational UAS units by 2028.^[1],[2],[3]

Over the past decade, Chinese drone companies, especially Da Jiang Innovations (DJI), have dominated the global commercial UAS market. While Shenzhen-based DJI controls a majority of the sUAS market share throughout the U.S. and the world, the “DoD’s Statement on DJI Systems” explicitly indicates that DJI poses “potential threats to national security.” The following white paper will outline DJI’s popularity in the drone market, examples of state and non-state actors employing DJI sUAS, potential security concerns associated with the company, and restrictions and legislation addressing Chinese-manufactured drones.^[4]

DJI’s Founding and Evolution

In 2006, Frank Wang founded DJI as a student at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology to develop a flying toy that would not crash most of the time. While DJI released its first quadcopters in 2011, its introduction of the first Phantom drone in 2013 revolutionized the market by providing an inexpensive model with straightforward controls. In 2016, DJI offered new imaging and flight capabilities in the Mavic Pro. The drone’s efficient design enabled consumers to transport the units easily and proved essential for future improvements to DJI’s designs and functionality. Furthermore, in 2018, the Mavic Air’s release introduced a lightweight model with new preprogrammed flight modes, autonomous operation, and unique features. Following these aerial innovations, DJI debuted its flagship Mavic 2 Pro and Zoom to provide high-end camera options, safety features, and simple operating and flying mechanisms. DJI Mavic 3’s release in 2022 included significant capability improvements, including approximately 45 minutes of flight time, omnidirectional obstacle sensing, and a transmission range of 15 km. The cost-to-flight ratio between the DJI Phantom and DJI Mavic 3 models, released almost 10 years apart, increased by 17.5%.^{[5],[6],[7],[8],[9]}

Figure 1 illustrates the DJI Mavic 3 Pro’s estimated transmission range within the setting of Washington, D.C.

Figure 1
DJI Mavic 3 Pro: Transmission Ranges to and from the Washington Monument

These developments and further innovations helped DJI capture approximately 77% of the American hobby drone market and 90% of the global commercial drone service provider market, according to estimates from 2020. More recent estimates concur that DJI continues to control most of the market. DJI drones also have been widely used by American public-safety agencies. According to open-source reports released in 2023, DJI drones comprised a majority of sUAS units registered by local governments and police departments in New Jersey and systems used for official operation in the State of New York. Furthermore, before a recent ban was initiated in Florida, almost half of the drones registered by state and local governments and police departments there were manufactured by DJI. In addition, security forces and government agencies of allies of the U.S. rely on DJI systems. For example, as of 2023, DJI products comprise more than two-thirds of drones operated by police forces in the United Kingdom.^[9],[10]

Employment of DJI Drones

DJI drones used in the Russian-Ukraine conflict highlight the platform’s capabilities. Small recreational UAS models like the DJI Mavic quadcopter have assisted both armies in reconnaissance missions and delivering bombs. For example, in March 2023, Ukraine obtained 300 DJI Mavic 3T UAVs through its “Army of Drones” program. According to a Ukrainian press release, each aerial vehicle included a thermal sensor and a high-powered zoom camera that allows an operator to conduct reconnaissance, artillery, and night operations. An unclassified report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence also revealed that China had shipped more than $12 million in drones and components to Russia as of March 2023. While DJI announced in 2022 that it would suspend all sales in Ukraine and Russia, a study of at least 1,000 cases of drones used for reconnaissance and attacks in the conflict from March 2022 to March 2023 found that DJI platforms accounted for more than half of identifiable units.^{[11],[12],[13],[14],[15],[16],[17]}

Open-source reporting also reveals the use of DJI drones in the Israel-Hamas conflict. Expert analysis of the 07 October 2023 attack indicates that Hamas employed modified commercial quadcopter drones, including aerial vehicles manufactured by DJI, to drop explosives onto Israel’s observation towers. These attacks successfully disrupted sensors, communications, and weapons systems along the border of Gaza. Footage from one of the attacks shows an armed DJI quadcopter drone taking out an Israeli Merkava tank. The IDF has also used DJI platforms for their operations, including the DJI Avata, to explore tunnels constructed by Hamas.^{[18],[19],[20],[21],[22]}

Finally, analysis from the assassination attempt of former President Trump in Butler, PA, on 13 July 2024 indicates that the gunman surveyed the area using a DJI drone. Roughly two (2) hours before the rally, the 20-year-old gunman flew the drone about 200 yards from the stage for approximately 11 minutes. Investigators also found the drone in the shooter’s car after the attempt on the former president’s life.^[23],[24]

Security Concerns and Bans on DJI Drones

In 2015, China initiated its “Made in China 2025” strategic plan, which is a ten-year effort to invest in key industries and maintain its global leadership and market dominance. China has promoted sophisticated market mechanisms and minimized red tape to initiate rapid growth as part of this effort. Furthermore, the PRC’s “Military-Civil Fusion” and “The National Security Law of the PRC” indicate that citizens and private organizations in China are required to assist the government and intelligence services with security issues. The Chinese Community Party remains committed to these strategies and laws within the commercial drone industry, directing companies to invest significantly in drones and components, develop domestic supply chains, and acquire and transfer western technology. For example, open-source reports reveal that at least four (4) Chinese investment companies with close ties to the PRC are investors in DJI. These investors include the China Chengtong Holdings Group, Shanghai Venture Capital Guidance Fund, Guangdong Hengjian Investment Holding, and the State Development & Investment Corporation. With the PRC’s strong backing of its drone industry over the past decade, DJI and other Chinese companies have been able to flood the worldwide market with lower-cost drones that have more advanced capabilities.^{[25],[8],[26]}

Figure 2 illustrates China’s extensive global UAS exports in 2023.

Figure 2
Chinese UAS Exports and Imports, 2023^[27]

Given the PRC’s expanded control of companies and data within China, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a “Cybersecurity Guidance” document in January 2024 addressing Chinese-manufactured UAS. According to CISA and the FBI, “the use of Chinese-manufactured UAS in critical infrastructure operations risks exposing sensitive information to PRC authorities, jeopardizing U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.” The document highlights that the many points of connections associated with UAS can present exploitation opportunities. For example, updates managed by Chinese entities can lead to unknown data collection and transmission capabilities without the owner’s knowledge.^[28]

On 24 May 2017, the Department of the Navy released an internal memo citing the operational risks of using the “DJI Family of Products.” According to the memo (released under the Freedom of Information Act), DJI systems have potential cyber vulnerabilities, particularly involving the data link between the aircraft and the ground station. On 02 August 2017, the U.S. Army issued a memo ordering all personnel to stop using DJI drones due to cyber vulnerabilities. In June 2019, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2020, which prohibits the operation or procurement of UAS manufactured in a “covered foreign country” (defined as China by Public Law 116-92) by the DoD for military activities and the Department of Energy for defense activities. In addition, the Department of Commerce added DJI to its Entity List on 21 December 2020, terminating DJI’s access to American technology, suppliers, and markets.^{[29],[30],[31]}

In January 2021, Executive Order 13981 and the passing of Senate Bill 73 prohibited the federal government from procuring or using UAS models manufactured or assembled by entities based in China or subject to influence or control by the PRC. Two (2) years later, the U.S. Senate passed a similar bill, the American Secure Drone Act of 2023, which was incorporated into the NDAA for FY2024. A few states also have banned DJI products, including Florida and Mississippi. Mississippi’s Senate Bill 2853, passed in 2023, requires all sUAS units acquired by the state or any agency or political subdivision to be purchased from a manufacturing company incorporated and headquartered in the U.S.^{[32],[33],[34]}

Countering Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Drones Act Overview

In February 2022, Congresswoman Elise Stefanik (R-NY) introduced the “Countering CCP Drones Act,” which passed the House of Representatives on 09 September 2024. The bill requires telecommunications and video surveillance equipment or services produced by DJI to be included on a “list of communications equipment or services determined by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security.” Other companies on the “Covered List” include Huawei Technologies Company, ZTE Corporation, and Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company. Proponents of the bill cite national security concerns and indicate that banning DJI drones from operating on American communications infrastructure will foster the growth of a competitive domestic drone industry. The Countering CCP Drones Act now sits with the Senate, with some predicting the Senate version of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) could incorporate the bill.^{[35],[36],[37]}

