Chinese Investment and Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean

Introduction

RMC’s White Paper “China-Cuba Relations: Recent Developments and Implications for U.S. National Security” in June 2023 detailed the diplomatic relations and economic cooperation between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Cuba. As the paper highlights, China’s investments in Cuba’s economy and infrastructure, military cooperation between the two (2) nations, and joint intelligence efforts present potential national security implications for the U.S. Over the past 18 months, China has continued investment and influence activities in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The U.S. and its allies are concerned that the PRC is utilizing its economic leverage and relationships with nations in LAC to pursue geopolitical objectives, potentially expand its military capabilities, and bolster authoritarian regimes. The following White Paper highlights China’s growing influence in LAC by offering investment examples in Peru, Brazil, Mexico, and The Bahamas and associated U.S. national security concerns.

Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean

Since taking power in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping has launched significant infrastructure projects worldwide as part of China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI). Xi’s vision of this “New Silk Road,” a reference to the original Silk Road during the westward expansion of China’s Han Dynasty, includes developing a significant network of railways, energy pipelines, highways, and streamlined border crossings westward and southward. At the same time, China’s leader seeks to establish a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road by investing in port development worldwide to accommodate increasing maritime trade. Many scholars and analysts recognize that the BRI’s effort to bolster “connectivity and communication” with states in Eurasia and Africa is a primary component of China’s strategy to advance its economic and political ties with the rest of the world.[1],[2]

A few years after launching the initiative, China’s President Xi referred to Latin America as a “natural extension of BRI.” LAC is home to valuable raw materials and agricultural goods, such as petroleum, soybeans, and lithium, and provides potential international shipping connectivity across the Pacific Ocean. As a result, the People’s Republic of China has increasingly engaged in trade, investment opportunities, and development projects with various nations in the region over the past 20 years. Furthermore, China looks to accrue soft power in LAC through educational and cultural exchanges and technological advancements.[1],[2],[3],[4]

From 2003 to 2022, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled $187.5 billion in LAC. While data highlights the decreasing value of Chinese investment in LAC in recent years, Chinese interest in information and communication technology (ICT), renewable energy, and other emerging industries is increasing. In addition, China remains committed to infrastructure investments at ports throughout the region, including flooding LAC with crane exports. Chinese customs data reveals that crane exports to Latin America increased by 47% year-on-year from January to October 2024.[5],[6],[7]

Experts studying malign Chinese influence worldwide remain concerned about Chinese technology corporations, such as Huawei and ZTE, exponentially capturing LAC’s telecommunications markets.  Huawei’s success in LAC is attributed to leveraging China’s foreign policy and diplomatic ties, the company’s quality customer service, and building access networks at low cost or free of charge in remote, mountainous, and rural areas where developing telecommunications infrastructure is expensive. While Huawei equipment cannot be sold or imported in the U.S. as of November 2022 due to national security concerns, the company now works with every large mobile and internet service provider in LAC. Also, the company is rapidly developing LAC’s 5G infrastructure. Experts fear that long-term dependencies on 5G developed by Huawei could amplify the CCP’s surveillance initiatives and control over the region’s communications, infrastructure, and sensitive technology. Though China’s economic interests are the primary driver for its activities in LAC, some analysts indicate that the PRC also seeks to expand its political influence in the region to counterattack the U.S.’s containment of China’s rise. In addition, China looks for governmental support in LAC for its positions on Taiwan, human rights, internet governance, and other affairs.[8],[9],[10],[11]

Peru

In November 2024, China continued expanding its investments and influence in Peru. From 15 to 16 November, Chinese President Xi Jinping, U.S. President Joe Biden, and leaders worldwide attended the 2024 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Summit in Lima. During the two-day summit, China and Peru updated their free trade agreement (FTA), which was initially signed in 2009. While the two (2) countries engaged in almost $36 billion in bilateral trade last year, Peru’s foreign minister indicated that the updated agreement would increase commerce by at least 50% between the nations. Earlier in November, China and Peru also agreed to a memorandum of understanding to increase bilateral cooperation on food security, food product regulation, and education.[12],[13]

China has significant mining and infrastructure projects in Peru, including the $3.6 billion Port of Chancay. The Chinese-funded megaport inaugurated on 15 November 2024 anticipates decreasing trans-Pacific transit times and logistics costs. Furthermore, the port is the first location in South America with the capacity to host carrier ships too large to fit through the Panama Canal. According to open-source reports, Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries supplies the port’s automated cargo cranes, while China-based shipping company Cosco will operate the port exclusively. Analysts highlight that the Port of Chancay’s location could significantly impact supply chains. For example, Peru is South America’s second-largest producer of raw copper, a critical resource for manufacturing electronic and clean-energy technologies. China has invested $11.4 billion in the Peruvian mining sector, where most resources are devoted to ensuring access to copper.[12],[14]

Some security experts, including General Laura Richardson, the former Commander of U.S. Southern Command, warn that the Port of Chancay presents potential security risks to the Homeland. According to General Richardson, the port could be a dual-use facility for China’s Navy. While China states the project is motivated by commercial interests, the U.S. remains concerned that the port could enhance China’s military capabilities due to its size, depth, and strategic location.[14],[15]

Brazil

In November 2024, China and Brazil took significant steps in strengthening economic ties. Following the G20 Leaders’ Summit hosted in Brazil, that country’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva hosted Xi Jinping for a state visit. On 20 November, China and Brazil signed 37 agreements on trade, technology, and the environment. While Brazil declined to join China’s BRI, Brazil “recognized the relevance” of the BRI in one (1) of the agreements and looks to pursue smaller bilateral deals with China. The package of 37 agreements also included a deal between China Development Bank and Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). China Development Bank loaned BNDES an equivalent of $690 million USD (¥5 billion) to support a variety of projects and expand alternatives to the U.S. dollar.[12],[16],[17]

The idea of reducing reliance on the American dollar is also a priority of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) economic coalition. In 2015, the BRICS coalition established the New Development Bank. The newly-founded bank represents an alternative to Western-backed initiatives such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. During President Lula’s visit to China in April 2023, former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff was sworn in as head of the New Development Bank. According to Rousseff, the New Development Bank has allocated about $6.1 billion to Brazil since its inception to December 2023, financing 21 projects.[18],[19],[20]

The relationship between China and Brazil is primarily economic, although the two (2) nations have engaged in various military cooperation agreements since mid-2000. Chinese companies have invested about $71 billion in Brazil from 2007 to 2023, more than any other nation in Latin America. In addition to concerns surrounding China’s increasing economic presence, open-source research analysis highlights potential risks associated with China’s satellite cooperation with Brazil. From 1984 to 2022, the two (2) nations signed 24 bilateral diplomatic agreements formalizing cooperation in the satellite sector. Furthermore, since China launched the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite program’s first collaboratively developed satellite in 1999, the two (2) countries have worked together to launch six (6) satellites and seek to launch a seventh in early 2025. According to some U.S. national security experts, space facilities accessible to China in the region could potentially be utilized to intercept data transmitted by Western satellites. Furthermore, space facilities in the Western Hemisphere could potentially offer China telemetry or communication in support of kinetic attacks.[21],[22],[23]

Mexico

On 14 February 1972, Mexico and China established diplomatic and trade relations. Chinese direct investment in Mexico began in the late 1990s and accelerated in the 2010s as part of China’s global economic strategy. China targets Mexico’s manufacturing sector, capitalizing on the nation’s proximity to the U.S., skilled labor, and tariff-free access to North American markets through the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). China also benefits from Mexico’s strategic position along key North American trade routes. However, many Mexican citizens view the PRC as a competitor, since both China and Mexico are established manufacturing exporters. Therefore, Mexico has not signed China’s BRI and is not a participant in the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). However, China’s investments in Mexico, particularly in infrastructure and manufacturing, align with some BRI goals. These investments bolster Chinese companies’ supply chain resilience, reduce costs, and mitigate geopolitical risks.[24],[25],[26],[27],[28]

Some experts indicate that China’s growing economic influence in Mexico poses significant challenges to U.S. regional dominance, domestic manufacturing resilience, and economic security. For example, the proximity of Chinese-funded manufacturing operations to the U.S., particularly in industries such as computer equipment and electronics, raises critical national security risks. Open-source reports highlight that factories producing semiconductors or telecommunications components near the U.S. border could enable covert surveillance, data theft, or the insertion of compromised technology into critical infrastructure. These fears are amplified when such operations involve components used in U.S. defense systems, cloud computing, or smart technologies integral to national infrastructure. Furthermore, integrating Chinese companies into North American supply chains risks creating dependencies that Beijing could exploit during geopolitical conflicts, disrupting essential goods or imposing economic leverage. China’s strategic investments in Mexico may also diminish the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions and trade policies by providing Beijing with alternative economic footholds in the region.[29],[30],[31]

The Bahamas

China and The Bahamas established formal relations on 23 May 1997. Trade between China and The Bahamas, plus five (5) other Caribbean countries, has grown steadily over the past few decades. In 2022, China’s exports to The Bahamas totaled approximately $405 million, whereas Bahamian exports to China amounted to around $9 million. In addition, China has significantly invested in Bahamian infrastructure over the past 15 years, including a $30 million grant to develop a national stadium, preferential loans to construct a $3 billion megaport at Freeport, and $40 million to create a port off the island of Abaco. On 28 March 2024, the Bahamian Prime Minister endorsed China’s Global Development Initiative and reaffirmed the Bahamas’ commitment to the “One-China” policy.[32],[33],[34]

In 2021, the USNORTHCOM Commander testified before the U.S. Senate about concerns regarding China’s growing influence in the Caribbean, particularly in The Bahamas, as part of its broader strategy to undermine U.S. dominance. For example, while China’s investments have helped to bolster local economic recovery from Hurricane Dorian and the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. officials warn that The Bahamas offers China a strategic foothold near critical U.S. infrastructure. In addition, Huawei has established a dominant presence in The Bahamas’ telecommunications market. In 2014, Bahamas Telecommunications Company (BTC) partnered with Huawei to upgrade the nation’s network to 4G LTE. Similarly, BTC’s main competitor, Aliv, relies heavily on Huawei for its infrastructure. Concerns about Huawei’s near monopoly in The Bahamas gained international attention in 2020, as an open-source report revealed evidence that Huawei equipment supplied to BTC had been used for cyberespionage targeting U.S. citizens.[35],[36],[37],[38],[39]

Conclusion

China is rapidly expanding its economic and political influence in LAC by serving as South America’s top trading partner and a significant foreign direct investment and lending provider in essential industries. As highlighted above, many American security experts remain concerned that Chinese investments in LAC’s critical infrastructure, such as deep-water ports and space facilities, pose potential national security threats to the U.S. As the PRC continues investing in critical infrastructure sectors in the region, some American analysts argue that the United States Congress, in coordination with the Executive Branch, should explore innovative trade, industrial, and development policies that bolster economic cooperation, address supply chain concerns, and enhance U.S. financial and nonfinancial assistance to LAC countries.[40],[41]

[1] Lei, Y. (2024, October 23). China–Latin America relations in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. Wiley. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dpr.12814.

[2] McBride, J., Berman, N., and Chatzky, A. (2023, February 2). China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.

[3] U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (2021). China’s Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_1_Section_2–Chinas_Influence_in_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf.

[4] Congressional Research Service. (2023, June 23). China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10982.

[5] Pettus, E. L. (2023, October 5). The Expanding Leverage of the People’s Republic of China in Latin America: Implications for US National Security and Global Order. Indo-Pacific Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3540614/the-expanding-leverage-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-in-latin-america-implic/.

[6] Myers, M., Melguizo, A., and Wang, Y. (2024, January). Emerging Trends in Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Dialogue. Retrieved from https://thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Emerging-Trends-in-Chinese-Foreign-Direct-Investment-in-LAC-4.pdf.

[7] The Latin American Post Staff. (2024, December 02). China Expands Maritime Influence Across Latin America. Retrieved from https://latinamericanpost.com/business-and-finance/china-expands-maritime-influence-across-latin-america/.

[8] Delgado, J. (2023, March 07). China, 5G, and the Security Threat in Latin America. Diálogo. Retrieved from https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-5g-and-the-security-threat-in-latin-america/.

[9] Myers, M. (2023, August 25). China’s Increasing Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-increasing-involvement-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.

[10] Alvarado, P. D. (2024, April). Huawei’s Expansion in Latin America and the Caribbean: Views from the Region. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/sr-529_huaweis-expansion-latin-america-caribbean-views-region.pdf.

[11] Berg, R.C. (2024, February 12). China and Russia engage Latin America and the Caribbean differently. Both threaten US interests. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/china-and-russia-engage-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-differently-both-threaten-us-interests/.

[12] Holmes, S., and Huesa, J. (2024, November 26). China in Latin America: November 2024. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/article/china-latin-america-november-2024.

[13] Aquino, M. (2024, November 11). Exclusive: Peru and China to sign strengthened free-trade agreement in Xi’s APEC visit. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/peru-china-sign-strengthened-free-trade-agreement-xis-apec-visit-2024-11-08/.

[14] Stepherd, C., and Li, L. (2024, November 14). China opens huge port in Peru to extend its reach in Latin America. Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/theaters/americas/2024-11-14/china-peru-port-latin-america-foothold-warship-15849859.html.

[15] Stott, M. (2024, November 4). Chinese warships could use Peru’s big new port, US general warns. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/f6589d13-6014-47d0-8cc5-e98a0b7ad0bc.

[16] Hughes, E. (2024, November 20). Brazil’s Lula welcomes China’s Xi for state visit as ties between countries strengthen. AP. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/brazil-china-xi-lula-b979f2f78530c917b37c47f97f24d96a.

[17] Paraguassu, L. (2024, November 20). Brazil development bank gets $690 million loan from China. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/brazil-development-bank-gets-690-million-loan-china-2024-11-20/.

[18] Associated Press. (2023, April 14). China’s Xi and Brazil’s Lula meet in Beijing to boost ties. NBC News. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-xi-jinping-brazil-lula-beijing-meeting-trading-partners-economy-rcna79732.

[19] Ferragamo, M. (2024, December 12). What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding#chapter-title-0-2.

[20] New Development Bank. (2023, December 8). Brazil Receives USD 1.7 Billion from New Development Bank. Retrieved from https://www.ndb.int/news/brazil-receives-usd-1-7-billion-from-new-development-bank/.

[21] Soliz de Stange, A. (2023, June 14). China and Brazil’s Cooperation in the Satellite Sector: Implications for the United States? Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3428204/china-and-brazils-cooperation-in-the-satellite-sector-implications-for-the-unit/.