While the Countering CCP Drones Act has earned bipartisan support, many companies and industry representatives oppose the bill. Critics claim banning DJI drones could limit commercial options and increase costs for companies and consumers. They also assert that a ban on DJI drones could disrupt the operations of law enforcement agencies, first responders, and farmers who rely on the company’s products. DJI states that lawmakers therein “reference inaccurate and unsubstantiated allegations regarding DJI’s operations” and denies that their drones “collect flight logs, photos, or video by default.” DJI continues to fight against market restrictions by sponsoring and maintaining the Drone Advocacy Alliance website.^[35],[38]

Ongoing Developments

In 2022, the DoD included DJI on its list of “Chinese military companies” (CMC) operating directly or indirectly in the U.S. in accordance with the statutory requirement of Section 1260H of the NDAA for FY2021. On 18 October 2024, a former U.S. Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the DoD on behalf of DJI for including the company. In the lawsuit, DJI argues that it is “neither owned nor controlled by the Chinese military.” DJI claims that it has “lost business deals, been stigmatized as a national security threat, and been banned from contracting with multiple federal government agencies” due to the DoD’s decision. This lawsuit shortly follows open-source media reports that DJI informed distributors that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection is citing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) to withhold some sUAS units from being imported. The UFLPA prohibits importation of goods produced entirely or partly in the Xinjiang region in response to what the U.S. government details as forced labor abuses directed at Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups.^[39],[40]

Conclusion

In the “Cybersecurity Guidance” referenced above, CISA and the FBI encourage public and private sector organizations to reference the DoD’s Blue UAS Cleared List for models compliant with federal cybersecurity policies. After the FY2020 NDAA was signed into law, in which section 848 prohibited specific components from covered countries, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) started the Blue UAS initiative in August 2020. Blue UAS maintains and includes a list of policy-approved commercial UAS models for DoD and government users that are validated by the DIU as “cyber-secure” and “safe to fly.”  As of May 2024, the Blue UAS Cleared List includes at least 26 platforms manufactured by 14 different entities. A platform added to the list requires a DoD customer to sponsor its inclusion or has the capability to meet a DoD customer’s needs when the DIU initiates a “Commercial Solutions Opening.” As DJI and other Chinese drone companies encounter increasing market restrictions within the U.S., public and private entities could consult the DIU’s evolving Blue UAS Cleared List to meet their commercial drone needs.^[41]

[1] Shaikh, S., Karako, T., and McLoughlin, M. (2023, November). Countering Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems: Air Defense by and for the Joint Force. CSIS. Retrieved from https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-11/231114_Shaikh_Countering_sUAS.pdf?VersionId= qJtlCY3Z071CXL0Dt8_wD5ul9UIdmUFj.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense. (2021, January). Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/07/2002561080/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-COUNTER-SMALL-UNMANNED-AIRCRAFT-SYSTEMS-STRATEGY.PDF.

[3] FAA. (n.d). Emerging Aviation Entrants: Unmanned Aircraft System and Advanced Air Mobility. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/unmanned_ aircraft_systems.pdf.

[4] U.S. Department of Defense. (2021). Department Statement on DJI Systems. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2706082/department-statement-on-dji-systems/.

[5] Santo, B. (2018, December 27). The Consumer Electronics Hall of Fame: DJI Phantom Drone. IEEE Spectrum. Retrieved from https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-consumer-electronics-hall-of-fame-dji-phantom-drone.

[6] Chiu, Karen. (2018, October 2). The story of drone pioneer DJI. SCMP. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/abacus/who-what/what/article/3028241/story-drone-pioneer-dji.

[7] Vox Creative. (2020, March 23). The evolution of the DJI Mavic Series, from an ambitious idea to the world’s flagship drone to a tool for crisis. The Verge. Retrieved from https://www.theverge.com/ ad/21167685/dji-mavic-drone-series-evolution.

[8] Kroenig, M., and Bayoumi, I. (2024, June 27). A Global Strategy to Secure UAS Supply Chains. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-global-strategy-to-secure-uas-supply-chains/.

[9] AUVSI. (2024, September). Whitepaper: AUVSI Partnership for Drone Competitiveness. Partnership for Drone Competitiveness. Retrieved from https://www.auvsi.org/sites/default/files/AUVSI-Partnership-for-Drone-Competitiveness-White-Paper.pdf.

[10] Brewster, T. (2023, June). US States Fly Thousands Of Chinese Drones Across the East Coast. Marco Rubio is Furious. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/ 2023/06/01/american-states-fly-thousands-of-chinese-drones-across-east-coast/.

[11] Myre, G. (2023, March 28). A Chinese drone for hobbyists plays a crucial role in the Russia-Ukraine war. NPR. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2023/03/21/1164977056/a-chinese-drone-for-hobbyists-plays-a-crucial-role-in-the-russia-ukraine-war.

[12] Zafra, M., Hunder, M., Rao, A., & Kiyada, S. (2024, March 26). How Drone Combat In Ukraine Is Changing Warfare. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/.

[13] Bertrand, N. (2023, July 27). US intel report details increasing importance of Chinese technology to Russia’s war in Ukraine. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/27/politics/us-intelligence-report-russia-china-ukraine/index.html.

[14] Ross. P.E. (2023, May 17). Budget Drones in Ukraine Are Redefining Warfare. Spectrum. Retrieved from https://spectrum.ieee.org/drone-warfare-ukraine.

[15] Luzin, P. (2023, November 23).  Russian Military Drones: Past, Present, and Future of the UAV Industry. FPRI. Retrieved from https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/11/russian-military-drones-past-present-and-future-of-the-uav-industry/

[16] Crumley, B. (2024, March 31). Ukraine sends 300 DJI Mavic 3T drones to battle Russians ahead of expected offensive. Drone DJ. Retrieved from https://dronedj.com/2023/03/31/ukraine-sends-300-dji-mavic-3t-drones-to-battle-russians-ahead-of-expected-offensive/.

[17] Vallance, C. (2022, April 27). Chinese drone firm DJI pauses operations in Russia and Ukraine. BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-61179022.

[18] Kaniewski, D. (2023, October 20). Hamas: Learning about drone warfare from the war in Ukraine. DW. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/hamas-learning-about-drone-warfare-from-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67169578.

[19] Byman, D., McCabe, R., Palmer, A., Doxsee C., Holtz, M., and Duff, D. (2023, December 19). Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Data. CSIS. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/ analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data.

[20] Armitage, R. (2023, November 05). The skies over Gaza are abuzz with drones. Some are Israeli, some are American, and some are flying bombs made by Hamas. ABC. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-06/drones-flying-over-and-within-gaza/103067280.

[21] Jankowicz, M. (2023, October 10). How Hamas likely used rudimentary drones to ‘blind and deafen’ Israel’s border and pave the way for its onslaught. Business Insider. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/hamas-drones-take-out-comms-towers-ambush-israel-2023-10.

[22] Kesteloo, H. (2023, November 20). DJI Avata Drones: A New Tool in IDF Military Operations. Drone XL. Retrieved from https://dronexl.co/2023/11/20/dji-avata-drones-idf-military-operations/.

[23] Kosnar, M., & Dilanian, K. (2024, July 19). Trump shooter flew drone over venue hours before attempted assassination, source says. NBC News. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-shooter-flew-drone-venue-hours-attempted-assassination-source-sa-rcna162817.

[24] Lybrand, H., Rabinowitz, H., and Cole, D. (2024, July 24). Takeaways from FBI testimony: Trump shooter searched details of JFK assassination and flew drone near rally site. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/24/politics/fbi-wray-house-hearing-trump-shooting/index.html.

[25] PRC State Council. (2022, March 08). Notice of the State Council on the Publication of “Made in China 2025.” Center for Security and Emerging Technology. Retrieved from https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0432_made_in_china_2025_EN.pdf.

[26] Cadell, C. (2022, February 1). Drone Company DJI Obscured Ties to Chinese State Funding, Documents Show. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2706082/department-statement-on-dji-systems/.

[27] UN Comtrade Database. (n.d). Trade Data. Retrieved from https://comtradeplus.un.org/ TradeFlow.

[28] CISA and FBI. (2024, January). Cybersecurity Guidance: Chinese-Manufactured UAS. Retrieved from https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/Cybersecurity%20Guidance%20Chinese-Manufactured%20UAS.pdf.

[29] National Security Archive. (n.d.). Department of the Navy Memorandum raised possibility of cyber vulnerabilities, susceptibility to electromagnetic interference. National Security Archive. Retrieved from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/cyber-vault/2019-12-16/military-concerns-over-chinese-dji-drones.

[30] U.S. Congress. (2019, December 20). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/.

[31] National Archives. (2020). Addition of Entities to the Entity List, Revision of Entry on the Entity List, and Removal of Entities From the Entity List. Retrieved from https://www.federalregister.gov/ documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-entry-on-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-entities.

[32] U.S. Congress. (2021). S.73 – American Security Drone Act of 2021. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/73/text.

[33] National Archives. (2021). S.73 – American Security Drone Act of 2021. Retrieved from https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/22/2021-01646/protecting-the-united-states-from-certain-unmanned-aircraft-systems.

[34] Mississippi Legislature. (2023). Mississippi Senate Bill 2853. Retrieved from https://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2023/html/SB/2800-2899/SB2853IN.htm

[35] Govtrack.us. (n.d.). H.R. 2864: Countering CCP Drones Act. Retrieved from https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/118/hr2864/text.

[36] Federal Communications Commission. (2024, September). List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act. Retrieved from https://www.fcc.gov/ supplychain/coveredlist.

[37] Howe, S. (2024, September 24). Who’s Opposed to the Proposed DJI Ban? Commercial UAV News. Retrieved from https://www.commercialuavnews.com/who-s-opposed-to-the-proposed-dji-ban.

[38] DJI ViewPoints Team. (2024, March 1). The Countering CCP Drones Act (An Attempt To Ban DJI). Retrieved from https://viewpoints.dji.com/blog/get-the-facts-countering-ccp-drones-act.

[39] Shepardson, D. (2024, October 21). Drone Maker DJI Sues Pentagon Over Chinese Military Listing. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/legal/chinese-dronemaker-dji-sues-pentagon-over-chinese-military-listing-2024-10-19/

[40] Martina, M., and Shepardson, D. (2024, October 16). US Customs halts some drone imports from Chinese manufacturer DJI, company says. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-customs-halting-some-drone-imports-chinese-manufacturer-dji-company-says-2024-10-16/.

[41] Defense Innovation Unit. (2024, May). About Blue UAS. Retrieved from https://www.diu.mil/blue-uas.

Introduction

This white paper is the second of RMC’s 2024 Election Series focused on potential threats to this election cycle. This paper will provide detailed information on domestic threats to the 2024 elections. Threat actors from the extreme left- and right-wing of the American political spectrum are likely to protest, create civil disturbances, and commit acts of political violence as the November elections approach. Misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation on both sides serve to fuel the heated environment. This paper is not an all-inclusive assessment of potential threats but is intended to highlight the potential for election related protests, civil disturbances, domestic terrorism, and political violence.

 Current Domestic Extremism Environment in the U.S.

The domestic extremism environment in the U.S. is marked by a range of ideologically-driven groups and individuals who pose various threat levels. These groups and individuals often have religious, racial, or ethnic causes that push them to acts of violence. Some actors use the Constitutional right to free speech, expression, and assembly to incite conflict and later justify their actions. Furthermore, since the incident at the U.S. Capitol Building on 06 January 2021, domestic extremists have evolved and adapted their strategies. Several groups have been trying to affect changes at the local level, including hosting conferences, and challenging local school district policies. They hope to embed their concerns into mainstream conservative discourse with minimal scrutiny. This has allowed them to initiate conflicts at the local level and made it more difficult for law enforcement to mitigate future potential incidents.^[1],[2]

The Founding Fathers intended for the American system of government to be slow and deliberate, with checks and balances. However, society promotes an increasingly fast pace via technology and modern conveniences. This leads to an expectation that the federal government can operate at the same pace and immediately change with the times. This leads to frustration on both ends of the political spectrum. The ease of spreading extremist ideologies has intensified political and social divisions, making it more difficult for diverse groups to find common ground. This can lead to gridlock in political institutions and exacerbate conflicts over policy and governance.^[1],[3],[4]

As the presidential election approaches, it is likely that the presence of violent extremists will increase, as evidenced by the 13 July 2024 assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump at a campaign rally. Domestic extremist groups are relatively easy to monitor as they often publish their ideologies and recruit new members online. Lone actors are more difficult to identify and target because they often lack the interactions and indicators that law enforcement uses to investigate threat groups. Because they carry out attacks by themselves, it is much more difficult to disrupt their plans. The threats posed by groups and individuals on both sides of the political spectrum must be understood to properly defend against them while still protecting and upholding Constitutional rights.^[1],[5]

Issues Driving Political Discourse in the 2024 Election

The issues deepening the political division between left- and right-wing groups are diverse. Abortion, crime, border security, foreign policy, and election integrity all have the potential to spark unrest and violence. Both sides have deep-seated beliefs and are unlikely to find middle ground on these issues.^[6]

The Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturned Roe v. Wade and sent the legality of abortion back to the states. Since then, conservative states have significantly limited access to the procedure, ranging from total bans, some of which include exclusions (for rape, incest, and saving the life of the mother), to bans after certain timeframes, usually between six (6) and 15 weeks of pregnancy. More liberal states still allow access to abortion up to 24 weeks of pregnancy while others allow abortions to take place until birth. These varied polices, while welcomed within their states, continue to drive a broader national argument.^[7],[8],[9]

The debate surrounding border security includes questions about how to humanely treat migrants unlawfully entering the country. The political left generally believes that they should be welcomed and supported, including a path to citizenship and, in some jurisdictions, the right to vote. The right has raised concerns over the economic impact and the idea tacitly rewarding those who have broken the law. The idea of “America First” opposes taking care of non-citizens before fixing domestic issues like the national debt, education, veteran’s issues, and homelessness.^[7],[8]

Closely related to the border security issues is crime. The political right points to rising crime rates, particularly in large cities, which it blames on liberal policies. This often includes emphasizing violence committed by illegal immigrants against American citizens. The political left claims that crime rates are not increasing and, therefore, wants to deemphasize the issue. In reality, crime reporting to the U.S. Department of Justice has been incomplete since 2020, with many jurisdictions choosing not to furnish yearly statistics. Both sides of the political aisle have been accused of selectively emphasizing data that supports their arguments.^[7],[8]

Foreign policy, particularly support for the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, also creates division. The right, historically supportive of overseas military intervention, questions the cost and if American interests are truly at stake. The left, historically critical of such intervention, is now supporting Ukraine’s fight against Russia, while remaining divided on Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza. The Jewish community in the U.S. has historically supported the Democratic party. However, left-wing protestors supporting Palestinian issues (and even outright championing Hamas) also generally align themselves with the Democratic party. This dichotomy in an election year complicates the issue on the left. The two (2) major political parties’ evolution here has both created internal division and enflamed tensions across the aisle.^[7],[8]

Election integrity is another issue exacerbating the political divide in America. Lawsuits regarding election integrity have been filed nationwide by both sides of the political spectrum. Texas recently reported removing over one (1) million voters from their rolls in the last three (3) years. Most were deceased voters, and the rest were removed for not being current residents, including approximately 1,900 illegal immigrants. Michigan, on the other hand, recently passed a bill limiting the ability to contest election results and initiate recounts post-election. Multiple investigations and lawsuits regarding electronic voting machines, ballot harvesting, irregularities, and claims of election fraud during the 2020 election have produced mixed results. As a result of these issues, the political right tends to be highly suspicious of the different voting systems and laws that govern each states’ elections while the political left is tends to be supportive of current voting systems. The Constitution holds that each state has authority over election administration.^[7],[8]

Left-Wing Threat Actors

The most significant left-wing threat actors in the U.S. include groups and movements motivated by anti-capitalist, anarchist, and communist or socialist ideologies. Among the most prominent in recent years is Antifa, a loosely organized movement that opposes what it deems to be fascism, white supremacy, and/or far-right ideologies, often using violence (“direct action”) to further its goals. Although not a centralized group, Antifa cells and their members have been involved in street-level confrontations, property damage, and counterprotests, particularly during periods of heightened political tension.  Black Lives Matter (BLM) is primarily a social and political movement, with multiple national and local nonprofits adopting the moniker, along with unaffiliated supporters who identify with the movement online. BLM has been associated with a wide range of protest activities, some of which have been controversial. While many BLM-related actions are peaceful, there have been several instances where protests have escalated into violence and property damage.^[10],[11]

The potential for unrest on the part of left-wing groups may be heightened depending upon several factors. Incidents involving law enforcement and those involving alleged “racial injustice” have historically triggered protests. Additionally, the outcome of the upcoming U.S. presidential election, particularly if former President Trump is reelected, may lead to widespread demonstrations. The involvement of more radical left-wing elements may result in confrontations, property damage, or other forms of civil disturbance. Law enforcement and security agencies typically prepare for such possibilities in the lead-up to major elections.^[11]