[22] Chivvis, C.S. and Geaghan-Beinerm, B. (2023, December 13). Brazil in the Emerging World Order. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/brazil-in-the-emerging-world-order?lang=en.

[23] Ellis, R. E. (2024, February 16). China-Latin America Space Cooperation: An Overview. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/china-latin-america-space-cooperation-an-overview/.

[24] French, H.W. (2024, February 9). Mexico Is America’s Answer to China’s Belt and Road. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/09/united-states-mexico-immigration-border-china-trade-bri/.

[25] Ellis, R.E. (2023, August 11). Mexico’s Engagement with China and Choices for its Future. US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3495410/mexicos-engagement-with-china-and-choices-for-its-future/.

[26] Reuters. (2023, December 5). China and Mexico officials vow to strengthen cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/china-mexico-officials-vow-strengthen-cooperation-2023-12-05/.

[27] Goodman, P.S. (2023, June 20). Why Chinese Companies Are Investing Billions in Mexico. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/03/business/china-mexico-trade.html.

[28] Ezrarti, M. (2024, October 26). Mexico Also Wants To Decouple From China. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2024/10/26/mexico-also-wants-to-decouple-from-china/.

[29] Kuttner, R. (2022, February 1). China: Epicenter of the Supply Chain Crisis. The American Prospect. Retrieved from https://prospect.org/economy/china-epicenter-of-the-supply-chain-crisis/.

[30] Escobado, R. (2024, December 18). U.S. begins to retaliate against China over hack of telecom networks. CBS News. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-retaliates-against-china-hack-telecom-networks/.

[31] Industrial Cyber. (2024, October 7). Chinese cyberattack reportedly compromised US broadband providers, possibly accessing federal court data. Retrieved from https://industrialcyber.co/threats-attacks/chinese-cyberattack-reportedly-compromised-us-broadband-providers-possibly-accessing-federal-court-data/.

[32] The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). (2024, October). Bilateral Trade Profile: Chain & the Bahamas. Retrieved by https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/bhs.

[33] Griffin, P. J., and Danvers, W. (2021, November 15). A strategic challenge for the US: China and The Bahamas. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/581017-a-strategic-challenge-for-the-us-china-and-the-bahamas/.

[34] Office of The Prime Minister, Commonwealth of The Bahamas. (2024, April 23). Prime Minister Philip Davis’s Remarks for the Official Visit of His Excellency Mao Weiming, Governor of Hunan Province, People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from https://opm.gov.bs/prime-minister-davis-governor-mao-weiming-official-visit-remarks/.

[35] Ward, J. (2023, October 11). US general warns of China’s plan for influence in Bahamas, region. The Nassau Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.thenassauguardian.com/home/us-general-warns-of-china-s-plan-for-influence-in-bahamas-region/article_af712826-0100-530f-8915-153a8a851903.html.

[36] Brown, O. (2024, August 10). China’s Ambassador Strengthening Ties Between The Bahamas And China. Bahamas Chronicle. Retrieved from https://bahamaschronicle.com/chinas-ambassador-strengthening-ties-between-the-bahamas-and-china/.

[37] The Nassau Guardian. (2023, October 12). A strategic challenge for the US: China and The Bahamas. Retrieved from https://www.thenassauguardian.com/opinion/a-strategic-challenge-for-the-us-china-and-the-bahamas/article_5077ad78-a3c0-5a7b-936f-f4bf279b5273.html

[38] Foreign Affairs Committee. (2022, November 14). China Regional Snapshot: The Caribbean. Retrieved from https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-snapshot-project-the-caribbean/#:~:text=China%20is%20a%20member%20of,Tobago%2C%20Guyana%2C%20and%20Suriname.

[39] Ellis, R.E. (2023, August 2). PRC Engagement in The Bahamas. US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3495418/prc-engagement-in-the-bahamas/.

[40] Roy, D. (2023, June 15). China’s Growing Influence in Latin America. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri.

[41] Zhang, P. (2024, May). Pepe Zhang provides testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/testimony/pepe-zhang-provides-testimony-to-the-us-china-economic-and-security-review-commission/.

Da Jiang Innovations (DJI) Drones: An Overview

Introduction

In February 2024, RMC’s White Paper “Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) and the Force Protection Threat to DoD” outlined the potential uses, characteristics, and capabilities of sUAS. As highlighted in the paper, the Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledges that an adversary employing sUAS could challenge American military advantage and degrade the Joint Force’s freedom of maneuver across multiple domains. At the same time, civilians and private organizations use drones for filmmaking, law enforcement, utility inspections, emergency response, agriculture, and delivery. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), forecasts highlight the possibilities for as many as 1.92 million small recreational UAS units by 2028.[1],[2],[3]

Over the past decade, Chinese drone companies, especially Da Jiang Innovations (DJI), have dominated the global commercial UAS market. While Shenzhen-based DJI controls a majority of the sUAS market share throughout the U.S. and the world, the “DoD’s Statement on DJI Systems” explicitly indicates that DJI poses “potential threats to national security.” The following white paper will outline DJI’s popularity in the drone market, examples of state and non-state actors employing DJI sUAS, potential security concerns associated with the company, and restrictions and legislation addressing Chinese-manufactured drones.[4]

DJI’s Founding and Evolution

In 2006, Frank Wang founded DJI as a student at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology to develop a flying toy that would not crash most of the time. While DJI released its first quadcopters in 2011, its introduction of the first Phantom drone in 2013 revolutionized the market by providing an inexpensive model with straightforward controls. In 2016, DJI offered new imaging and flight capabilities in the Mavic Pro. The drone’s efficient design enabled consumers to transport the units easily and proved essential for future improvements to DJI’s designs and functionality. Furthermore, in 2018, the Mavic Air’s release introduced a lightweight model with new preprogrammed flight modes, autonomous operation, and unique features. Following these aerial innovations, DJI debuted its flagship Mavic 2 Pro and Zoom to provide high-end camera options, safety features, and simple operating and flying mechanisms. DJI Mavic 3’s release in 2022 included significant capability improvements, including approximately 45 minutes of flight time, omnidirectional obstacle sensing, and a transmission range of 15 km. The cost-to-flight ratio between the DJI Phantom and DJI Mavic 3 models, released almost 10 years apart, increased by 17.5%.[5],[6],[7],[8],[9]

Figure 1 illustrates the DJI Mavic 3 Pro’s estimated transmission range within the setting of Washington, D.C.

Figure 1
DJI Mavic 3 Pro: Transmission Ranges to and from the Washington Monument

These developments and further innovations helped DJI capture approximately 77% of the American hobby drone market and 90% of the global commercial drone service provider market, according to estimates from 2020. More recent estimates concur that DJI continues to control most of the market. DJI drones also have been widely used by American public-safety agencies. According to open-source reports released in 2023, DJI drones comprised a majority of sUAS units registered by local governments and police departments in New Jersey and systems used for official operation in the State of New York. Furthermore, before a recent ban was initiated in Florida, almost half of the drones registered by state and local governments and police departments there were manufactured by DJI. In addition, security forces and government agencies of allies of the U.S. rely on DJI systems. For example, as of 2023, DJI products comprise more than two-thirds of drones operated by police forces in the United Kingdom.[9],[10]

Employment of DJI Drones

DJI drones used in the Russian-Ukraine conflict highlight the platform’s capabilities. Small recreational UAS models like the DJI Mavic quadcopter have assisted both armies in reconnaissance missions and delivering bombs. For example, in March 2023, Ukraine obtained 300 DJI Mavic 3T UAVs through its “Army of Drones” program. According to a Ukrainian press release, each aerial vehicle included a thermal sensor and a high-powered zoom camera that allows an operator to conduct reconnaissance, artillery, and night operations. An unclassified report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence also revealed that China had shipped more than $12 million in drones and components to Russia as of March 2023. While DJI announced in 2022 that it would suspend all sales in Ukraine and Russia, a study of at least 1,000 cases of drones used for reconnaissance and attacks in the conflict from March 2022 to March 2023 found that DJI platforms accounted for more than half of identifiable units.[11],[12],[13],[14],[15],[16],[17]

Open-source reporting also reveals the use of DJI drones in the Israel-Hamas conflict. Expert analysis of the 07 October 2023 attack indicates that Hamas employed modified commercial quadcopter drones, including aerial vehicles manufactured by DJI, to drop explosives onto Israel’s observation towers. These attacks successfully disrupted sensors, communications, and weapons systems along the border of Gaza. Footage from one of the attacks shows an armed DJI quadcopter drone taking out an Israeli Merkava tank. The IDF has also used DJI platforms for their operations, including the DJI Avata, to explore tunnels constructed by Hamas.[18],[19],[20],[21],[22]

Finally, analysis from the assassination attempt of former President Trump in Butler, PA, on 13 July 2024 indicates that the gunman surveyed the area using a DJI drone. Roughly two (2) hours before the rally, the 20-year-old gunman flew the drone about 200 yards from the stage for approximately 11 minutes. Investigators also found the drone in the shooter’s car after the attempt on the former president’s life.[23],[24]

Security Concerns and Bans on DJI Drones

In 2015, China initiated its “Made in China 2025” strategic plan, which is a ten-year effort to invest in key industries and maintain its global leadership and market dominance. China has promoted sophisticated market mechanisms and minimized red tape to initiate rapid growth as part of this effort. Furthermore, the PRC’s “Military-Civil Fusion” and “The National Security Law of the PRC” indicate that citizens and private organizations in China are required to assist the government and intelligence services with security issues. The Chinese Community Party remains committed to these strategies and laws within the commercial drone industry, directing companies to invest significantly in drones and components, develop domestic supply chains, and acquire and transfer western technology. For example, open-source reports reveal that at least four (4) Chinese investment companies with close ties to the PRC are investors in DJI. These investors include the China Chengtong Holdings Group, Shanghai Venture Capital Guidance Fund, Guangdong Hengjian Investment Holding, and the State Development & Investment Corporation. With the PRC’s strong backing of its drone industry over the past decade, DJI and other Chinese companies have been able to flood the worldwide market with lower-cost drones that have more advanced capabilities.[25],[8],[26]

Figure 2 illustrates China’s extensive global UAS exports in 2023.

Figure 2
Chinese UAS Exports and Imports, 2023[27]

Given the PRC’s expanded control of companies and data within China, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a “Cybersecurity Guidance” document in January 2024 addressing Chinese-manufactured UAS. According to CISA and the FBI, “the use of Chinese-manufactured UAS in critical infrastructure operations risks exposing sensitive information to PRC authorities, jeopardizing U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.” The document highlights that the many points of connections associated with UAS can present exploitation opportunities. For example, updates managed by Chinese entities can lead to unknown data collection and transmission capabilities without the owner’s knowledge.[28]

On 24 May 2017, the Department of the Navy released an internal memo citing the operational risks of using the “DJI Family of Products.” According to the memo (released under the Freedom of Information Act), DJI systems have potential cyber vulnerabilities, particularly involving the data link between the aircraft and the ground station. On 02 August 2017, the U.S. Army issued a memo ordering all personnel to stop using DJI drones due to cyber vulnerabilities. In June 2019, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2020, which prohibits the operation or procurement of UAS manufactured in a “covered foreign country” (defined as China by Public Law 116-92) by the DoD for military activities and the Department of Energy for defense activities. In addition, the Department of Commerce added DJI to its Entity List on 21 December 2020, terminating DJI’s access to American technology, suppliers, and markets.[29],[30],[31]

In January 2021, Executive Order 13981 and the passing of Senate Bill 73 prohibited the federal government from procuring or using UAS models manufactured or assembled by entities based in China or subject to influence or control by the PRC. Two (2) years later, the U.S. Senate passed a similar bill, the American Secure Drone Act of 2023, which was incorporated into the NDAA for FY2024. A few states also have banned DJI products, including Florida and Mississippi. Mississippi’s Senate Bill 2853, passed in 2023, requires all sUAS units acquired by the state or any agency or political subdivision to be purchased from a manufacturing company incorporated and headquartered in the U.S.[32],[33],[34]

Countering Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Drones Act Overview

In February 2022, Congresswoman Elise Stefanik (R-NY) introduced the “Countering CCP Drones Act,” which passed the House of Representatives on 09 September 2024. The bill requires telecommunications and video surveillance equipment or services produced by DJI to be included on a “list of communications equipment or services determined by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security.” Other companies on the “Covered List” include Huawei Technologies Company, ZTE Corporation, and Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company. Proponents of the bill cite national security concerns and indicate that banning DJI drones from operating on American communications infrastructure will foster the growth of a competitive domestic drone industry. The Countering CCP Drones Act now sits with the Senate, with some predicting the Senate version of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) could incorporate the bill.[35],[36],[37]

While the Countering CCP Drones Act has earned bipartisan support, many companies and industry representatives oppose the bill. Critics claim banning DJI drones could limit commercial options and increase costs for companies and consumers. They also assert that a ban on DJI drones could disrupt the operations of law enforcement agencies, first responders, and farmers who rely on the company’s products. DJI states that lawmakers therein “reference inaccurate and unsubstantiated allegations regarding DJI’s operations” and denies that their drones “collect flight logs, photos, or video by default.” DJI continues to fight against market restrictions by sponsoring and maintaining the Drone Advocacy Alliance website.[35],[38]

Ongoing Developments

In 2022, the DoD included DJI on its list of “Chinese military companies” (CMC) operating directly or indirectly in the U.S. in accordance with the statutory requirement of Section 1260H of the NDAA for FY2021. On 18 October 2024, a former U.S. Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the DoD on behalf of DJI for including the company. In the lawsuit, DJI argues that it is “neither owned nor controlled by the Chinese military.” DJI claims that it has “lost business deals, been stigmatized as a national security threat, and been banned from contracting with multiple federal government agencies” due to the DoD’s decision. This lawsuit shortly follows open-source media reports that DJI informed distributors that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection is citing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) to withhold some sUAS units from being imported. The UFLPA prohibits importation of goods produced entirely or partly in the Xinjiang region in response to what the U.S. government details as forced labor abuses directed at Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups.[39],[40]

Conclusion

In the “Cybersecurity Guidance” referenced above, CISA and the FBI encourage public and private sector organizations to reference the DoD’s Blue UAS Cleared List for models compliant with federal cybersecurity policies. After the FY2020 NDAA was signed into law, in which section 848 prohibited specific components from covered countries, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) started the Blue UAS initiative in August 2020. Blue UAS maintains and includes a list of policy-approved commercial UAS models for DoD and government users that are validated by the DIU as “cyber-secure” and “safe to fly.”  As of May 2024, the Blue UAS Cleared List includes at least 26 platforms manufactured by 14 different entities. A platform added to the list requires a DoD customer to sponsor its inclusion or has the capability to meet a DoD customer’s needs when the DIU initiates a “Commercial Solutions Opening.” As DJI and other Chinese drone companies encounter increasing market restrictions within the U.S., public and private entities could consult the DIU’s evolving Blue UAS Cleared List to meet their commercial drone needs.[41]

[1] Shaikh, S., Karako, T., and McLoughlin, M. (2023, November). Countering Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems: Air Defense by and for the Joint Force. CSIS. Retrieved from https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-11/231114_Shaikh_Countering_sUAS.pdf?VersionId= qJtlCY3Z071CXL0Dt8_wD5ul9UIdmUFj.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense. (2021, January). Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/07/2002561080/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-COUNTER-SMALL-UNMANNED-AIRCRAFT-SYSTEMS-STRATEGY.PDF.

[3] FAA. (n.d). Emerging Aviation Entrants: Unmanned Aircraft System and Advanced Air Mobility. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/unmanned_ aircraft_systems.pdf.

[4] U.S. Department of Defense. (2021). Department Statement on DJI Systems. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2706082/department-statement-on-dji-systems/.

[5] Santo, B. (2018, December 27). The Consumer Electronics Hall of Fame: DJI Phantom Drone. IEEE Spectrum. Retrieved from https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-consumer-electronics-hall-of-fame-dji-phantom-drone.

[6] Chiu, Karen. (2018, October 2). The story of drone pioneer DJI. SCMP. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/abacus/who-what/what/article/3028241/story-drone-pioneer-dji.

[7] Vox Creative. (2020, March 23). The evolution of the DJI Mavic Series, from an ambitious idea to the world’s flagship drone to a tool for crisis. The Verge. Retrieved from https://www.theverge.com/ ad/21167685/dji-mavic-drone-series-evolution.

[8] Kroenig, M., and Bayoumi, I. (2024, June 27). A Global Strategy to Secure UAS Supply Chains. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-global-strategy-to-secure-uas-supply-chains/.

[9] AUVSI. (2024, September). Whitepaper: AUVSI Partnership for Drone Competitiveness. Partnership for Drone Competitiveness. Retrieved from https://www.auvsi.org/sites/default/files/AUVSI-Partnership-for-Drone-Competitiveness-White-Paper.pdf.

[10] Brewster, T. (2023, June). US States Fly Thousands Of Chinese Drones Across the East Coast. Marco Rubio is Furious. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/ 2023/06/01/american-states-fly-thousands-of-chinese-drones-across-east-coast/.

[11] Myre, G. (2023, March 28). A Chinese drone for hobbyists plays a crucial role in the Russia-Ukraine war. NPR. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2023/03/21/1164977056/a-chinese-drone-for-hobbyists-plays-a-crucial-role-in-the-russia-ukraine-war.

[12] Zafra, M., Hunder, M., Rao, A., & Kiyada, S. (2024, March 26). How Drone Combat In Ukraine Is Changing Warfare. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/.

[13] Bertrand, N. (2023, July 27). US intel report details increasing importance of Chinese technology to Russia’s war in Ukraine. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/27/politics/us-intelligence-report-russia-china-ukraine/index.html.

[14] Ross. P.E. (2023, May 17). Budget Drones in Ukraine Are Redefining Warfare. Spectrum. Retrieved from https://spectrum.ieee.org/drone-warfare-ukraine.

[15] Luzin, P. (2023, November 23).  Russian Military Drones: Past, Present, and Future of the UAV Industry. FPRI. Retrieved from https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/11/russian-military-drones-past-present-and-future-of-the-uav-industry/

[16] Crumley, B. (2024, March 31). Ukraine sends 300 DJI Mavic 3T drones to battle Russians ahead of expected offensive. Drone DJ. Retrieved from https://dronedj.com/2023/03/31/ukraine-sends-300-dji-mavic-3t-drones-to-battle-russians-ahead-of-expected-offensive/.

[17] Vallance, C. (2022, April 27). Chinese drone firm DJI pauses operations in Russia and Ukraine. BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-61179022.

[18] Kaniewski, D. (2023, October 20). Hamas: Learning about drone warfare from the war in Ukraine. DW. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/hamas-learning-about-drone-warfare-from-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67169578.

[19] Byman, D., McCabe, R., Palmer, A., Doxsee C., Holtz, M., and Duff, D. (2023, December 19). Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Data. CSIS. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/ analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data.

[20] Armitage, R. (2023, November 05). The skies over Gaza are abuzz with drones. Some are Israeli, some are American, and some are flying bombs made by Hamas. ABC. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-06/drones-flying-over-and-within-gaza/103067280.

[21] Jankowicz, M. (2023, October 10). How Hamas likely used rudimentary drones to ‘blind and deafen’ Israel’s border and pave the way for its onslaught. Business Insider. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/hamas-drones-take-out-comms-towers-ambush-israel-2023-10.

[22] Kesteloo, H. (2023, November 20). DJI Avata Drones: A New Tool in IDF Military Operations. Drone XL. Retrieved from https://dronexl.co/2023/11/20/dji-avata-drones-idf-military-operations/.

[23] Kosnar, M., & Dilanian, K. (2024, July 19). Trump shooter flew drone over venue hours before attempted assassination, source says. NBC News. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-shooter-flew-drone-venue-hours-attempted-assassination-source-sa-rcna162817.

[24] Lybrand, H., Rabinowitz, H., and Cole, D. (2024, July 24). Takeaways from FBI testimony: Trump shooter searched details of JFK assassination and flew drone near rally site. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/24/politics/fbi-wray-house-hearing-trump-shooting/index.html.

[25] PRC State Council. (2022, March 08). Notice of the State Council on the Publication of “Made in China 2025.” Center for Security and Emerging Technology. Retrieved from https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0432_made_in_china_2025_EN.pdf.

[26] Cadell, C. (2022, February 1). Drone Company DJI Obscured Ties to Chinese State Funding, Documents Show. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2706082/department-statement-on-dji-systems/.

[27] UN Comtrade Database. (n.d). Trade Data. Retrieved from https://comtradeplus.un.org/ TradeFlow.

[28] CISA and FBI. (2024, January). Cybersecurity Guidance: Chinese-Manufactured UAS. Retrieved from https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/Cybersecurity%20Guidance%20Chinese-Manufactured%20UAS.pdf.

[29] National Security Archive. (n.d.). Department of the Navy Memorandum raised possibility of cyber vulnerabilities, susceptibility to electromagnetic interference. National Security Archive. Retrieved from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/cyber-vault/2019-12-16/military-concerns-over-chinese-dji-drones.

[30] U.S. Congress. (2019, December 20). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/.

[31] National Archives. (2020). Addition of Entities to the Entity List, Revision of Entry on the Entity List, and Removal of Entities From the Entity List. Retrieved from https://www.federalregister.gov/ documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-entry-on-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-entities.

[32] U.S. Congress. (2021). S.73 – American Security Drone Act of 2021. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/73/text.

[33] National Archives. (2021). S.73 – American Security Drone Act of 2021. Retrieved from https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/22/2021-01646/protecting-the-united-states-from-certain-unmanned-aircraft-systems.

[34] Mississippi Legislature. (2023). Mississippi Senate Bill 2853. Retrieved from https://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2023/html/SB/2800-2899/SB2853IN.htm

[35] Govtrack.us. (n.d.). H.R. 2864: Countering CCP Drones Act. Retrieved from https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/118/hr2864/text.

[36] Federal Communications Commission. (2024, September). List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act. Retrieved from https://www.fcc.gov/ supplychain/coveredlist.

[37] Howe, S. (2024, September 24). Who’s Opposed to the Proposed DJI Ban? Commercial UAV News. Retrieved from https://www.commercialuavnews.com/who-s-opposed-to-the-proposed-dji-ban.

[38] DJI ViewPoints Team. (2024, March 1). The Countering CCP Drones Act (An Attempt To Ban DJI). Retrieved from https://viewpoints.dji.com/blog/get-the-facts-countering-ccp-drones-act.

[39] Shepardson, D. (2024, October 21). Drone Maker DJI Sues Pentagon Over Chinese Military Listing. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/legal/chinese-dronemaker-dji-sues-pentagon-over-chinese-military-listing-2024-10-19/

[40] Martina, M., and Shepardson, D. (2024, October 16). US Customs halts some drone imports from Chinese manufacturer DJI, company says. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-customs-halting-some-drone-imports-chinese-manufacturer-dji-company-says-2024-10-16/.

[41] Defense Innovation Unit. (2024, May). About Blue UAS. Retrieved from https://www.diu.mil/blue-uas.

2024 Election Series: Domestic Threats to the 2024 Elections

Introduction

This white paper is the second of RMC’s 2024 Election Series focused on potential threats to this election cycle. This paper will provide detailed information on domestic threats to the 2024 elections. Threat actors from the extreme left- and right-wing of the American political spectrum are likely to protest, create civil disturbances, and commit acts of political violence as the November elections approach. Misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation on both sides serve to fuel the heated environment. This paper is not an all-inclusive assessment of potential threats but is intended to highlight the potential for election related protests, civil disturbances, domestic terrorism, and political violence.

 Current Domestic Extremism Environment in the U.S.

The domestic extremism environment in the U.S. is marked by a range of ideologically-driven groups and individuals who pose various threat levels. These groups and individuals often have religious, racial, or ethnic causes that push them to acts of violence. Some actors use the Constitutional right to free speech, expression, and assembly to incite conflict and later justify their actions. Furthermore, since the incident at the U.S. Capitol Building on 06 January 2021, domestic extremists have evolved and adapted their strategies. Several groups have been trying to affect changes at the local level, including hosting conferences, and challenging local school district policies. They hope to embed their concerns into mainstream conservative discourse with minimal scrutiny. This has allowed them to initiate conflicts at the local level and made it more difficult for law enforcement to mitigate future potential incidents.[1],[2]

The Founding Fathers intended for the American system of government to be slow and deliberate, with checks and balances. However, society promotes an increasingly fast pace via technology and modern conveniences. This leads to an expectation that the federal government can operate at the same pace and immediately change with the times. This leads to frustration on both ends of the political spectrum. The ease of spreading extremist ideologies has intensified political and social divisions, making it more difficult for diverse groups to find common ground. This can lead to gridlock in political institutions and exacerbate conflicts over policy and governance.[1],[3],[4]

As the presidential election approaches, it is likely that the presence of violent extremists will increase, as evidenced by the 13 July 2024 assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump at a campaign rally. Domestic extremist groups are relatively easy to monitor as they often publish their ideologies and recruit new members online. Lone actors are more difficult to identify and target because they often lack the interactions and indicators that law enforcement uses to investigate threat groups. Because they carry out attacks by themselves, it is much more difficult to disrupt their plans. The threats posed by groups and individuals on both sides of the political spectrum must be understood to properly defend against them while still protecting and upholding Constitutional rights.[1],[5]

Issues Driving Political Discourse in the 2024 Election

The issues deepening the political division between left- and right-wing groups are diverse. Abortion, crime, border security, foreign policy, and election integrity all have the potential to spark unrest and violence. Both sides have deep-seated beliefs and are unlikely to find middle ground on these issues.[6]

The Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturned Roe v. Wade and sent the legality of abortion back to the states. Since then, conservative states have significantly limited access to the procedure, ranging from total bans, some of which include exclusions (for rape, incest, and saving the life of the mother), to bans after certain timeframes, usually between six (6) and 15 weeks of pregnancy. More liberal states still allow access to abortion up to 24 weeks of pregnancy while others allow abortions to take place until birth. These varied polices, while welcomed within their states, continue to drive a broader national argument.[7],[8],[9]

The debate surrounding border security includes questions about how to humanely treat migrants unlawfully entering the country. The political left generally believes that they should be welcomed and supported, including a path to citizenship and, in some jurisdictions, the right to vote. The right has raised concerns over the economic impact and the idea tacitly rewarding those who have broken the law. The idea of “America First” opposes taking care of non-citizens before fixing domestic issues like the national debt, education, veteran’s issues, and homelessness.[7],[8]

Closely related to the border security issues is crime. The political right points to rising crime rates, particularly in large cities, which it blames on liberal policies. This often includes emphasizing violence committed by illegal immigrants against American citizens. The political left claims that crime rates are not increasing and, therefore, wants to deemphasize the issue. In reality, crime reporting to the U.S. Department of Justice has been incomplete since 2020, with many jurisdictions choosing not to furnish yearly statistics. Both sides of the political aisle have been accused of selectively emphasizing data that supports their arguments.[7],[8]

Foreign policy, particularly support for the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, also creates division. The right, historically supportive of overseas military intervention, questions the cost and if American interests are truly at stake. The left, historically critical of such intervention, is now supporting Ukraine’s fight against Russia, while remaining divided on Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza. The Jewish community in the U.S. has historically supported the Democratic party. However, left-wing protestors supporting Palestinian issues (and even outright championing Hamas) also generally align themselves with the Democratic party. This dichotomy in an election year complicates the issue on the left. The two (2) major political parties’ evolution here has both created internal division and enflamed tensions across the aisle.[7],[8]

Election integrity is another issue exacerbating the political divide in America. Lawsuits regarding election integrity have been filed nationwide by both sides of the political spectrum. Texas recently reported removing over one (1) million voters from their rolls in the last three (3) years. Most were deceased voters, and the rest were removed for not being current residents, including approximately 1,900 illegal immigrants. Michigan, on the other hand, recently passed a bill limiting the ability to contest election results and initiate recounts post-election. Multiple investigations and lawsuits regarding electronic voting machines, ballot harvesting, irregularities, and claims of election fraud during the 2020 election have produced mixed results. As a result of these issues, the political right tends to be highly suspicious of the different voting systems and laws that govern each states’ elections while the political left is tends to be supportive of current voting systems. The Constitution holds that each state has authority over election administration.[7],[8]

Left-Wing Threat Actors

The most significant left-wing threat actors in the U.S. include groups and movements motivated by anti-capitalist, anarchist, and communist or socialist ideologies. Among the most prominent in recent years is Antifa, a loosely organized movement that opposes what it deems to be fascism, white supremacy, and/or far-right ideologies, often using violence (“direct action”) to further its goals. Although not a centralized group, Antifa cells and their members have been involved in street-level confrontations, property damage, and counterprotests, particularly during periods of heightened political tension.  Black Lives Matter (BLM) is primarily a social and political movement, with multiple national and local nonprofits adopting the moniker, along with unaffiliated supporters who identify with the movement online. BLM has been associated with a wide range of protest activities, some of which have been controversial. While many BLM-related actions are peaceful, there have been several instances where protests have escalated into violence and property damage.[10],[11]