Left-wing activists may mobilize if they believe that the election outcome threatens democratic principles, social justice, or civil rights. The potential for clashes with right-wing groups or for confrontations with law enforcement is high. The situation may be further exacerbated by misinformation, inflammatory rhetoric, and the mobilization of extremist elements. As such, authorities must continue to prepare for a range of scenarios to manage and mitigate potential post-election violence.^[12]

Right-Wing Threat Actors

Right-wing extremist organizations continue to recruit, train and plan for actions before, during, and after the election. Actions prior to the election may include assassination threats against candidates and public officials, the targeting of large voter gatherings, and domestic disturbances at key dates associated with former President Trump’s ongoing legal cases. Actions during the election may include threats against polling offices, election workers, and collection points. The post-election phase may include attacks against government buildings, law enforcement, or directly against officials deemed responsible for real or perceived malfeasance and corruption.^[13]

Organizations that may be significant sources for the right-wing extremism groups include the accelerationist Boogaloo movement, the neo-fascist skullmask movement, the Oath Keepers, and the Proud Boys. In 2019, a top Federal Bureau of Investigation official told Congress that the agency only devoted a small amount of resources to combat the domestic threat, at an estimated 20%. Members of several right-wing organizations have traveled to conflict zones, including the war in Ukraine, for training and to seek the mentorship of veteran fighters. Right-wing threat actors vary in ideology and are constantly evolving. Some are decentralized ideological networks rather than clear hierarchical organizations. They organize themselves into local groups or chapters ensuring there is no national organization to coordinate their activity. These right-wing threat actors will continue to demonstrate an ability and willingness to capitalize on socially divisive situations to advance their anti-government aims. The threat of violence is likely to increase during periods of political unrest as its members may attempt to hijack public demonstrations and social and/or racial justice rallies to sow chaos.^[14],[15]

The threat of violence from far-right threat actors in the U.S. will remain high, marked by lone offenders or small group attacks that occur with little warning. These actors will continue to be inspired by a mix of conspiracy theories, personal grievances, and enduring racial, ethnic, religious, and anti-government ideologies. Since 2022, there have been three (3) fatal attacks in the U.S., resulting in 21 deaths. Multiple non-lethal attacks have been documented as well. Law enforcement has disrupted over a half-dozen plots during the same period targeting law enforcement, government institutions, faith-based organizations, retail locations, ethnic and religious minorities, healthcare infrastructure, transportation services, and the energy sector. While violent extremists will likely continue to use accessible, easy-to-use weapons for these attacks, they also will leverage social media and encrypted communications platforms to share novel tactics and techniques. Communication and planning online will likely grow as they continue to spread their views, recruit followers, and inspire future attacks. Some have improved the quality of their video and written content online, which may help them to recruit new followers and inspire attacks.^[16]

Conclusion

Left- and right-wing extremist groups are as varied as the issues driving the political divide in the U.S. Finding middle ground is more difficult now than any other time in modern history. Extremist groups on both sides are using technology to spread their ideological views and propaganda to garner support for their causes. While political campaigns distance themselves from these groups, they still tread lightly for fear of losing their votes. Many, if not most, people involved in extremist movements are also highly motivated voters. These groups may even deescalate their rhetoric, protests (both nonviolent and otherwise), or other public activities leading up to the election to curry favor with moderate voters who may vote for the same candidate.

The U.S. has become increasingly polarized, with deep divisions across political, social, and cultural lines. If the election results are close, contested, or perceived as illegitimate by a significant portion of the population, the likelihood of unrest increases. Protests, demonstrations, and other forms of civil disturbance may arise, driven by both left-wing and right-wing groups. However, the groups at either end of the political spectrum continue to issue both real and implied threats, only time will tell if they intend to act on them.

[1] National Security Council. (2021, June). National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. National Security Council. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf.

[2] Holt, J. (n.d.). How Domestic Extremism Adapted and Evolved After the January 6 US Capitol Attack. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/after-the-insurrection-how-domestic-extremists-adapted-and-evolved-after-the-january-6-us-capitol-attack/.

[3] Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2021, June 15). White House Unveils Strategy to Combat Domestic Extremism. NY Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/us/politics/biden-domestic-terrorism-extremists.html.

[4] Department of Treasury (n.d.). Domestic Violent Extremism. Department of Treasury. Retrieved from https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/terrorism-and-illicit-finance/domestic-violent-extremism.

[5] Department of Homeland Security. (2022, March 11). DHS Releases Report on Internal Review of Domestic Violent Extremism. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/03/11/dhs-releases-report-internal-review-domestic-violent-extremism.

[6] Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis. (2023, September). Homeland Threat Assessment. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf.

[7] Pew Research Center. (2024, February 29). Americans’ Top Policy Priority for 2024: Strengthening the Economy. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/29/americans-top-policy-priority-for-2024-strengthening-the-economy/.

[8] Pew Research Center. (2024, June 6). Cultural Issues and the 2024 Election. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/06/cultural-issues-and-the-2024-election/.

[9] Hensley, E and Washington, J. (2024, May 1) How Major Abortion Laws Compare, State by State. The Fuller Project. Retrieved from fullerproject.org/story/how-major-abortion-laws-compare-state-by-state-map/.

[10] Goff, K and McCarthy, J. (2022, February 8) No, antifa didn’t ‘infiltrate’ Black Lives Matter during the 2020 protests. But did it increase violence? Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/08/antifa-blm-extremism-violence/.

[11] 118^th Congress. (2023, March 7). H.Res.202 – Deeming certain conduct of members of Antifa as domestic terrorism and designating Antifa as a domestic terrorist organization. U.S. Congress. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-resolution/202/text.

[12] Hoffman, B and Ware, J. (2024, June 28). How Bad Will Political Violence in the U.S. Get? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/28/civil-war-political-violence-u-s-2024-election/.

[13] Council on Foreign Relations. (2024, April 23). There Is a Risk of Extremist Violence Around the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. CFR. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/news-releases/there-risk-extremist-violence-around-2024-us-presidential-election-warns-new-cfr.

[14] Rotella, S. (2021, January 22). Global Right-Wing Extremism Networks Are Growing. The U.S. is Just Now Catching Up. ProPublica. Retrieved from https://www.propublica.org/article/global-right-wing-extremism-networks-are-growing-the-u-s-is-just-now-catching-up.

[15] George Washington University. (2024). Domestic Extremism. GW. Retrieved from https://extremism.gwu.edu/domestic-extremism

[16] Homeland Security. (2024). Homeland Threat Assessment. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf

Introduction

The 2024 U.S. presidential election will be held on Tuesday, 05 November 2024, amid myriad domestic issues and the most significant political polarization in decades. The worldwide great power competition, wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and Chinese aggression towards Taiwan have escalated tension in ways that are reminiscent of the 1968 election cycle. Incumbent President Joe Biden (a Democrat) has decided to not seek reelection, leaving the Democrat nomination open for the time being, despite widespread endorsements for Vice President Kamala Harris. Former President Donald Trump (a Republican) has officially received his party’s nomination. The race also features at least three (3) notable third-party candidates who may influence the election outcome. This complex situation is likely conducive to a variety of threat actors, both foreign and domestic.

This white paper is the first in RMC’s 2024 Election Series that will examine potential threats associated with the current landscape. This paper will provide historical precedent and a top-level overview of the threats from foreign and domestic actors. Future papers will examine the involved parties and their activities in-depth, including coverage of follow-on events.

 The 1968 Presidential Election Cycle: Precedent for 2024

The term “unprecedented” has become common across media sources to describe the current political climate. However, the 1960s and 1970s were also time of great turmoil, with the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, and worldwide nuclear proliferation. Concerns over communist influence and espionage were rampant. The country was also at the height of several protest movements for civil rights, withdrawal from Vietnam (and the end of the Selective Service draft), women’s rights, and environmentalism. There was also a growing sexual revolution and emergent drug culture. Crime was on the rise nationally.^[1],[2]

This tumultuous climate led to regular demonstrations, particularly on college campuses. Many turned violent, with injuries and property damage. Clashes between police and protesters were common. In November 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. In April 1968, civil rights pioneer Dr. Marting Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in Memphis. In November of that same year, President Kennedy’s brother and likely presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy was also shot and killed in Los Angeles.^[1],[2]

During the 1968 presidential election, many voters were concerned for the nation’s future. War, inflation, unemployment, crime, and protest activity fostered a contentious environment that caused President Lyndon Johnson (a Democrat), amid primary challenges, to not seek reelection. Following the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, Hubert Humphries to become the Democratic nominee. Richard Nixon returned from virtual political exile to become the Republican nominee, running on a platform of improving the economy, America’s inner cities, crime, education, healthcare, immigration, Middle East stability, and European security against the Soviet-Union. He also sought a progressive de-Americanization of the Vietnam War.^{[1],[2],[3],[4]}

Nixon would go on to win the election with a thin majority of the popular vote (0.7%). His election would not bring an end to the unrest. In 1970, National Guard troops opened fire at an anti-war protest at Kent State University, wounding nine (9) and killing (4). The Students for a Democratic Society, a college organization founded in 1962, lead to the radical offshoot the Weather Underground in 1969. The organization would go on to conduct bombings, murders and kidnapping, mostly against U.S. government targets and individuals deemed to be part of “the establishment.” Other groups such as the Black Liberation Army, Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, New World Liberation Front, and Symbionese Liberation Army would also conduct violent political action on American soil.^[5],[6],[7]

Commonalities between the 1968 and 2024 election cycle include overseas wars, tensions in the Middle East, competition with China, inflation, economic issues, abortion, crime, immigration, and political violence, including the recent assassination attempt on former President (and now Candidate) Donald Trump. Understanding this historical context aids in predictive analysis of potential threats in relation to the 2024 election, which is the first step in mitigation.

2024 Presidential Election Outlook

The Department of Homeland Security’s 2024 Homeland Threat Assessment indicates that U.S. electoral processes remain an attractive target for adversaries, many of whom will likely seek to influence or interfere with the 2024 election. Some Domestic Violent Extremists (DVE) may attempt to disrupt civic and democratic processes, mobilized by their perceptions of the upcoming election cycle. Nation-state threat actors will likely use novel technologies and cyber tools to undermine national confidence in a free and fair election. Cyber actors likely will seek to exploit election-related systems, including state, local, and political parties’ networks, as well as election officials’ personal devices and e-mail accounts. DHS assesses that civil disturbances, targeted political violence, and foreign influence efforts are likely during the 2024 election cycle.^[8]

Domestic Threats

The 2020 Presidential Election was one of the most contested and disputed elections in history, which led to the riot at the U.S. Capitol on 06 January 2021. Misinformation and disinformation reached new heights as technology agitated online discourse, which manifested in the real world. The political divide of the 2020 election cycle remains unresolved and new issues have emerged. Some DVEs, particularly those motivated by conspiracy theories and anti-government or partisan grievances, may seek to disrupt electoral processes. Threats and violence could be directed at government officials, voters, and election infrastructure, including polling places, ballot drop box locations, voter registration sites, campaign events, political party offices, and vote counting sites.^[8]

Divisive issues that may incite protests and violence include:^[9],[10]

• American financial support to Ukraine and Israel, especially considering rising inflation and economic issues in the U.S.
• Protests against Israel’s war against Hamas, including the use of antisemitic rhetoric, which has resulted in counter protests.
• Foreign policy, particularly regarding China, Russia, Ukraine, NATO expansion and Israel.
• The U.S. Southern Border and illegal immigration, which have escalated concerns over the integrity of the 2024 election.
• Election integrity, including the security of voting machines and the use of mail-in ballots and drop boxes, along with potentially outdated voter rolls.
• Abortion, which was sent back to the states by the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision overturning Roe v. Wade.
• National crime rates, with divides between those who believe in stricter enforcement and those who feel law enforcement unjustifiably targets marginalized socioeconomic groups.

Recent Domestic Developments

The recent assassination attempt on former President Trump highlights the potential for political violence in this election season. While the incident seems to have unified the right, bipartisan calls to deescalate rhetoric only lasted a few days. The investigation into the circumstances that permitted the attempt are ongoing.

On Sunday, 21 July, President Biden announced that he will not seek reelection. He is now endorsing Vice President Kamala Harris. President Biden’s delegates to the Democratic National Convention will ultimately decide the Democrat nominee based on party guidelines. While conventional wisdom suggests they will vote for Vice President Harris, they are not strictly bound by President Biden’s endorsement. However unlikely, if she does not win a majority of support from delegates there could be a contested Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The last time this happened in 1968, Chicago experienced violent protests that resulted in clashes with the police, later fueling complaints of brutality by law enforcement officers.

Foreign Threats

Russia, China, and Iran likely view the 2024 election cycle as an opportunity to conduct overt and covert influence campaigns aimed at shaping favorable US policy outcomes and undermining American stability. These adversarial states are likely to use artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies to improve the quality and reach of their influence operations, spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to undermine trust in institutions, social cohesion, and election integrity. These efforts will likely increase as November approaches.^[8],[11]

According to the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Russia has considered elections as opportunities to conduct influence operations for decades. In 2024, Russia’s primary concern is the effect U.S. election outcomes may have on their war in Ukraine and will likely attempt to influence them in support of its goals.^[11]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the primary pacing threat to the U.S. While tensions over China’s intent for the reunification of Taiwan may be the PRC’s primary concern, their long-term goal is to replace the U.S. as the dominant world power. During the U.S. midterm elections in 2022, its propaganda targeted candidates from both political parties. PRC influence activities are increasing in sophistication, including with the use of generative AI. The PRC will also actively exploit societal divisions in the U.S. in a manner similar to previous Russian influence operations.^[11]

Iran has conducted malign influence operations across the Middle East, Israel, and the U.S., leveraging its growing technical expertise and an opportunistic approach to cyber operations. The ODNI assess that Iran is likely to attempt influence operations targeting the 2024 U.S. elections. Additionally, reports indicate that Iran is influencing and financing Pro-Palestinian and Pro-Hamas protests across the U.S., which could lead to civil disturbances and violence.^[11],[12]

Cyber actors, both government‑affiliated and cyber criminals, likely will remain opportunistic in their targeting of election-related networks and data, routinely attempting to exploit misconfigured or vulnerable public‑facing websites, webservers, and election‑related information technology systems. These actors are likely to engage in social engineering campaigns, including spearphishing and phishing/smishing government officials.^[11]

Conclusion

The threat landscape surrounding the 2024 presidential election is still developing, but there are historical precedents that inform some predictive analysis. While the outcome of the election is far from certain, it is safe to say that the political tensions in the U.S. will not be quelled by the election of either candidate. Protest activity, civil unrest, and even targeted political violence are likely. Foreign actors will attempt to use social engineering techniques, malicious cyber activity, and financial ties to influence elections and fan the flames of political and social tensions. While this paper provides a baseline overview of the threats associated with the 2024 election, RMC’s white paper series will continue to examine the threats posed by both foreign and domestic actors in greater detail both before and during the election. Post-election papers will also address significant follow-on threat activity and scenarios that may occur.

[1] Nichter, L. (2023, 01 August). The Year that Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968. Yale University Press.

[2] Converse, P. et al. (2014, 01 August). Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election. Cambridge University Press

[3] Peters, G and Wooley, J. (1968, August 05). Republican Party Platform of 1968. The American Presidency Project. Retrieved from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1968.

[4] Humphrey, H. (1968) Hubert H. Humphries Papers: An Inventory of His 1968 Presidential Campaign Files. Minnesota Historical Society Manuscript Collections. Retrieved from http://www2.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00720/pdf/hhh41.pdf.

[5] Wooley, J and Peters, G. (n.d.). 1968 Election Statistics. The American Presidency Project. Retrieved from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/elections/1968.

[6] Chard, D. (2021, September). Nixon’s War at Home: The FBI, Leftist Guerrillas, and the Origins of Counterterrorism. The University of North Carolina Press.

[7] Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). Weather Underground Bombings. FBI. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/weather-underground-bombings.

[8] Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis. (2023, September). Homeland Threat Assessment. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf.

[9] Pew Research Center. (2024, February 29). Americans’ Top Policy Priority for 2024: Strengthening the Economy. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/29/americans-top-policy-priority-for-2024-strengthening-the-economy/.

[10] Pew Research Center. (2024, June 6). Cultural Issues and the 2024 Election. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/06/cultural-issues-and-the-2024-election/.

[11] Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2024, February 5). Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. ODNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

[12] Quinn, J. (2024, July 9). Iran Finances U.S. Campus Protests: Top Intel Official. National Review. Retrieved from https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/iran-finances-u-s-campus-protests-top-intel-official/.

Introduction

Over the past 20 years, the United States military has accumulated the most combat experience of any armed force in the world. Foreign powers in competition with the U.S. are aware of this operational advantage and actively seek to close the experience gap. Many Department of Defense (DoD) servicemembers who joined the military early in the Global War on Terror have either retired or will be retiring soon. They are being recruited by other nations and corporations with lucrative job offers that leverage their experience both on and off the battlefield. In many cases, the companies they are working for appear to be American or affiliated with countries allied with the U.S. However, veteran servicemembers may also be taking jobs with nation-state threat actors.