The potential for unrest on the part of left-wing groups may be heightened depending upon several factors. Incidents involving law enforcement and those involving alleged “racial injustice” have historically triggered protests. Additionally, the outcome of the upcoming U.S. presidential election, particularly if former President Trump is reelected, may lead to widespread demonstrations. The involvement of more radical left-wing elements may result in confrontations, property damage, or other forms of civil disturbance. Law enforcement and security agencies typically prepare for such possibilities in the lead-up to major elections.[11]

Left-wing activists may mobilize if they believe that the election outcome threatens democratic principles, social justice, or civil rights. The potential for clashes with right-wing groups or for confrontations with law enforcement is high. The situation may be further exacerbated by misinformation, inflammatory rhetoric, and the mobilization of extremist elements. As such, authorities must continue to prepare for a range of scenarios to manage and mitigate potential post-election violence.[12]

Right-Wing Threat Actors

Right-wing extremist organizations continue to recruit, train and plan for actions before, during, and after the election. Actions prior to the election may include assassination threats against candidates and public officials, the targeting of large voter gatherings, and domestic disturbances at key dates associated with former President Trump’s ongoing legal cases. Actions during the election may include threats against polling offices, election workers, and collection points. The post-election phase may include attacks against government buildings, law enforcement, or directly against officials deemed responsible for real or perceived malfeasance and corruption.[13]

Organizations that may be significant sources for the right-wing extremism groups include the accelerationist Boogaloo movement, the neo-fascist skullmask movement, the Oath Keepers, and the Proud Boys. In 2019, a top Federal Bureau of Investigation official told Congress that the agency only devoted a small amount of resources to combat the domestic threat, at an estimated 20%. Members of several right-wing organizations have traveled to conflict zones, including the war in Ukraine, for training and to seek the mentorship of veteran fighters. Right-wing threat actors vary in ideology and are constantly evolving. Some are decentralized ideological networks rather than clear hierarchical organizations. They organize themselves into local groups or chapters ensuring there is no national organization to coordinate their activity. These right-wing threat actors will continue to demonstrate an ability and willingness to capitalize on socially divisive situations to advance their anti-government aims. The threat of violence is likely to increase during periods of political unrest as its members may attempt to hijack public demonstrations and social and/or racial justice rallies to sow chaos.[14],[15]

The threat of violence from far-right threat actors in the U.S. will remain high, marked by lone offenders or small group attacks that occur with little warning. These actors will continue to be inspired by a mix of conspiracy theories, personal grievances, and enduring racial, ethnic, religious, and anti-government ideologies. Since 2022, there have been three (3) fatal attacks in the U.S., resulting in 21 deaths. Multiple non-lethal attacks have been documented as well. Law enforcement has disrupted over a half-dozen plots during the same period targeting law enforcement, government institutions, faith-based organizations, retail locations, ethnic and religious minorities, healthcare infrastructure, transportation services, and the energy sector. While violent extremists will likely continue to use accessible, easy-to-use weapons for these attacks, they also will leverage social media and encrypted communications platforms to share novel tactics and techniques. Communication and planning online will likely grow as they continue to spread their views, recruit followers, and inspire future attacks. Some have improved the quality of their video and written content online, which may help them to recruit new followers and inspire attacks.[16]

Conclusion

Left- and right-wing extremist groups are as varied as the issues driving the political divide in the U.S. Finding middle ground is more difficult now than any other time in modern history. Extremist groups on both sides are using technology to spread their ideological views and propaganda to garner support for their causes. While political campaigns distance themselves from these groups, they still tread lightly for fear of losing their votes. Many, if not most, people involved in extremist movements are also highly motivated voters. These groups may even deescalate their rhetoric, protests (both nonviolent and otherwise), or other public activities leading up to the election to curry favor with moderate voters who may vote for the same candidate.

The U.S. has become increasingly polarized, with deep divisions across political, social, and cultural lines. If the election results are close, contested, or perceived as illegitimate by a significant portion of the population, the likelihood of unrest increases. Protests, demonstrations, and other forms of civil disturbance may arise, driven by both left-wing and right-wing groups. However, the groups at either end of the political spectrum continue to issue both real and implied threats, only time will tell if they intend to act on them.

[1] National Security Council. (2021, June). National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. National Security Council. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf.

[2] Holt, J. (n.d.). How Domestic Extremism Adapted and Evolved After the January 6 US Capitol Attack. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/after-the-insurrection-how-domestic-extremists-adapted-and-evolved-after-the-january-6-us-capitol-attack/.

[3] Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2021, June 15). White House Unveils Strategy to Combat Domestic Extremism. NY Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/us/politics/biden-domestic-terrorism-extremists.html.

[4] Department of Treasury (n.d.). Domestic Violent Extremism. Department of Treasury. Retrieved from https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/terrorism-and-illicit-finance/domestic-violent-extremism.

[5] Department of Homeland Security. (2022, March 11). DHS Releases Report on Internal Review of Domestic Violent Extremism. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/03/11/dhs-releases-report-internal-review-domestic-violent-extremism.

[6] Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis. (2023, September). Homeland Threat Assessment. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf.

[7] Pew Research Center. (2024, February 29). Americans’ Top Policy Priority for 2024: Strengthening the Economy. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/29/americans-top-policy-priority-for-2024-strengthening-the-economy/.

[8] Pew Research Center. (2024, June 6). Cultural Issues and the 2024 Election. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/06/cultural-issues-and-the-2024-election/.

[9] Hensley, E and Washington, J. (2024, May 1) How Major Abortion Laws Compare, State by State. The Fuller Project. Retrieved from fullerproject.org/story/how-major-abortion-laws-compare-state-by-state-map/.

[10] Goff, K and McCarthy, J. (2022, February 8) No, antifa didn’t ‘infiltrate’ Black Lives Matter during the 2020 protests. But did it increase violence? Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/08/antifa-blm-extremism-violence/.

[11] 118th Congress. (2023, March 7). H.Res.202 – Deeming certain conduct of members of Antifa as domestic terrorism and designating Antifa as a domestic terrorist organization. U.S. Congress. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-resolution/202/text.

[12] Hoffman, B and Ware, J. (2024, June 28). How Bad Will Political Violence in the U.S. Get? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/28/civil-war-political-violence-u-s-2024-election/.

[13] Council on Foreign Relations. (2024, April 23). There Is a Risk of Extremist Violence Around the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. CFR. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/news-releases/there-risk-extremist-violence-around-2024-us-presidential-election-warns-new-cfr.

[14] Rotella, S. (2021, January 22). Global Right-Wing Extremism Networks Are Growing. The U.S. is Just Now Catching Up. ProPublica. Retrieved from https://www.propublica.org/article/global-right-wing-extremism-networks-are-growing-the-u-s-is-just-now-catching-up.

[15] George Washington University. (2024). Domestic Extremism. GW. Retrieved from https://extremism.gwu.edu/domestic-extremism

[16] Homeland Security. (2024). Homeland Threat Assessment. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf

2024 Election Series Introduction: Domestic and Foreign Threats

Introduction

The 2024 U.S. presidential election will be held on Tuesday, 05 November 2024, amid myriad domestic issues and the most significant political polarization in decades. The worldwide great power competition, wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and Chinese aggression towards Taiwan have escalated tension in ways that are reminiscent of the 1968 election cycle. Incumbent President Joe Biden (a Democrat) has decided to not seek reelection, leaving the Democrat nomination open for the time being, despite widespread endorsements for Vice President Kamala Harris. Former President Donald Trump (a Republican) has officially received his party’s nomination. The race also features at least three (3) notable third-party candidates who may influence the election outcome. This complex situation is likely conducive to a variety of threat actors, both foreign and domestic.

This white paper is the first in RMC’s 2024 Election Series that will examine potential threats associated with the current landscape. This paper will provide historical precedent and a top-level overview of the threats from foreign and domestic actors. Future papers will examine the involved parties and their activities in-depth, including coverage of follow-on events.

 The 1968 Presidential Election Cycle: Precedent for 2024

The term “unprecedented” has become common across media sources to describe the current political climate. However, the 1960s and 1970s were also time of great turmoil, with the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, and worldwide nuclear proliferation. Concerns over communist influence and espionage were rampant. The country was also at the height of several protest movements for civil rights, withdrawal from Vietnam (and the end of the Selective Service draft), women’s rights, and environmentalism. There was also a growing sexual revolution and emergent drug culture. Crime was on the rise nationally.[1],[2]

This tumultuous climate led to regular demonstrations, particularly on college campuses. Many turned violent, with injuries and property damage. Clashes between police and protesters were common. In November 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. In April 1968, civil rights pioneer Dr. Marting Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in Memphis. In November of that same year, President Kennedy’s brother and likely presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy was also shot and killed in Los Angeles.[1],[2]

During the 1968 presidential election, many voters were concerned for the nation’s future. War, inflation, unemployment, crime, and protest activity fostered a contentious environment that caused President Lyndon Johnson (a Democrat), amid primary challenges, to not seek reelection. Following the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, Hubert Humphries to become the Democratic nominee. Richard Nixon returned from virtual political exile to become the Republican nominee, running on a platform of improving the economy, America’s inner cities, crime, education, healthcare, immigration, Middle East stability, and European security against the Soviet-Union. He also sought a progressive de-Americanization of the Vietnam War.[1],[2],[3],[4]

Nixon would go on to win the election with a thin majority of the popular vote (0.7%). His election would not bring an end to the unrest. In 1970, National Guard troops opened fire at an anti-war protest at Kent State University, wounding nine (9) and killing (4). The Students for a Democratic Society, a college organization founded in 1962, lead to the radical offshoot the Weather Underground in 1969. The organization would go on to conduct bombings, murders and kidnapping, mostly against U.S. government targets and individuals deemed to be part of “the establishment.” Other groups such as the Black Liberation Army, Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, New World Liberation Front, and Symbionese Liberation Army would also conduct violent political action on American soil.[5],[6],[7]

Commonalities between the 1968 and 2024 election cycle include overseas wars, tensions in the Middle East, competition with China, inflation, economic issues, abortion, crime, immigration, and political violence, including the recent assassination attempt on former President (and now Candidate) Donald Trump. Understanding this historical context aids in predictive analysis of potential threats in relation to the 2024 election, which is the first step in mitigation.

2024 Presidential Election Outlook

The Department of Homeland Security’s 2024 Homeland Threat Assessment indicates that U.S. electoral processes remain an attractive target for adversaries, many of whom will likely seek to influence or interfere with the 2024 election. Some Domestic Violent Extremists (DVE) may attempt to disrupt civic and democratic processes, mobilized by their perceptions of the upcoming election cycle. Nation-state threat actors will likely use novel technologies and cyber tools to undermine national confidence in a free and fair election. Cyber actors likely will seek to exploit election-related systems, including state, local, and political parties’ networks, as well as election officials’ personal devices and e-mail accounts. DHS assesses that civil disturbances, targeted political violence, and foreign influence efforts are likely during the 2024 election cycle.[8]

Domestic Threats

The 2020 Presidential Election was one of the most contested and disputed elections in history, which led to the riot at the U.S. Capitol on 06 January 2021. Misinformation and disinformation reached new heights as technology agitated online discourse, which manifested in the real world. The political divide of the 2020 election cycle remains unresolved and new issues have emerged. Some DVEs, particularly those motivated by conspiracy theories and anti-government or partisan grievances, may seek to disrupt electoral processes. Threats and violence could be directed at government officials, voters, and election infrastructure, including polling places, ballot drop box locations, voter registration sites, campaign events, political party offices, and vote counting sites.[8]

Divisive issues that may incite protests and violence include:[9],[10]

  • American financial support to Ukraine and Israel, especially considering rising inflation and economic issues in the U.S.
  • Protests against Israel’s war against Hamas, including the use of antisemitic rhetoric, which has resulted in counter protests.
  • Foreign policy, particularly regarding China, Russia, Ukraine, NATO expansion and Israel.
  • The U.S. Southern Border and illegal immigration, which have escalated concerns over the integrity of the 2024 election.
  • Election integrity, including the security of voting machines and the use of mail-in ballots and drop boxes, along with potentially outdated voter rolls.
  • Abortion, which was sent back to the states by the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision overturning Roe v. Wade.
  • National crime rates, with divides between those who believe in stricter enforcement and those who feel law enforcement unjustifiably targets marginalized socioeconomic groups.

Recent Domestic Developments

The recent assassination attempt on former President Trump highlights the potential for political violence in this election season. While the incident seems to have unified the right, bipartisan calls to deescalate rhetoric only lasted a few days. The investigation into the circumstances that permitted the attempt are ongoing.

On Sunday, 21 July, President Biden announced that he will not seek reelection. He is now endorsing Vice President Kamala Harris. President Biden’s delegates to the Democratic National Convention will ultimately decide the Democrat nominee based on party guidelines. While conventional wisdom suggests they will vote for Vice President Harris, they are not strictly bound by President Biden’s endorsement. However unlikely, if she does not win a majority of support from delegates there could be a contested Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The last time this happened in 1968, Chicago experienced violent protests that resulted in clashes with the police, later fueling complaints of brutality by law enforcement officers.

Foreign Threats

Russia, China, and Iran likely view the 2024 election cycle as an opportunity to conduct overt and covert influence campaigns aimed at shaping favorable US policy outcomes and undermining American stability. These adversarial states are likely to use artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies to improve the quality and reach of their influence operations, spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to undermine trust in institutions, social cohesion, and election integrity. These efforts will likely increase as November approaches.[8],[11]

According to the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Russia has considered elections as opportunities to conduct influence operations for decades. In 2024, Russia’s primary concern is the effect U.S. election outcomes may have on their war in Ukraine and will likely attempt to influence them in support of its goals.[11]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the primary pacing threat to the U.S. While tensions over China’s intent for the reunification of Taiwan may be the PRC’s primary concern, their long-term goal is to replace the U.S. as the dominant world power. During the U.S. midterm elections in 2022, its propaganda targeted candidates from both political parties. PRC influence activities are increasing in sophistication, including with the use of generative AI. The PRC will also actively exploit societal divisions in the U.S. in a manner similar to previous Russian influence operations.[11]

Iran has conducted malign influence operations across the Middle East, Israel, and the U.S., leveraging its growing technical expertise and an opportunistic approach to cyber operations. The ODNI assess that Iran is likely to attempt influence operations targeting the 2024 U.S. elections. Additionally, reports indicate that Iran is influencing and financing Pro-Palestinian and Pro-Hamas protests across the U.S., which could lead to civil disturbances and violence.[11],[12]

Cyber actors, both government‑affiliated and cyber criminals, likely will remain opportunistic in their targeting of election-related networks and data, routinely attempting to exploit misconfigured or vulnerable public‑facing websites, webservers, and election‑related information technology systems. These actors are likely to engage in social engineering campaigns, including spearphishing and phishing/smishing government officials.[11]

Conclusion

The threat landscape surrounding the 2024 presidential election is still developing, but there are historical precedents that inform some predictive analysis. While the outcome of the election is far from certain, it is safe to say that the political tensions in the U.S. will not be quelled by the election of either candidate. Protest activity, civil unrest, and even targeted political violence are likely. Foreign actors will attempt to use social engineering techniques, malicious cyber activity, and financial ties to influence elections and fan the flames of political and social tensions. While this paper provides a baseline overview of the threats associated with the 2024 election, RMC’s white paper series will continue to examine the threats posed by both foreign and domestic actors in greater detail both before and during the election. Post-election papers will also address significant follow-on threat activity and scenarios that may occur.

[1] Nichter, L. (2023, 01 August). The Year that Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968. Yale University Press.

[2] Converse, P. et al. (2014, 01 August). Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election. Cambridge University Press

[3] Peters, G and Wooley, J. (1968, August 05). Republican Party Platform of 1968. The American Presidency Project. Retrieved from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1968.

[4] Humphrey, H. (1968) Hubert H. Humphries Papers: An Inventory of His 1968 Presidential Campaign Files. Minnesota Historical Society Manuscript Collections. Retrieved from http://www2.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00720/pdf/hhh41.pdf.

[5] Wooley, J and Peters, G. (n.d.). 1968 Election Statistics. The American Presidency Project. Retrieved from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/elections/1968.

[6] Chard, D. (2021, September). Nixon’s War at Home: The FBI, Leftist Guerrillas, and the Origins of Counterterrorism. The University of North Carolina Press.

[7] Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). Weather Underground Bombings. FBI. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/weather-underground-bombings.

[8] Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis. (2023, September). Homeland Threat Assessment. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf.

[9] Pew Research Center. (2024, February 29). Americans’ Top Policy Priority for 2024: Strengthening the Economy. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/29/americans-top-policy-priority-for-2024-strengthening-the-economy/.

[10] Pew Research Center. (2024, June 6). Cultural Issues and the 2024 Election. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/06/cultural-issues-and-the-2024-election/.

[11] Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2024, February 5). Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. ODNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

[12] Quinn, J. (2024, July 9). Iran Finances U.S. Campus Protests: Top Intel Official. National Review. Retrieved from https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/iran-finances-u-s-campus-protests-top-intel-official/.

Veteran Support to Foreign Nation-State Militaries

Introduction

Over the past 20 years, the United States military has accumulated the most combat experience of any armed force in the world. Foreign powers in competition with the U.S. are aware of this operational advantage and actively seek to close the experience gap. Many Department of Defense (DoD) servicemembers who joined the military early in the Global War on Terror have either retired or will be retiring soon. They are being recruited by other nations and corporations with lucrative job offers that leverage their experience both on and off the battlefield. In many cases, the companies they are working for appear to be American or affiliated with countries allied with the U.S. However, veteran servicemembers may also be taking jobs with nation-state threat actors.

Historical Context

Historically, the U.S. has supported other nations prior to wars with diplomatic, economic, and military assistance. Active and veteran personnel have a history of supporting, advising, and training foreign militaries. For example, in 1914, before the U.S. entered World War I, Americans began crossing into Canada to receive military training and volunteer to fight for foreign militaries, including the French Foreign Legion. After Japan attacked China in 1937, Americans served as observers, advisors, and recruiters for foreign air forces. There were also DoD and Department of State civilian employees and contractors who assisted with logistics, policymaking, and training for the fledgling Republic of Vietnam before American involvement in the war.[1],[2],[3]

The current wars in Ukraine and Israel have seen veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces traveling overseas to take part in these conflicts. American veterans have also supported foreign nations on their own through various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), volunteer efforts, initiatives aimed at humanitarian aid, community development, and educational programs.[4],[5],[6],[7],[8],[9]

A Legal Perspective

Before a retired or veteran servicemember can begin working for a foreign government, they are required to receive approval from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. This is covered under the Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and federal law. The Emoluments Clause states that, to preserve national security and prevent conflicts of interest, this approval is required before the servicemember takes a job with a foreign government. The filing and approval requirements must be followed closely, or the DoD may withhold benefits and retirement pay. Statutory enforcement is limited, and there is still a lack of internal policing on this matter. Individuals are expected to act in a manner that would not risk operational security, but they are not required to report their work after the initial background investigation. As a result, once former servicemembers acquire approval permitting them to work for foreign powers, the U.S. Government has no awareness of what may be shared. This creates an obvious and difficult-to-detect national security risk.[10],[11],[12]

Often, former servicemembers work for U.S. companies that support foreign governments or corporations and educational institutions that are controlled, owned, or operated by a foreign government. This requires the same waiver process by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the servicemember’s military branch. In this manner, hundreds of retired servicemembers have received approval to work for foreign governments.[10],[11],[12]

There are several other laws that apply to foreign military service. The Neutrality Act of 1794 prohibits persons within the jurisdiction of the U.S. from enlisting in foreign militaries. Violations of the Neutrality Act are punishable by fines, imprisonment of not more than three (3) years, or both. While the law applies to those within the U.S., it does not apply to those who enlist while they are in another country. Treason (18 U.S.C. 2381) would apply to a U.S. citizen who supports a foreign entity at war or in conflict with the U.S. American citizens can be expatriated for voluntarily committing acts designated by Congress. Voluntary service in the armed forces of a foreign state is an expatriating act, resulting in the loss of U.S. citizenship if those armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or the individual. serves as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. Notably, these laws have rarely been enforced.[10]

During the Global War on Terror, including the War in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military became dependent on civilian contractors at levels never before seen. By October 2020, 43,800 contractors were serving in the CENTCOM area of operations, compared to 15,000 DoD personnel. Many contractors were prior servicemembers who had already deployed and who returned under lucrative contracts as instructors, security personnel, and technical support. However, some contractors have decided to work for other nations, not all of whom are allied with American interests.[13],[14]

Virtually all retirees and most veterans have clearances prior to beginning work for a foreign entity. This creates an opportunity for unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Clearance holders are responsible for safeguarding classified information, including its transmittal, destruction, storage, distribution, handling, and accounting thereof. Once veterans are no longer associated with the department or agency that granted their clearance, there is no oversight or reporting process for the U.S. government to track mishandlings or unauthorized disclosures. Even if a robust system were in place, it would likely be reactive in nature as preventative measures would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Veterans also have broad experience and skillsets that may or may not be explicitly classified, but these tactics, techniques, and procedures can be leveraged by foreign nations and used against American interests.[15]

Case Study: U.S. Veterans in Middle East

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contracted many American veterans of the Global War on Terror to advise and train its personnel. Between 2015 and 2022, some 280 military retirees sought federal authorization to work there. At the time, requests to work for the UAE exceeded those for any other nation in the world. Many were retired General and Flag Officers. There were also an estimated hundreds more veterans already employed by the UAE and by state-owned companies. Most of these veterans did not serve until retirement and did not have to seek federal permission. They are often given double or triple what similar jobs would have earned in the U.S.[16]

Improvements in the martial proficiency of the UAE’s military may have helped the country to send troops into civil wars in Yemen and Libya. These conflicts led to questions about human rights violations. The armed forces of the UAE have imprisoned journalists, human rights activists, and other critics in show trials widely condemned by the international community. At the same time, U.S. veterans were being authorized by the Department of State and DoD to work for the UAE, the Emiratis joined OPEC efforts to reduce global oil production, contrary to American interests. UAE has also been scrutinized by the Justice Department for allegedly interfering in U.S. elections and politics. In 2022, a U.S. intelligence report showed that the UAE made extensive efforts to influence U.S. politics via lobbying firms and to exploit lax and unenforced disclosure laws.[16],[17],[18]

Case Study: China Seeks U.S. Military Experience.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to aggressively recruit U.S. veterans. The PRC aims to recruit personnel to “train the trainer” and bolster its doctrinal shortcomings. China’s last major military campaign was approximately 45 years ago, during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, in which its air and naval forces played little to no role. Pending a possible major military conflict in Taiwan, China understands that its key military forces have not had any combat experience or any effective overhaul in doctrine and tactics in decades. Despite its buildup of forces and the looming possibility of an invasion of Taiwan, Beijing continues to struggle with air operations, pilot proficiency, and tactics that would help it to circumvent U.S. forces, should they directly support Taiwan. This makes the experience of veteran U.S. pilots a much-desired skillset that is essential to overcoming experience gaps.[19],[20],[21]

In June 2024, the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing coalition released a joint threat bulletin highlighting the PLA’s recruitment of current and former military personnel from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and other Western countries to help improve China’s military capabilities. Air operations personnel, flight engineers, and former military pilots are the most in-demand targets. According to the coalition of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., the PLA uses private firms or professional networking sites to conceal their relationship, paying exorbitant salaries, and offering recruits the opportunity to fly “exotic aircraft.” China also sends its servicemembers to private defense and aerospace companies worldwide. These entities, such as the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA), Beijing China Aviation Technology Co. (BCAT), Paramount Group, and Stratos, train in a multitude of disciplines in land, air, and sea operations.[22],[23]

A recent extradition ruling in Australia involving a former U.S. Marine highlights China’s initiative to gain insight into American military tactics and deploy a more robust fleet of aircraft carriers amid increasing aggression toward Taiwan and tensions in the South China Sea. In May 2024, an Australian magistrate ruled that a former U.S. Marine, a naturalized Australian citizen, could be extradited to the U.S. to face charges related to training Chinese military pilots. In October 2022, the former servicemember was arrested by Australian federal police for training Chinese military pilots to land on aircraft carriers between November 2009 and November 2012. According to a 2017 indictment, he conspired with the TFASA to export defense services. Open-source reporting indicates that potential charges in the U.S. include money laundering and breaking arms control law.[19],[24],[25],[26]

Outlook

Historical precedence for U.S. veterans supporting militaries and wartime efforts of other nations date back to the nation’s founding. The Global War on Terror saw a sharp rise in the widespread use of contractors, creating an environment where American veterans commanded high salaries in the U.S. and abroad. The terrorist groups in that conflict were not and are not near-peer competitors. There was less concerns of the illicit sharing of information and experience with other nations. However, this new era of great power competition has near-peer nation-state militaries seeking to challenge the U.S. as the last remaining superpower.

While technology, equipment and doctrine can all be developed, experience can only be earned. The U.S. military has paid the high price to earn the most combat experience in the world. Foreign actors will continue to aggressively seek out this knowledge and experience to close the gap with the U.S. military. The large amounts of money involved creates a potential conflict of interest, with American military experience being sold to the highest bidder. The legally and ethically gray area created by contractors over the last two (2) decades has fostered confusion about support for foreign governments. Greater oversight and enforcement of current laws can ensure that information is not being shared with foreign governments that are or may become competitors to the U.S. As a cleared contracting firm, RMC’s team is trained to meet and exceed the information and operational security requirements to protect the information of our government and commercial clients.  RMC’s Intelligence and Climate Analysis Division will continue to monitor relevant developments and the implications for U.S. national security.

[1] The National World War I Museum. (n.d.) The Volunteers: Americans Join World War I, 1914-1919. Retrieved from https://www.theworldwar.org/exhibitions/volunteers-americans-join-world-war-i-1914-1919.

[2] National Archives and Records Administration. (n.d.) A Prelude to War: The Flying Tigers. Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/a_people_at_war/prelude_to_war/flying_tigers.html.

[3] Nelson, A. (2013, July). Just Good Advice: The American Advisors in the Vietnam War. The University of Southern Mississippi. Retrieved from https://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1187&context=honors_theses.

[4] Southards, C. (2023, November 29). Ukraine, Israel, Yemen…American Veterans Increasingly Serving in Overseas Conflicts. Department of California American Legion. Retrieved from https://calegion.org/ukraine-israel-yemenamerican-veterans-are-increasingly-serving-in-overseas-conflicts/.

[5] Cook, E. (2024, February 22). Americans Can Now Join Ukraine’s National Guard Zelensky Says. Newsweek. Retrieved from https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-americans-fighters-military-russia-zelensky-1872314.

[6] Israeli Defense Forces. (n.d.) How to Join Us and Voluntary Programs. Retrieved from https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/how-to-join-us-and-voluntary-programs/how-to-join/.

[7] Fautre, W. (2024, March 29). HRWF. Retrieved from https://hrwf.eu/world-the-role-of-ngos-to-protect-civilians-in-armed-conflicts/.

[8] Stowe, C. (2022, July 11). U.S. – Vietnam Relations, the Legacy of War, and the Role of NGOs. GlobalWA. Retrieved from https://globalwa.org/2022/07/u-s-vietnam-relations-the-legacy-of-war-and-the-role-of-ngos/.

[9] Team Rubicon. (2020, January 13). Veteran-Led Disaster Response and Humanitarian Group Team Rubicon Commemorates “A Decade of Service and Grit”. PR Newswire. Retrieved from https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/veteran-led-disaster-response-and-humanitarian-group-team-rubicon-commemorates-a-decade-of-service-and-grit-300985302.html.

[10] Congressional Research Service. (2022, March 28). U.S. Nationals and Foreign Military Service. CRS. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12068.

[11] Mitchell, E. (2023, June 20). Senators Introduce Bill Restricting Retired Troops’ Work for Foreign Governments. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4059497-senators-introduce-bill-restricting-retired-troops-work-for-foreign-governments/.

[12] Kness, R. (2017, June 30). Working for a Contractor or Foreign Government after Military Service. ClearanceJobs.com. Retrieved from https://news.clearancejobs.com/2017/06/30/working-contractor-foreign-government-military-service/.

[13] Cancian, M. (2021, August 30). In Afghanistan, Contractors were Unsung Heroes of US Efforts. Breaking Defense. Retrieved from https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/in-afghanistan-contractors-were-unsung-heroes-of-us-efforts/.