Historical Context

Historically, the U.S. has supported other nations prior to wars with diplomatic, economic, and military assistance. Active and veteran personnel have a history of supporting, advising, and training foreign militaries. For example, in 1914, before the U.S. entered World War I, Americans began crossing into Canada to receive military training and volunteer to fight for foreign militaries, including the French Foreign Legion. After Japan attacked China in 1937, Americans served as observers, advisors, and recruiters for foreign air forces. There were also DoD and Department of State civilian employees and contractors who assisted with logistics, policymaking, and training for the fledgling Republic of Vietnam before American involvement in the war.^[1],[2],[3]

The current wars in Ukraine and Israel have seen veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces traveling overseas to take part in these conflicts. American veterans have also supported foreign nations on their own through various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), volunteer efforts, initiatives aimed at humanitarian aid, community development, and educational programs.^{[4],[5],[6],[7],[8],[9]}

A Legal Perspective

Before a retired or veteran servicemember can begin working for a foreign government, they are required to receive approval from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. This is covered under the Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and federal law. The Emoluments Clause states that, to preserve national security and prevent conflicts of interest, this approval is required before the servicemember takes a job with a foreign government. The filing and approval requirements must be followed closely, or the DoD may withhold benefits and retirement pay. Statutory enforcement is limited, and there is still a lack of internal policing on this matter. Individuals are expected to act in a manner that would not risk operational security, but they are not required to report their work after the initial background investigation. As a result, once former servicemembers acquire approval permitting them to work for foreign powers, the U.S. Government has no awareness of what may be shared. This creates an obvious and difficult-to-detect national security risk.^{[10],[11],[12]}

Often, former servicemembers work for U.S. companies that support foreign governments or corporations and educational institutions that are controlled, owned, or operated by a foreign government. This requires the same waiver process by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the servicemember’s military branch. In this manner, hundreds of retired servicemembers have received approval to work for foreign governments.^{[10],[11],[12]}

There are several other laws that apply to foreign military service. The Neutrality Act of 1794 prohibits persons within the jurisdiction of the U.S. from enlisting in foreign militaries. Violations of the Neutrality Act are punishable by fines, imprisonment of not more than three (3) years, or both. While the law applies to those within the U.S., it does not apply to those who enlist while they are in another country. Treason (18 U.S.C. 2381) would apply to a U.S. citizen who supports a foreign entity at war or in conflict with the U.S. American citizens can be expatriated for voluntarily committing acts designated by Congress. Voluntary service in the armed forces of a foreign state is an expatriating act, resulting in the loss of U.S. citizenship if those armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or the individual. serves as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. Notably, these laws have rarely been enforced.^[10]

During the Global War on Terror, including the War in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military became dependent on civilian contractors at levels never before seen. By October 2020, 43,800 contractors were serving in the CENTCOM area of operations, compared to 15,000 DoD personnel. Many contractors were prior servicemembers who had already deployed and who returned under lucrative contracts as instructors, security personnel, and technical support. However, some contractors have decided to work for other nations, not all of whom are allied with American interests.^[13],[14]

Virtually all retirees and most veterans have clearances prior to beginning work for a foreign entity. This creates an opportunity for unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Clearance holders are responsible for safeguarding classified information, including its transmittal, destruction, storage, distribution, handling, and accounting thereof. Once veterans are no longer associated with the department or agency that granted their clearance, there is no oversight or reporting process for the U.S. government to track mishandlings or unauthorized disclosures. Even if a robust system were in place, it would likely be reactive in nature as preventative measures would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Veterans also have broad experience and skillsets that may or may not be explicitly classified, but these tactics, techniques, and procedures can be leveraged by foreign nations and used against American interests.^[15]

Case Study: U.S. Veterans in Middle East

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contracted many American veterans of the Global War on Terror to advise and train its personnel. Between 2015 and 2022, some 280 military retirees sought federal authorization to work there. At the time, requests to work for the UAE exceeded those for any other nation in the world. Many were retired General and Flag Officers. There were also an estimated hundreds more veterans already employed by the UAE and by state-owned companies. Most of these veterans did not serve until retirement and did not have to seek federal permission. They are often given double or triple what similar jobs would have earned in the U.S.^[16]

Improvements in the martial proficiency of the UAE’s military may have helped the country to send troops into civil wars in Yemen and Libya. These conflicts led to questions about human rights violations. The armed forces of the UAE have imprisoned journalists, human rights activists, and other critics in show trials widely condemned by the international community. At the same time, U.S. veterans were being authorized by the Department of State and DoD to work for the UAE, the Emiratis joined OPEC efforts to reduce global oil production, contrary to American interests. UAE has also been scrutinized by the Justice Department for allegedly interfering in U.S. elections and politics. In 2022, a U.S. intelligence report showed that the UAE made extensive efforts to influence U.S. politics via lobbying firms and to exploit lax and unenforced disclosure laws.^{[16],[17],[18]}

Case Study: China Seeks U.S. Military Experience.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to aggressively recruit U.S. veterans. The PRC aims to recruit personnel to “train the trainer” and bolster its doctrinal shortcomings. China’s last major military campaign was approximately 45 years ago, during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, in which its air and naval forces played little to no role. Pending a possible major military conflict in Taiwan, China understands that its key military forces have not had any combat experience or any effective overhaul in doctrine and tactics in decades. Despite its buildup of forces and the looming possibility of an invasion of Taiwan, Beijing continues to struggle with air operations, pilot proficiency, and tactics that would help it to circumvent U.S. forces, should they directly support Taiwan. This makes the experience of veteran U.S. pilots a much-desired skillset that is essential to overcoming experience gaps.^{[19],[20],[21]}

In June 2024, the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing coalition released a joint threat bulletin highlighting the PLA’s recruitment of current and former military personnel from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and other Western countries to help improve China’s military capabilities. Air operations personnel, flight engineers, and former military pilots are the most in-demand targets. According to the coalition of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., the PLA uses private firms or professional networking sites to conceal their relationship, paying exorbitant salaries, and offering recruits the opportunity to fly “exotic aircraft.” China also sends its servicemembers to private defense and aerospace companies worldwide. These entities, such as the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA), Beijing China Aviation Technology Co. (BCAT), Paramount Group, and Stratos, train in a multitude of disciplines in land, air, and sea operations.^[22],[23]

A recent extradition ruling in Australia involving a former U.S. Marine highlights China’s initiative to gain insight into American military tactics and deploy a more robust fleet of aircraft carriers amid increasing aggression toward Taiwan and tensions in the South China Sea. In May 2024, an Australian magistrate ruled that a former U.S. Marine, a naturalized Australian citizen, could be extradited to the U.S. to face charges related to training Chinese military pilots. In October 2022, the former servicemember was arrested by Australian federal police for training Chinese military pilots to land on aircraft carriers between November 2009 and November 2012. According to a 2017 indictment, he conspired with the TFASA to export defense services. Open-source reporting indicates that potential charges in the U.S. include money laundering and breaking arms control law.^{[19],[24],[25],[26]}

Outlook

Historical precedence for U.S. veterans supporting militaries and wartime efforts of other nations date back to the nation’s founding. The Global War on Terror saw a sharp rise in the widespread use of contractors, creating an environment where American veterans commanded high salaries in the U.S. and abroad. The terrorist groups in that conflict were not and are not near-peer competitors. There was less concerns of the illicit sharing of information and experience with other nations. However, this new era of great power competition has near-peer nation-state militaries seeking to challenge the U.S. as the last remaining superpower.

While technology, equipment and doctrine can all be developed, experience can only be earned. The U.S. military has paid the high price to earn the most combat experience in the world. Foreign actors will continue to aggressively seek out this knowledge and experience to close the gap with the U.S. military. The large amounts of money involved creates a potential conflict of interest, with American military experience being sold to the highest bidder. The legally and ethically gray area created by contractors over the last two (2) decades has fostered confusion about support for foreign governments. Greater oversight and enforcement of current laws can ensure that information is not being shared with foreign governments that are or may become competitors to the U.S. As a cleared contracting firm, RMC’s team is trained to meet and exceed the information and operational security requirements to protect the information of our government and commercial clients.  RMC’s Intelligence and Climate Analysis Division will continue to monitor relevant developments and the implications for U.S. national security.