[14] Mazzarino, A. (2023, May 16). The Unseen Soldiers of America’s Privatized Wars. The Nation Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/world/private-contract-soldiers/.

[15] Congressional Research Service. (2023, February 2). The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21900.

[16] Whitlock, C and Jones, N. (2022, October 18). UAE Relied on Expertise of Retired U.S. Troops to Beef up its Military. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/uae-military-us-veterans/.

[17] HRW. (2021, January 13). UAE: Reality of Abuses Contradicts Tolerance Rhetoric. HRW. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/uae-reality-abuses-contradicts-tolerance-rhetoric.

[18] Middle East Eye. (2022, November 13). US intelligence report claims UAE ‘meddled in American politics’. MEE. Retrieved from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-meddled-american-politics-us-intelligence-report-claims.

[19] Perez, Z. (2024, June 07). US, Allied Intel Agencies Warn Pilots to Avoid Chinese Recruitment. Military Times. Retrieved from https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/06/07/us-allied-intel-agencies-warn-pilots-to-avoid-chinese-recruitment/.

[20] Gin, C. M. (2016). How China Wins: A Case Study of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. US Army Command and General Staff College Press. Retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/how-china-wins.pdf.

[21] Lillis, K. B. (2024, June 05). US and Allies Warn China is Intensifying its Efforts to Recruit Western Military Pilots. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/05/politics/us-and-allies-warn-china-recruit-pilots/index.html.

[22] Novelly, T. (2024, June 06). China is ‘Aggressively Recruiting’ Pilots from the US and NATO Countries, Intelligence Agencies Warn. Military.com. Retrieved from https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/06/06/china-aggressively-recruiting-pilots-us-and-nato-countries-intelligence-agencies-warn.html.

[23] The National Counterintelligence and Security Center. (2024, June 5). Safeguarding Our Military Expertise: Foreign Companies Continue to Recruit Current and Former Western Service Members to Bolster the PRC’s Military. DNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/products/Safeguarding_Our_Military_Expertise.pdf.

[24] Bennett, B. (2024, June 5). U.S. Cracks Down on Former ‘Top Gun’ Pilots Found to Be Training China’s Air Force. Time. Retrieved from https://time.com/6985561/top-gun-pilots-china/.

[25] Whiteman, H. (2024, May 24). Ex-US Marines fighter pilot loses bid to block extradition to the United States over China training allegations. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/24/australia/daniel-duggan-us-extradition-hearing-intl-hnk/index.html.

[26] Needham, K. (2024, May 24). Former US Marine pilot can be extradited, Australian magistrate rules. Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2024-05-24/former-marine-pilot-extradition-13960410.html.

Implications of Climate on Extremism

Introduction

Climate is directly linked to the history of human development. Humanity thrives in areas rich in resources and climates conducive to the cultivation of necessities. Changes in climate can cause scarcity of resources. The stress on populations, economies, and governments increases the potential for conflict. Often, these conditions involve emerging or depressed societies that are unable to cope with the negative effects of climate change, leaving room for extremist groups to develop. Climate change can cause regional instability that helps extremist group exploit the misery that follows.

Regional Instability Caused by Climate

The climate-security nexus posits that climate change and kinetic conflict can create a continuous cycle where each impacts the other. Climate change typically intensifies conflicts that are already present, which can limit a population’s ability to relocate from the effects of a changing environment. Because they are unwilling or unable to leave, threat actors can use the scarcity of resources to exert control over vulnerable populations. This combination of environmental stressors and extremism has a significant negative impact on community resilience.[i]

Economists generally recognize three (3) causes of resource scarcity. The first occurs when supply chains are not able to meet an increased demand. Population growth increases demands for food, water, shelter, and medical supplies. The second occurs when the demand remains the same, but there is a decreased availability of resources. The third occurs when human factors cause resource scarcity, such as supply chain disruptions, government ineptitude, or conflict. Climate can be a direct cause of resources scarcity. Most climate adverse areas rely on agriculture, livestock farming, fishing, and trade for their livelihood. Climate change impacts cropping patterns, grazing routes, and planting times for farmers in these communities. Climate variability, coupled with a community’s inability to adapt and an increasing population size, lead to an ecosystem that cannot sustain the people living there. Climate also plays a factor in the strength and increased occurrence of natural disasters, which can disrupt supply chains. The concurrent resource scarcity causes a rise in the prices of essential goods while local economies are already struggling. This leads to a reduction in income and revenue, further impeding a local population’s ability to obtain essential goods and services.[ii],[iii]

Disease is often associated with climate adverse regions. Food scarcity, lack of quality healthcare, and changes in climate create environmental conditions conducive to pathogen vectors that all increase the likelihood of outbreaks in vulnerable populations. The spread of disease can increase the demand for already scarce resources, especially those associated with medical care.[iv]

Climate adverse areas often face high levels of poverty, low socioeconomic development, and governmental neglect. A government’s inability to provide relief leads to tension with the population, which can easily turn into civil unrest. Protests and riots, however justifiable, may elicit a violent response from law enforcement and the military. Extremist groups often emerge from these conflicts and exploit these conditions.[v]

Terrorist Group Exploitation of Climate Crises

Terrorist and other non-state threat actors may exploit the climate crisis by exacerbating resource scarcity and exploiting weak governance structures to gain power and influence. This furthers their goals and makes counterterrorist operations more difficult as local populations become more sympathetic to their ideology.

Eight (8) of the 15 countries most exposed to climate risks have United Nations peacekeeping missions or ongoing special missions. As stated earlier, climate-related issues cause a scarcity of resources, and fragile economies become further depressed. Those who are unemployed or struggling to survive become attracted to extremist organizations, who provide food, shelter, and jobs for their members. Local populations can become radicalized by propaganda, which becomes more attractive under ineffectual local governance. This recruitment and radicalization process often targets the young, who are more likely to be attracted to the zealotry of terrorist organizations.[vi]

Often, five (5) critical tactics are used to undermine trust in local governments: kinetic attacks, propaganda, exploitation of grievances, disruption, and recruitment. Terrorist groups target civil institutions, public officials, or community spaces with violence, instilling fear, and demonstrating the government’s inability to protect its citizens. They disseminate propaganda both online and through traditional media to spread disinformation and highlight government failures. They exploit existing grievances, such as economic inequality or perceived injustices, to portray the government as indifferent or oppressive. Furthermore, they target essential services and/or infrastructure to cause chaos. Lastly, they recruit disillusioned individuals by offering an alternative to the perceived corruption or incompetence of the government.[vii]

Extremist organizations often attempt to gain control of scarce resources, not only for their own use, but also to curry favor with or exert control over vulnerable populations. These actions may increase local support or just delegitimize the government, who may not be able to adequately respond. Some notable examples include:

  • After the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and again after floods that killed approximately 1,600, Pakistani militant Islamist groups provided relief aid including food and water to locals. These actions came amid criticism of the Pakistani government’s slow and inadequate response.[viii]
  • In 2015, ISIS seized the Ramadi Dam in Iraq, allowing them to control water flow down the Euphrates River. ISIS reduced the flow as much as 50% at times to demonstrate their capability and use it as leverage in the region. Had ISIS decided to destroy the dam, the resulting floods could have caused significant damage and loss of life.[ix]
  • In 2017, after Typhoon Kai-tak killed at least 32 people in the Philippines, Maoist rebels attacked a Philippine Army convoy carrying relief aid to rural parts of the country. The attack highlighted the difficulty of the government to secure rural areas and provide aid.[x]

Case Study: Boko Haram Exploitation of Lake Chad

Over the last few decades, declining water levels, warmer temperatures, drought, decreasing rainfall, and diminishing pastureland have cultivated conditions that exacerbate conflict and violence in the Lake Chad Basin’s area. Lake Chad’s area decreased from more than 26,000 km2 to 1,350 km2 from the 1960s to 2014, depleting much of its wildlife. Furthermore, the Sahel region’s temperatures are rising 1.5 times faster than the global average, while the area is experiencing decreasing average annual rainfall and water levels in the two (2) major rivers that flow into Lake Chad. While the lake’s resources have diminished and the region suffers reduced livestock production and crop yields, the area is experiencing a significant population surge. Lake Chad currently supports over 30 million people in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, but population growth predictions estimate that 80 million livelihoods could depend on the lake by 2030. The rapid demand for water for drinking, sanitation, cooking, and other activities, combined with climate change’s impact on the lake, has exacerbated environmental degradation, poverty, food insecurity, and unemployment. As of March 2024, there are four (4) million food-insecure individuals and 499,000 severely malnourished children in the region.5,[xi],[xii],[xiii]

Research surrounding the humanitarian crisis suggests that Boko Haram capitalizes on the environmental instability and competition for scarce resources in the Lake Chad region. Boko Haram, which uses the name “Jama‘atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da‘awati wal-Jihad” (JASDJ; Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad) and the “Nigerian Taliban,” was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department in November 2013. While the group operated in various forms since the late 1990s, Boko Haram slowly started to gain operational capabilities when the former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau, claimed leadership of the group in July 2010. In 2014, the group gained increased international attention after kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in Borno State, Nigeria, and engaging in frequent attacks against Christians, security and police forces, the media, schools, and politicians. In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).[xiv],[xv]

Boko Haram takes advantage of social unrest and conflict by recruiting disenfranchised people who encounter obstacles with climate-induced adversity and competition for resources. Water scarcity from population surge and lake degradation, combined with population migration, has led to violence and tensions between communities, migrants, farmers, and ethnic groups throughout the Lake Chad Basin. Boko Haram exploits these tensions by offering financial incentives, offering a sense of belonging, taking advantage of weakened local governance and security apparatuses, and perpetuating violence in vulnerable areas. For example, Boko Haram recruits young people suffering from poverty and unemployment to engage in drug and human trafficking operations and smuggle small arms and light weapons. These illicit activities further sustain the group’s operations and perpetuate violence in inter-ethnic and farmer-herder conflicts.11,12,14

A study published by Marine Corps University Press titled “Changing Hydrography, Violent Extremism, and Climate-Conflict Intersection” highlights the relationship between conflict and environmental changes in the Lake Chad Basin area. Data collected by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a nonprofit that gathers reported information on internal conflict, and NASA satellite imagery around Lake Chad highlight armed conflict events in places previously submerged by the open water of Lake Chad. According to the study, almost two (2) dozen ACLED incidents from 2009 and 2019 would have been located on open water had they taken place in 1973. The study also illustrates increasing conflict activity within 100 miles of Lake Chad’s open water between 2009 and 2019.[xvi]

Outlook

Extremist organizations will continue to take advantage of the geopolitical conditions created by resource scarcity caused by changing climates. Research shows increases in radicalization and recruitment across climate adverse regions worldwide. To gain power and influence, extremist organizations will fill power vacuums left by governments unable to provide basic necessities and control scarce resources. Perhaps, in time, it will be possible to predict shifting climates, understand the effects, and provide support to vulnerable populations before resource scarcity enables extremist organizations to thrive. RMC’s Intelligence and Climate Analysis Division will continue to monitor relevant climate and geopolitical developments in order to analyze potential impacts to client assets, personnel, and operations.

Sources

[i] Beauregard, J. (2020, September 19). Understanding the Climate Change-National Security Nexus: The Three Faces of Climate Security. Modern War Institute at West Point. Retrieved from https://mwi.westpoint.edu/understanding-the-climate-change-national-security-nexus-the-three-faces-of-climate-security/.

[ii] Master Class Staff. (2023, January 18). Resource Scarcity: Three Causes of Resource Scarcity. Master Class Articles. Retrieved from https://www.masterclass.com/articles/resource-scarcity.

[iii] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2024, January 30). Resource Scarcity and the Shifting Dynamics of Global Security. NATO. Retrieved from https://www.act.nato.int/article/resource-scarcity-and-shifting-dynamics-of-global-security/.

[iv] U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. (2021, March). Climate Change and the Developing World: A Disproportionate Impact. U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. Retrieved from https://www.usglc.org/blog/climate-change-and-the-developing-world-a-disproportionate-impact/.

[v] Center for Preventative Action. (2024, February 14). Violent Extremism in the Sahel. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel.

[vi] United Nations Security Council. (2021, December 9). People, Countries Impacted by Climate Change also vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, violence, Speakers Tell Security Council in Open Debate. United Nations. Retrieved from https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14728.doc.htm.

[vii] Ndebele, L. (2022, May 03). ‘A New, Despicable Turn in Violence’ as Insurgents Attack Water Sources in Burkina Faso. News 24. Retrieved from https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/ a-new-despicable-turn-in-violence-as-insurgents-attack-water-sources-in-burkina-faso-20220503.

[viii] Zaidi, S. A. (2010, September 29) Pakistan After the Floods. Carnegie Endowment. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2010/09/pakistan-after-the-floods?lang=en.

[ix] Lossow, T. (2016, January). Water as a Weapon: IS on the Euphrates and Tigris. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2016C03_lsw.pdf.

[x] Reuters staff. (2017, December 18). Philippines says Maoist rebels attacked soldiers on typhoon relief duty. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1EC0JB/.

[xi] Frimpong, O. B. (2020, July). Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Lake Chad Basin: Key Issues and Way Forward. Wilson Center. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/ climate-change-and-violent-extremism-lake-chad-basin-key-issues-and-way-forward.

[xii] Center for Preventative Action. (2024, February 14). Violent Extremism in the Sahel. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel.

[xiii] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2024, March 13). Lake Chad Basin Humanitarian Snapshot. OCHA. Retrieved from https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/ nigeria/lake-chad-basin-humanitarian-snapshot-13-march-2024.

[xiv] Fah, H. (2023, May 15). A Catastrophic Correlation: How Climate Change Influenced Terrorism Around Lake Chad. ASIS International. Retrieved from https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/articles/2023/05/climate-change-and-security/lake-chad-terrorism.

[xv] National Counterterrorism Center. (n.d.). Boko Haram. DNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/ nctc/groups/boko_haram.html.

[xvi] Griffin, T. E. (2020, July 27). Lake Chad: Changing Hydrography, Violent Extremism, and Climate-Conflict Intersection. Marine Corps University. Retrieved from https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/ Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/Lake-Chad/.

The Espionage Threat to Military Exercises

Introduction
Military organizations around the world routinely participate large-scale exercises in order to achieve a variety of objectives, making exercises highly appealing targets for espionage collection by adversaries. Moreover, some countries may conduct low-level collection activities against fellow participants. This paper will provide a brief overview of military exercises and the potential for associated intelligence collection activities. Additionally, this paper will examine case studies involving three (3) major exercises through the lens of espionage threats.