[1] The National World War I Museum. (n.d.) The Volunteers: Americans Join World War I, 1914-1919. Retrieved from https://www.theworldwar.org/exhibitions/volunteers-americans-join-world-war-i-1914-1919.

[2] National Archives and Records Administration. (n.d.) A Prelude to War: The Flying Tigers. Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/a_people_at_war/prelude_to_war/flying_tigers.html.

[3] Nelson, A. (2013, July). Just Good Advice: The American Advisors in the Vietnam War. The University of Southern Mississippi. Retrieved from https://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1187&context=honors_theses.

[4] Southards, C. (2023, November 29). Ukraine, Israel, Yemen…American Veterans Increasingly Serving in Overseas Conflicts. Department of California American Legion. Retrieved from https://calegion.org/ukraine-israel-yemenamerican-veterans-are-increasingly-serving-in-overseas-conflicts/.

[5] Cook, E. (2024, February 22). Americans Can Now Join Ukraine’s National Guard Zelensky Says. Newsweek. Retrieved from https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-americans-fighters-military-russia-zelensky-1872314.

[6] Israeli Defense Forces. (n.d.) How to Join Us and Voluntary Programs. Retrieved from https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/how-to-join-us-and-voluntary-programs/how-to-join/.

[7] Fautre, W. (2024, March 29). HRWF. Retrieved from https://hrwf.eu/world-the-role-of-ngos-to-protect-civilians-in-armed-conflicts/.

[8] Stowe, C. (2022, July 11). U.S. – Vietnam Relations, the Legacy of War, and the Role of NGOs. GlobalWA. Retrieved from https://globalwa.org/2022/07/u-s-vietnam-relations-the-legacy-of-war-and-the-role-of-ngos/.

[9] Team Rubicon. (2020, January 13). Veteran-Led Disaster Response and Humanitarian Group Team Rubicon Commemorates “A Decade of Service and Grit”. PR Newswire. Retrieved from https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/veteran-led-disaster-response-and-humanitarian-group-team-rubicon-commemorates-a-decade-of-service-and-grit-300985302.html.

[10] Congressional Research Service. (2022, March 28). U.S. Nationals and Foreign Military Service. CRS. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12068.

[11] Mitchell, E. (2023, June 20). Senators Introduce Bill Restricting Retired Troops’ Work for Foreign Governments. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4059497-senators-introduce-bill-restricting-retired-troops-work-for-foreign-governments/.

[12] Kness, R. (2017, June 30). Working for a Contractor or Foreign Government after Military Service. ClearanceJobs.com. Retrieved from https://news.clearancejobs.com/2017/06/30/working-contractor-foreign-government-military-service/.

[13] Cancian, M. (2021, August 30). In Afghanistan, Contractors were Unsung Heroes of US Efforts. Breaking Defense. Retrieved from https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/in-afghanistan-contractors-were-unsung-heroes-of-us-efforts/.

[14] Mazzarino, A. (2023, May 16). The Unseen Soldiers of America’s Privatized Wars. The Nation Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/world/private-contract-soldiers/.

[15] Congressional Research Service. (2023, February 2). The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21900.

[16] Whitlock, C and Jones, N. (2022, October 18). UAE Relied on Expertise of Retired U.S. Troops to Beef up its Military. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/uae-military-us-veterans/.

[17] HRW. (2021, January 13). UAE: Reality of Abuses Contradicts Tolerance Rhetoric. HRW. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/uae-reality-abuses-contradicts-tolerance-rhetoric.

[18] Middle East Eye. (2022, November 13). US intelligence report claims UAE ‘meddled in American politics’. MEE. Retrieved from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-meddled-american-politics-us-intelligence-report-claims.

[19] Perez, Z. (2024, June 07). US, Allied Intel Agencies Warn Pilots to Avoid Chinese Recruitment. Military Times. Retrieved from https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/06/07/us-allied-intel-agencies-warn-pilots-to-avoid-chinese-recruitment/.

[20] Gin, C. M. (2016). How China Wins: A Case Study of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. US Army Command and General Staff College Press. Retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/how-china-wins.pdf.

[21] Lillis, K. B. (2024, June 05). US and Allies Warn China is Intensifying its Efforts to Recruit Western Military Pilots. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/05/politics/us-and-allies-warn-china-recruit-pilots/index.html.

[22] Novelly, T. (2024, June 06). China is ‘Aggressively Recruiting’ Pilots from the US and NATO Countries, Intelligence Agencies Warn. Military.com. Retrieved from https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/06/06/china-aggressively-recruiting-pilots-us-and-nato-countries-intelligence-agencies-warn.html.

[23] The National Counterintelligence and Security Center. (2024, June 5). Safeguarding Our Military Expertise: Foreign Companies Continue to Recruit Current and Former Western Service Members to Bolster the PRC’s Military. DNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/products/Safeguarding_Our_Military_Expertise.pdf.

[24] Bennett, B. (2024, June 5). U.S. Cracks Down on Former ‘Top Gun’ Pilots Found to Be Training China’s Air Force. Time. Retrieved from https://time.com/6985561/top-gun-pilots-china/.

[25] Whiteman, H. (2024, May 24). Ex-US Marines fighter pilot loses bid to block extradition to the United States over China training allegations. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/24/australia/daniel-duggan-us-extradition-hearing-intl-hnk/index.html.

[26] Needham, K. (2024, May 24). Former US Marine pilot can be extradited, Australian magistrate rules. Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2024-05-24/former-marine-pilot-extradition-13960410.html.

Introduction

Climate is directly linked to the history of human development. Humanity thrives in areas rich in resources and climates conducive to the cultivation of necessities. Changes in climate can cause scarcity of resources. The stress on populations, economies, and governments increases the potential for conflict. Often, these conditions involve emerging or depressed societies that are unable to cope with the negative effects of climate change, leaving room for extremist groups to develop. Climate change can cause regional instability that helps extremist group exploit the misery that follows.

Regional Instability Caused by Climate

The climate-security nexus posits that climate change and kinetic conflict can create a continuous cycle where each impacts the other. Climate change typically intensifies conflicts that are already present, which can limit a population’s ability to relocate from the effects of a changing environment. Because they are unwilling or unable to leave, threat actors can use the scarcity of resources to exert control over vulnerable populations. This combination of environmental stressors and extremism has a significant negative impact on community resilience.[i]

Economists generally recognize three (3) causes of resource scarcity. The first occurs when supply chains are not able to meet an increased demand. Population growth increases demands for food, water, shelter, and medical supplies. The second occurs when the demand remains the same, but there is a decreased availability of resources. The third occurs when human factors cause resource scarcity, such as supply chain disruptions, government ineptitude, or conflict. Climate can be a direct cause of resources scarcity. Most climate adverse areas rely on agriculture, livestock farming, fishing, and trade for their livelihood. Climate change impacts cropping patterns, grazing routes, and planting times for farmers in these communities. Climate variability, coupled with a community’s inability to adapt and an increasing population size, lead to an ecosystem that cannot sustain the people living there. Climate also plays a factor in the strength and increased occurrence of natural disasters, which can disrupt supply chains. The concurrent resource scarcity causes a rise in the prices of essential goods while local economies are already struggling. This leads to a reduction in income and revenue, further impeding a local population’s ability to obtain essential goods and services.[ii]^,[iii]

Disease is often associated with climate adverse regions. Food scarcity, lack of quality healthcare, and changes in climate create environmental conditions conducive to pathogen vectors that all increase the likelihood of outbreaks in vulnerable populations. The spread of disease can increase the demand for already scarce resources, especially those associated with medical care.[iv]

Climate adverse areas often face high levels of poverty, low socioeconomic development, and governmental neglect. A government’s inability to provide relief leads to tension with the population, which can easily turn into civil unrest. Protests and riots, however justifiable, may elicit a violent response from law enforcement and the military. Extremist groups often emerge from these conflicts and exploit these conditions.[v]

Terrorist Group Exploitation of Climate Crises

Terrorist and other non-state threat actors may exploit the climate crisis by exacerbating resource scarcity and exploiting weak governance structures to gain power and influence. This furthers their goals and makes counterterrorist operations more difficult as local populations become more sympathetic to their ideology.

Eight (8) of the 15 countries most exposed to climate risks have United Nations peacekeeping missions or ongoing special missions. As stated earlier, climate-related issues cause a scarcity of resources, and fragile economies become further depressed. Those who are unemployed or struggling to survive become attracted to extremist organizations, who provide food, shelter, and jobs for their members. Local populations can become radicalized by propaganda, which becomes more attractive under ineffectual local governance. This recruitment and radicalization process often targets the young, who are more likely to be attracted to the zealotry of terrorist organizations.[vi]

Often, five (5) critical tactics are used to undermine trust in local governments: kinetic attacks, propaganda, exploitation of grievances, disruption, and recruitment. Terrorist groups target civil institutions, public officials, or community spaces with violence, instilling fear, and demonstrating the government’s inability to protect its citizens. They disseminate propaganda both online and through traditional media to spread disinformation and highlight government failures. They exploit existing grievances, such as economic inequality or perceived injustices, to portray the government as indifferent or oppressive. Furthermore, they target essential services and/or infrastructure to cause chaos. Lastly, they recruit disillusioned individuals by offering an alternative to the perceived corruption or incompetence of the government.[vii]

Extremist organizations often attempt to gain control of scarce resources, not only for their own use, but also to curry favor with or exert control over vulnerable populations. These actions may increase local support or just delegitimize the government, who may not be able to adequately respond. Some notable examples include:

• After the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and again after floods that killed approximately 1,600, Pakistani militant Islamist groups provided relief aid including food and water to locals. These actions came amid criticism of the Pakistani government’s slow and inadequate response.[viii]
• In 2015, ISIS seized the Ramadi Dam in Iraq, allowing them to control water flow down the Euphrates River. ISIS reduced the flow as much as 50% at times to demonstrate their capability and use it as leverage in the region. Had ISIS decided to destroy the dam, the resulting floods could have caused significant damage and loss of life.[ix]
• In 2017, after Typhoon Kai-tak killed at least 32 people in the Philippines, Maoist rebels attacked a Philippine Army convoy carrying relief aid to rural parts of the country. The attack highlighted the difficulty of the government to secure rural areas and provide aid.[x]

Case Study: Boko Haram Exploitation of Lake Chad

Over the last few decades, declining water levels, warmer temperatures, drought, decreasing rainfall, and diminishing pastureland have cultivated conditions that exacerbate conflict and violence in the Lake Chad Basin’s area. Lake Chad’s area decreased from more than 26,000 km² to 1,350 km² from the 1960s to 2014, depleting much of its wildlife. Furthermore, the Sahel region’s temperatures are rising 1.5 times faster than the global average, while the area is experiencing decreasing average annual rainfall and water levels in the two (2) major rivers that flow into Lake Chad. While the lake’s resources have diminished and the region suffers reduced livestock production and crop yields, the area is experiencing a significant population surge. Lake Chad currently supports over 30 million people in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, but population growth predictions estimate that 80 million livelihoods could depend on the lake by 2030. The rapid demand for water for drinking, sanitation, cooking, and other activities, combined with climate change’s impact on the lake, has exacerbated environmental degradation, poverty, food insecurity, and unemployment. As of March 2024, there are four (4) million food-insecure individuals and 499,000 severely malnourished children in the region.5^,[xi]^{,[xii],[xiii]}

Research surrounding the humanitarian crisis suggests that Boko Haram capitalizes on the environmental instability and competition for scarce resources in the Lake Chad region. Boko Haram, which uses the name “Jama‘atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da‘awati wal-Jihad” (JASDJ; Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad) and the “Nigerian Taliban,” was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department in November 2013. While the group operated in various forms since the late 1990s, Boko Haram slowly started to gain operational capabilities when the former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau, claimed leadership of the group in July 2010. In 2014, the group gained increased international attention after kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in Borno State, Nigeria, and engaging in frequent attacks against Christians, security and police forces, the media, schools, and politicians. In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).[xiv]^,[xv]

Boko Haram takes advantage of social unrest and conflict by recruiting disenfranchised people who encounter obstacles with climate-induced adversity and competition for resources. Water scarcity from population surge and lake degradation, combined with population migration, has led to violence and tensions between communities, migrants, farmers, and ethnic groups throughout the Lake Chad Basin. Boko Haram exploits these tensions by offering financial incentives, offering a sense of belonging, taking advantage of weakened local governance and security apparatuses, and perpetuating violence in vulnerable areas. For example, Boko Haram recruits young people suffering from poverty and unemployment to engage in drug and human trafficking operations and smuggle small arms and light weapons. These illicit activities further sustain the group’s operations and perpetuate violence in inter-ethnic and farmer-herder conflicts.11^,12^,14

A study published by Marine Corps University Press titled “Changing Hydrography, Violent Extremism, and Climate-Conflict Intersection” highlights the relationship between conflict and environmental changes in the Lake Chad Basin area. Data collected by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a nonprofit that gathers reported information on internal conflict, and NASA satellite imagery around Lake Chad highlight armed conflict events in places previously submerged by the open water of Lake Chad. According to the study, almost two (2) dozen ACLED incidents from 2009 and 2019 would have been located on open water had they taken place in 1973. The study also illustrates increasing conflict activity within 100 miles of Lake Chad’s open water between 2009 and 2019.[xvi]

Outlook

Extremist organizations will continue to take advantage of the geopolitical conditions created by resource scarcity caused by changing climates. Research shows increases in radicalization and recruitment across climate adverse regions worldwide. To gain power and influence, extremist organizations will fill power vacuums left by governments unable to provide basic necessities and control scarce resources. Perhaps, in time, it will be possible to predict shifting climates, understand the effects, and provide support to vulnerable populations before resource scarcity enables extremist organizations to thrive. RMC’s Intelligence and Climate Analysis Division will continue to monitor relevant climate and geopolitical developments in order to analyze potential impacts to client assets, personnel, and operations.

Sources

[i] Beauregard, J. (2020, September 19). Understanding the Climate Change-National Security Nexus: The Three Faces of Climate Security. Modern War Institute at West Point. Retrieved from https://mwi.westpoint.edu/understanding-the-climate-change-national-security-nexus-the-three-faces-of-climate-security/.

[ii] Master Class Staff. (2023, January 18). Resource Scarcity: Three Causes of Resource Scarcity. Master Class Articles. Retrieved from https://www.masterclass.com/articles/resource-scarcity.

[iii] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2024, January 30). Resource Scarcity and the Shifting Dynamics of Global Security. NATO. Retrieved from https://www.act.nato.int/article/resource-scarcity-and-shifting-dynamics-of-global-security/.

[iv] U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. (2021, March). Climate Change and the Developing World: A Disproportionate Impact. U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. Retrieved from https://www.usglc.org/blog/climate-change-and-the-developing-world-a-disproportionate-impact/.

[v] Center for Preventative Action. (2024, February 14). Violent Extremism in the Sahel. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel.

[vi] United Nations Security Council. (2021, December 9). People, Countries Impacted by Climate Change also vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, violence, Speakers Tell Security Council in Open Debate. United Nations. Retrieved from https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14728.doc.htm.

[vii] Ndebele, L. (2022, May 03). ‘A New, Despicable Turn in Violence’ as Insurgents Attack Water Sources in Burkina Faso. News 24. Retrieved from https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/ a-new-despicable-turn-in-violence-as-insurgents-attack-water-sources-in-burkina-faso-20220503.

[viii] Zaidi, S. A. (2010, September 29) Pakistan After the Floods. Carnegie Endowment. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2010/09/pakistan-after-the-floods?lang=en.

[ix] Lossow, T. (2016, January). Water as a Weapon: IS on the Euphrates and Tigris. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2016C03_lsw.pdf.

[x] Reuters staff. (2017, December 18). Philippines says Maoist rebels attacked soldiers on typhoon relief duty. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1EC0JB/.

[xi] Frimpong, O. B. (2020, July). Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Lake Chad Basin: Key Issues and Way Forward. Wilson Center. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/ climate-change-and-violent-extremism-lake-chad-basin-key-issues-and-way-forward.

[xii] Center for Preventative Action. (2024, February 14). Violent Extremism in the Sahel. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel.

[xiii] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2024, March 13). Lake Chad Basin Humanitarian Snapshot. OCHA. Retrieved from https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/ nigeria/lake-chad-basin-humanitarian-snapshot-13-march-2024.

[xiv] Fah, H. (2023, May 15). A Catastrophic Correlation: How Climate Change Influenced Terrorism Around Lake Chad. ASIS International. Retrieved from https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/articles/2023/05/climate-change-and-security/lake-chad-terrorism.

[xv] National Counterterrorism Center. (n.d.). Boko Haram. DNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/ nctc/groups/boko_haram.html.

[xvi] Griffin, T. E. (2020, July 27). Lake Chad: Changing Hydrography, Violent Extremism, and Climate-Conflict Intersection. Marine Corps University. Retrieved from https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/ Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/Lake-Chad/.