Military Exercises and the Espionage Threat
Per the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), exercises are defined as “a military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and execution that is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation.” Some objectives of exercises may include testing new systems/capabilities, training personnel, strengthening alliances, testing interoperability with allies, and geopolitical signaling to adversaries.1

Adversaries may seek to collect against exercises to better understand their likely opponents in the event of conflict. Exercises may reveal valuable insights such as the operational structures, strategy/tactics, and equipment utilization of opposing militaries. Adversaries may deploy technologically-advanced assets such as spy ships, aircraft, and satellites in order to successfully collect this intelligence. In turn, participation in exercises could create opportunities for participants to collect against one another. Such collection activities may include more overt forms of collection such as elicitation or unauthorized photography/videography. However, it is likely that any such activity occurs in a low-level fashion, in order to gain insights without jeopardizing crucial alliances.

Large-scale exercises frequently involve joint forces (incorporating ground, air, and naval units), as well as integration of multinational partners. Exercises can also serve as a useful platform to test new or emerging technologies in a simulated operational environment. The presence of these platforms (which could include stealth technology, unmanned systems, or advanced radars) likely draw the attention of adversaries and friendly collectors alike.

Case Study: RIMPAC
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is the world’s largest international maritime exercise, bolstering relationships among dozens of participating countries to safeguard sea lanes and secure the world’s oceans. Shortly after its founding in 1971, RIMPAC became a biennial exercise in 1974 due to its expanding scale. Hosted by the U.S. Pacific Fleet, RIMPAC’s 28th exercise (2022) in and around the Hawaiian Islands and Southern California included 26 nations, 38 surface ships, three (3) submarines, nine (9) national land forces, more than 30 unmanned systems, about 170 aircraft, and over 25,000 personnel. In late March 2024, personnel from 29 nations expected to participate in RIMPAC 2024 attended the final planning conference at Naval Base Point Loma Annex, San Diego. The 29th RIMPAC is expected to be executed in summer 2024.2,3,4

Reports over the past decade highlight potential intelligence surveillance activities by U.S. adversaries in the vicinity of RIMPAC activities. In 2014, China’s first time participating in RIMPAC, China sent an uninvited surveillance ship in addition to its four (4) People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships. According to a spokesman for U.S. Pacific Fleet, China’s Dongdiao-class auxiliary general intelligence (AGI) ship (designed to collect electronic and communication data from nearby vessels and aircraft) operated within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) during the exercise. Some experts were confused with China’s decision to send an uninvited spy ship with other PLAN vessels participating in most levels of the operation; however, the former commander of U.S. Pacific Command viewed the move as a positive sign that the Chinese vessel operated within another country’s maritime zones according to international law. Two (2) years later, Russia also sent an AGI ship into international waters off Hawaii during RIMPAC 2016 after not receiving an invite due to its annexation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine. In addition to the spy ship, the Russia destroyer Admiral Vinogradov (DD-572) shadowed the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) for two (2) days during the 2016 exercise.5,6,7,8

In 2018, the U.S. disinvited the PLAN from participating in RIMPAC 2018 in response to China’s militarization of the South China Sea. Nevertheless, U.S. Navy officials indicated that a PLAN AGI ship was spotted off the coast of Hawaii during RIMPAC 2018, causing no disruptions to the exercise. Given China’s continued military activities and the potential risks offering the PLAN to view American naval platforms, tactics, and capabilities up close, China has not been invited back as a RIMPAC participant since 2016.9,10,11

Case Study: Talisman Saber/Sabre
Talisman Saber (or Sabre) is a biennial military exercise held by the U.S. and Australia, along with a number of partner nations. The name of the exercise varies from year to year depending on which country leads the exercise (Saber for a U.S.-led exercise and Sabre for an Australian-led one). The 2023 iteration of the exercise included approximately 30,000 personnel from 13 countries, including regional first-time participants such as Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. The exercise seeks to enhance cooperation among nations in the Indo-Pacific, particularly given increased threats from China.12,13

In the lead-up to the 2023 iteration of Talisman Sabre, a PLAN AGI ship was spotted approaching Australia and specific areas where the exercise was expected to be held. An Australian military officer stated that this type of activity has occurred since 2017. The vessel ultimately proceeded to just outside Australia’s territorial waters in order to monitor the exercise. An Australian maritime patrol plane made contact with the vessel, and the encounter occurred without incident. The same Australian military officer stated that “[China will] passively collect, and we’ll adjust” adding that ”there’s some things we don’t necessarily want to give away and we have methods of being able to employ our forces without giving those more sensitive aspects of our training away”.13,14

In addition to the AGI vessel, China reportedly utilized “hundreds” of its satellites to monitor the 2023 exercise. While open-source details regarding this activity are limited, satellites provide a platform to conduct collection of imagery and signals intelligence. Satellite imagery could reveal details about weapons systems, military formations, and logistics processes. Signal collection could potentially reveal information related to command and control, as well as information on communications, radar, and other systems that operate on the electromagnetic spectrum.15

Case Study: BALTOPS
Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) is an annual military exercise that is conducted in the Baltic Sea region. The exercise typically occurs once a year and has been held since 1972, which makes it one of the longest running multinational maritime exercises in the world. The timing and specific details of each BALTOPS exercise can vary slightly each year depending on logistical and operational considerations. However, participants generally expect the exercise to take place on a regular basis, providing an opportunity for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partner nations to enhance interoperability, strengthen defense capabilities, and demonstrate collective deterrence in the Baltic Sea.16

BALTOPS 23, which took place from 04 June-16 June 2023, comprised of 20 countries which was four (4) more than the previous year. The exercise was comprised of more than 6,000 personnel, including nearly 1,500 sailors, marines, and airmen which was more than twice as many as in 2020. 50 ships, and more than 45 aircraft from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and other NATO allies were able to train and conduct high-intensity defense activities to help enhance capabilities within the alliance. BALTOPS 23 was a significant exercise as it served as Finland’s first joint exercise since becoming a NATO member in April 2023.17,18

During BALTOPS 16 in 2016, two (2) Russian intelligence gathering ships were spotted shadowing U.S. Navy and NATO vessels. While the Russian vessels showed no signs of force or aggression, they came as close as 1 mile from NATO forces. With Russia invading Ukraine in 2022, BALTOPS has served as a major push in tightening the alliance within NATO. Russia almost certainly perceives increased NATO cooperation as a geopolitical threat, which in turn increases the appeal of the exercise as a target for intelligence collection activities.16,19

Outlook
Large-scale military exercises will almost certainly continue to serve as highly appealing targets for intelligence collection. Adversaries will seek to collect on exercises in order to gain valuable insights into military capabilities that they may be likely to face in a conflict situation, while low-level collection may continue to occur among participants. RMC’s Intelligence & Climate Analysis Division continues to monitor relevant developments related to large-scale military exercises, to include potential espionage activities.

Sources

1. U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Retrieved from https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/AD1029823-DOD-Dictionary-of-Military-and-Associated-Terms-2017.pdf.

2. U.S. 3rd Fleet Public Affairs. (2023, December 5). U.S. 3rd Fleet Hosts RIMPAC Mid-Planning Conference. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Retrieved from https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3620775/us-3rd-fleet-hosts-rimpac-mid-planning-conference/.

3. U.S. 3rd Fleet Public Affairs. (2022, August 5). RIMPAC 2022 Concludes. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Retrieved from https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3118534/rimpac-2022-concludes/.

4. Llanos, M. (2024, March 28). U.S. 3rd Fleet Hosts RIMPAC Final Planning Conference. Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. Retrieved from https://www.dvidshub.net/news/467305/us-3rd-fleet-hosts-rimpac-final-planning-conference.

5. LaGrone, S. (2014, July 18). China Sends Uninvited Spy Ship to RIMPAC. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2014/07/18/china-sends-uninvited-spy-ship-rimpac.

6. Harper, J. (2014, July 29). PACOM chief: China spying on RIMPAC brings ‘good news.’ Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/pacom-chief-china-spying-on-rimpac-brings-good-news-1.295829.

7. LaGrone, S. (2016, July 06). Russian Spy Ship Now Off Hawaii, U.S. Navy Protecting ‘Critical Information.’ USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2016/07/06/russian-spy-ship-now-off-hawaii-u-s-navy-protecting-critical-information.

8. Eckstein, M. (2016, July 17). RIMPAC 2016: Russian Destroyer Shadowed USS America Near Hawaii. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2016/07/17/russ_des_hawaii_uss_america.

9. Eckstein, M. (2018, May 23). China Disinvited from Participating in 2018 RIMPAC Exercise. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2018/05/23/china-disinvited-participating-2018-rimpac-exercise.

10. LaGrone, S. (2018, July 13). Navy: Chinese Spy Ship Monitoring RIMPAC Exercise, Again. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2018/07/13/navy-chinese-spy-ship-monitoring-rimpac-exercise.

11. Werner, B. (2018, May 24). China’s Past Participation in RIMPAC Didn’t Yield Intended Benefits of Easing Tensions. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2018/05/24/33834.

12. U.S. Department of Defense. (n.d.). Talisman Sabre 23 reflects U.S., allies’ commitment to Indo-Pacific. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3476514/talisman-sabre-23-reflects-us-allies-commitment-to-indo-pacific/

13. McGuirk, R. (2023, July 21). US navy secretary says Australian multination military exercise demonstrates unity to China. AP News. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/talisman-sabre-australia-military-exercise-639e698f091b58abfe886f80f5a6dc44.

14. Greene, A. (2023, July 23). First image emerges of RAAF’s encounter with Chinese spy ship during Talisman Sabre. ABC News. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-07-24/first-image-of-australian-encounter-with-chinese-spy-ship/102637528.

15. Hundreds of Chinese satellites spying on US-Australia military exercises. (2023, August 21). WION. Retrieved from https://www.wionews.com/world/hundreds-of-chinese-satellites-keep-watch-over-us-australia-military-exercises-626928.

16. U.S. Navy. (2023, May 30). U.S. Sixth Fleet, Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO to Kick Off BALTOPS 2023. U.S. Navy. Retrieved from https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3410239/us-sixth-fleet-naval-striking-and-support-forces-nato-to-kick-off-baltops-2023/.

17. Moore-Carrillo, J. (2023, June 16). US, NATO wrap up joint exercises in the Baltics, Europe’s High North. Military Times. Retrieved from https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2023/06/16/us-nato-wrap-up-joint-exercises-in-the-baltics-europes-high-north/.

18. NATO. (2023, June 07). NATO ships participate in exercise BALTOPS 23. NATO. Retrieved from https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2023/-nato-ships-participate-in-exercise-baltops-23#:~:text=Participating%20nations%20include%20Belgium%2C%20Canada%2C%20Denmark%2C%20Estonia%2C%20Finland%2C,T%C3%BCrkiye%2C%20the%20United%20Kingdom%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States..

19. Tomlinson, L. (2016, June 16). Russian Spy Ships ‘Shadowing’ US Navy During Large NATO Exercise, Navy Admiral Says. Fox News. Retrieved from https://www.foxnews.com/world/russian-spy-ships-shadowing-us-navy-during-large-nato-exercise-navy-admiral-says.

Submarine Communications Cables (SCCs) and the Associated Threat/Hazard Environment

Introduction
Submarine Communications Cables (SCCs) are a vital part of global communications infrastructure. SCCs are also known by a variety of other names, to include underwater/undersea communications cables. However, for consistency, this paper will utilize the acronym SCC. This paper will examine the various threats and hazards that have the potential to affect SCCs, as well as a few recent case studies highlighting threat/hazard events involving SCCs.

SCC Overview
Modern SCCs consist of a fiber optic cable laid at the bottom of the ocean to connect two (2) or more landing stations. They are comprised of the optical fibers that carry data traffic, including internet and phone service. The fibers are typically covered in silicon gel and sheathed in plastic, steel wiring, copper, and nylon for insulation and protection. Many SCCs are no thicker than a household garden hose.1

Cable landing stations connect continents and provide the point where SCCs meet terrestrial networks. This enables internet service providers (ISPs), telecommunication networks, and other data centers to communicate across the globe. SCCs support commercial, economic, and national security ventures, and they also transmit the majority of civilian, military, and government offshore communications traffic. Over 95% of international data and voice transfers are routed through SCCs. They connect the continental U.S. with Alaska, Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as the rest of the world. SCCs are laid using ships outfitted for laying the optical cable on the ocean floor. A subsea plow is used to trough and bury SCCs near the shoreline to avoid damage from ships anchoring and fishing.1,2,3,4

Some cables are short, like the 131-kilometer CeltixConnect cable between Ireland and the United Kingdom. Others are significantly longer, such as the 20,000-kilometer Asia America Gateway cable. The 2Africa project connects 46 cable landing stations in 33 countries in Africa, Asia and Europe, at a length of 45,000 kilometers. It is the longest SCC in the world.5,6

In 1995, the traffic between satellite and submarine cables was evenly split. Today, SCCs carry over 97% of data traffic. Satellites are useful as an emergency backup during disasters, to expand mobile coverage, and to connect isolated areas. However, satellite communications are expensive, less reliable, and are becoming less common as SCC coverage grows. However, while SCCs are equal to landlocked cable systems in their capacity for data transmission, routing through multiple sovereign territories requires satellite communications to bridge gaps.7

There are only four (4) major companies in the world that manufacture and lay SCCs: The U.S.’s SubCom, Japan’s NEC Corporation, France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks and China’s HMN Technologies (formerly Huawei Marine Networks). In November 2020, Huawei Marine was rebranded as HMN Technologies Co. This followed Hengtong group completing its 81% shareholding acquisition of Huawei Marine. The remaining 19% was held by New Saxon 2019 Ltd. In December 2021, HMN Technologies was added by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to its Entity List because of national security and human rights concerns. For sensitive projects, the U.S. government reportedly only works with U.S.-based SubCom. Several other companies are sole or partial owner of SCCs or are major capacity buyers. These include Amazon, Meta, Google, and Microsoft. Content providers include Apple, LinkedIn (owned by Microsoft), Dropbox, IBM, OVH, Chinese content providers like Alibaba and Tencent, and content delivery networks like Akamai, Cloudflare, and Limelight.8,9,10,11

As of early 2024, there are nearly 1.4 million kilometers of SCCs worldwide. Europe, Asia, and Latin America all have significant volumes of data to communicate between their shores and North America. Conversely, there may be less data that needs to travel between other countries. SCCs are placed according to market demands. For example, if an emerging industry required extensive communications between Australia and South America, demand for a new cable in the South Pacific would likely drive construction.4

SCC Threat Environment
Due to their critical importance to global communications, SCCs are likely a highly appealing target to various threat actors. Because SCCs carry government/military communications, they are a potential target for espionage and sabotage by foreign nation-states. During the Cold War, the U.S. reportedly gained valuable intelligence by conducting a covert operation to tap an SCC that connected two Soviet naval bases. In early 2023, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization stated that Russia may seek to target SCCs following a suspected Russian attack on the underwater Nord Stream pipeline.12,13,14

Concerns have also been raised regarding China’s ability to tap into cables due to the market share held by HMN Technologies (formerly Huawei Marine). As previously noted, HMN Technologies has been flagged by the U.S. as a potential security risk. While Huawei had historically been scrutinized due to its ability to support China’s intelligence-gathering efforts, the sale/rebranding to HMN Technologies does not appear to have mitigated these concerns. A key stakeholder in HMN Technologies has notable ties to the Chinese Communist Party, and could potentially facilitate use of HMN infrastructure for espionage purposes.15,16

Non-state actors such as terrorist groups could also potentially seek to target SCCs and associated infrastructure. However, such groups likely have significantly lower capabilities than nation-states, and may seek to target shore infrastructure such as cable landing stations. Any significant disruption to international communications could serve as a symbolic victory for militant groups.

Malicious cyber actors could also seek to target SCCs for a variety of purposes. Cyber actors operating on behalf of a nation-state could be pursuing similar espionage/sabotage objectives as described above. However, other cyber actors may be pursuing financial gains (such as in a ransomware attack) or may be acting in pursuit of political objectives. Other cyber activity could affect the infrastructure that supports SCCs (such as cable landing stations), causing inadvertent disruptions.

SCC Hazard Environment
Estimates by telecommunication market research firm TeleGeography indicate an average of more than 100 SCC faults each year. Accidental hazards account for approximately 75% of the yearly SCC breaks. Natural hazards and equipment failure account for 14% and 6% of SCC breaks respectively with intentional damage making up the remaining 5%. While the recent Red Sea attack resulting in damage to three (3) SCCs is drawing attention to the vulnerabilities of SCC’s, accidental and natural hazards are far more likely to cause breakage.17

The most common accidental cause of SCC breaks is from fishing and anchoring. Anchors, when dropped directly onto the cables, cause damage to a relatively short section of the cable. When anchors, fishing gear or trawl nets hook onto a cable and drag it for some distance, the damage occurs across a much longer section of the cable and often requires the entire section of cable to be replaced. Although very rare, a vessel running aground or sinking can also cause damage to SCCs.18

Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP) attempts to balance the use of maritime space by traditional and emerging sectors while preserving the proper functioning of marine ecosystems. MSP can help reduce the accidental risk to SCCs by deconflicting marine areas used by fisheries, shipping, and SCCs. The appropriate burial of SCCs below the sea floor can help avoid accidental hazards, however natural hazards can expose buried cables over time. The shortest route possible across shipping lanes should be used for the planning and installation of SCCs. Creation of well documented zones where anchoring, trawling and certain forms of fishing are prohibited can also reduce the number of accidental breaks. Currently there are no universally accepted cable protection standards across the private sector and governments worldwide.17,18

Natural hazards to SCCs include earthquakes, volcanic activity, tsunamis, submarine landslides, tropical cyclones, storm surge, flooding, and rising sea levels. These natural hazards can displace large volumes of sediment, exposing cables to damaging turbidity currents. Tropical cyclones increase waves and currents creating higher potential of damage to SCCs. Storm-generated movement of sand, gravel and other seabed sediments can erode surface-laid cables. Sediment flows from river flooding, earthquakes and submarine landslides have caused sufficient movement of SCCs causing them to break. Sea floor vibrations from earthquakes and volcanic eruptions have cut SCCs in several incidents. Although natural hazard damage to SCCs is not common, they often cause multiple faults on multiple cables across long sections of the cable due to the broad geographic nature of many natural hazards.19,20,21

Cable landing stations are also susceptible to the risks posed by natural hazards. Cable landing stations are located in coastal areas which have an increased risk of tropical cyclones, storm surge, tsunamis, and flooding. The equipment associated with cable landing stations include telecommunications equipment, power generators, battery plants, and computer controls. These systems are sensitive to moisture and must be kept dry. Roofs can be damaged by high winds or rising water from floods and storm surge can enter the station and cause damage to equipment. Various types of storm surge and flooding are worsened by the effects of rising sea levels. Climate and natural hazard projections should be considered when planning and developing new SCC infrastructure which generally has a 20-30 year operational lifespan.
19,20,21

Case Study: 2022 Tonga Volcanic Eruption
On 15 January 2022, a massive underwater volcano eruption severed an SCC in Tonga, a remote island located east of Australia in the Pacific Ocean. The cable linked Tonga to Fiji, then onward to other cable networks. With the cable severed, Tonga lost the vast majority of its internet connectivity, with only limited satellite capabilities available. Restoration efforts took approximately five (5) weeks.22,23

The lack of connectivity hindered eruption-related response and recovery efforts, as an estimated 85% of Tonga’s population was affected by ash fall and limited access to safe drinking water. The lack of communication capabilities also made it difficult for Tongans and those visiting the country to contact friends and family outside the country.22,23

This incident highlights the potential for natural hazard-driven disruptions affecting SCCs, many of which can occur with little to no warning. Additionally, the incident highlights the reliance on SCCs in remote locations; particularly in island nations.

Case Study: 2022 Hawaii Hack
In April 2022, a cyberattack on an unidentified Hawaii-based SCC was stopped by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). A hacking group reportedly targeted a private company’s servers on the island of Oahu. HSI agents acted on a tip from out-of-state colleagues, identified the attack, and blocked access. An international hacking group was allegedly responsible. HSI worked with law enforcement in other countries to identify and arrest a suspect, whose name was not revealed in open source reporting, nor was the country where the apprehension occurred. Neither the goals of the attacks nor the nature of the charges have been made public.24

There are eight (8) SCCs that run through Hawaii connecting the mainland to foreign countries, including Japan, Australia and New Zealand. There are contingencies in the event of a successful hack or kinetic attack on an SCC. Communications can be rerouted to another cable. In the case of the attack on Oahu, there was no damage to the SCC or related infrastructure. However, that SCC and others in the area are still fundamentally vulnerable.25

While details surrounding this incident are limited, Hawaii is home to a dense concentration of U.S. military installations, assets, and personnel. Additionally, current reporting noted that the hacking group responsible was based internationally. It is possible that this activity could be related to espionage efforts or other malicious activity targeting the DoD.

Case Study: 2024 Houthi Attack
In early 2024, the Yemen-based Houthi militant group publicly threatened to target SCCs that pass through the Bab al-Mandab Straight, where there are at least 15 cables that carry approximately 17% of the world’s internet traffic. The Houthis posted an image depicting SCC routes in the Red Sea on the Telegram app, claiming that the maps were easily accessed. The legitimate (U.N. recognized) government of Yemen issued warnings due to the Houthi threats. Some dismissed the warnings, stating that the Houthis did not have the capability to target the cables.26,27

Three (3) of the undersea communication cables in the Bab al-Mandab Strait were damaged on 24 February 2024. Some early reporting on the incident speculated that the Houthis were responsible although the group denied any involvement. The latest reporting indicates that the SCCs were cut by the dragging anchor of the UK-owned cargo vessel, Rubymar. The ship was struck by a Houthi missile on 18 February 2024 causing significant damage. The crew dropped the anchor prior to abandoning the ship on 19 February 2024. The ship drifted, dragging the anchor across the Red Sea bottom, until it eventually capsized on 2 March 2024. These damaged SCCs belong to separate systems that connect Europe with Asia and Africa. The communications on the three (3) cables were rerouted through other cables, limiting the impact of the incident. Repairs may be delayed due to the availability of cable repair ships, which are usually scheduled in advance.26,27

Some analysts who dismissed the Houthi capability to carry out an attack on SCCs based their assessment on the premise that a threat actor would need the technical expertise and equipment to dive or use a manned or unmanned submersible to be successful. While the damage to SCCs in this incident was almost certainly an unintentional secondary effect of attacking local shipping, it highlights the vulnerability to SCCs. Threat actors aware of marine areas where SCCs are present would simply need to drag a ship anchor or pose as a fishing vessel to intentionally damage SCCs while providing the appearance of an accidental hazard.26,27

Outlook
SCCs will continue to serve a key role in the global communications infrastructure, while remaining susceptible to a wide variety of manmade and natural threats and hazards. SCCs will remain a highly appealing target to nation-state and non-state threat actors alike, while the natural hazard environment will persist, and many natural hazards are expected to be exacerbated by the effects of climate change. RMC’s Intelligence & Climate Analysis Division continues to monitor the global threat/hazard environment, to include incidents that may affect SCCs.

Sources

1. Swinhoe, D. (2021, August 26). What is a submarine cable? Subsea fiber explained. Retrieved from https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/what-is-a-submarine-cable-subsea-fiber-explained/.

2. Huston, G. (2023, March 14). Submarine cable resiliency in the face of disruptions. Retrieved from https://circleid.com/posts/20230314-submarine-cable-resiliency-in-the-face-of-disruptions.

3. EXA Infrastructure. (n.d.). Cable landing station. EXA Infrastructure. Retrieved fromhttps://exainfra.net/exa-knowledge-centre/cable-landing-station/.

4. TeleGeography. (n.d.). Submarine cable frequently asked questions. TeleGeography. Retrieved from https://www2.telegeography.com/submarine-cable-faqs-frequently-asked-questions.

5. Submarine Networks. (2020, May 15). 2Africa: a transformative subsea cable for future internet connectivity in Africa. Submarine Networks. Retrieved from https://www.submarinenetworks.com/ en/systems/asia-europe-africa/2africa.

6. NOAA. (n.d.). Submarine cables. NOAA. Retrieved from https://www.noaa.gov/submarine-cables.

7. Detecon Asia-Pacific Ltd. (2013, February). Economic impact of submarine cable disruptions. APEC. Retrieved from https://www.apec.org/docs/default-source/Publications/2013/2/Economic-Impact-of-Submarine-Cable-Disruptions/2013_psu_-Submarine-Cables.pdf.

8. Technavio. (2017, October 30). Top 5 vendors in the global submarine fiber cable market from 2017 to 2021. Business Wire. Retrieved from https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 20171030006219/en/Top-5-Vendors-in-the-Global-Submarine-Fiber-Cable-Market-from-2017-to-2021-Technavio.

9. Converge Digest. (2021, December 16). U.S. adds Huawei Marine Networks to entity list. Converge Digest. Retrieved from https://convergedigest.com/us-adds-huawei-marine-networks-to/.

10. Brock, J. (2023, March 24). U.S. and China wage war beneath the waves – over internet cables. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/us-china-tech-subcom/.

11. TeleGeography. (2017, November 9). A complete list of content providers’ submarine cable holdings. TeleGeography’s Official Blog. Retrieved from https://blog.telegeography.com/ telegeographys-content-providers-submarine-cable-holdings-list.

12. Wall, C., & Morcos, P. (2021, June 11). Invisible and vital: undersea cables and transatlantic security. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security.

13. Carle, M. (2022, June 29). The mission behind Operation Ivy Bells and how it was discovered. Military.com. Retrieved from https://www.military.com/history/operation-ivy-bells.html.

14. Siebold, S. (2023, May 3). NATO says Moscow may sabotage undersea cables as part of war on Ukraine. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/moscow-may-sabotage-undersea-cables-part-its-war-ukraine-nato-2023-05-03/.

15. Clark, E. (2021, July 23). Undersea cables bring Pacific nations online, but there are concerns China is trying to tap in. ABC News. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-24/china-huawei-build-png-cable-that-connects-to-sydney/100249922.

16. Hasler, J. (2019, June 5). Huawei Marine is being sold. That’s unlikely to change the threat it poses. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/05/huawei-marine-is-being-sold-thats-unlikely-change-threat-it-poses/.

17. Congressional Research Service. (2023 August 7). Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Issues for Congress. Retrieved from https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R47648.pdf.

18. European MSP Platform. (n.d.). Cables and Fisheries. European Union. Retrieved from https://maritime-spatial-planning.ec.europa.eu/sector-information/cables-and-fisheries.

19. Drew, S. (2009, October.). Causes of Cable Faults and Repairs in Regional Seas. International Cable Protection Committee. Retrieved from https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Causes_of_Cable_Faults_and_Repairs_in_Regional_Seas.pdf.

20. Dr. Clare, M. (2023, May). Submarine cable protection and the environment. International Cable Protection Committee. Retrieved from https://iscpc.org/publications/submarine-cable-protection-and-the-environment/ICPC_Public_EU_May%202023.pdf.

21. Clare, M. et al. (2023). Climate change hotspots and implications for the global subsea telecommunications network. Earth Science Reviews. Retrieved from https://pdf.sciencedirectassets.com/271741/1-s2.0-S0012825222X00135/1-s2.0-S0012825222003804/main.pdf.

22. Menon, P., & Westbrook, T. (2022, January 18). Undersea cable fault could cut off Tonga from rest of the world for weeks. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/markets/funds/undersea-cable-fault-could-cut-off-tonga-rest-world-weeks-2022-01-18/.

23. British Broadcasting Company. (2022, February 22). Tonga volcano: Internet restored five weeks after eruption. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60458303.

24. Boylan, P. (2022, April 12). Cyberattack on Hawaii undersea communications cable thwarted by Homeland Security. Star-Advertiser. Retrieved from https://www.staradvertiser.com/2022/04/12/ breaking-news/cyberattack-on-hawaii-undersea-communications-cable-thwarted-by-homeland-security/.

25. Hawaii News Now. (2022, April 13). HSI agents in Honolulu disrupted cyberattack on undersea cable critical to telecommunications. Retrieved from https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2022/04/13/hsi-agents-honolulu-disrupted-cyberattack-undersea-cable-critical-telecommunications/.

26. Monaghan, S. et al. (2024, March 7). Red Sea cable damage reveals soft underbelly of Global Economy. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-sea-cable-damage-reveals-soft-underbelly-global-economy.

27. Vigliarolo, B. (2024, February 27). Underwater cables in Red Sea damaged months after Houthis ‘threatened’ to do just that. The Register. Retrieved from https://www.theregister.com/2024/02/27/red_sea_cables_houthi/.

Foreign Object Debris (FOD) and the Hazard to DoD Aviation

Introduction
Per the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), foreign object debris (FOD) is defined as “any object, live or not, located in an inappropriate location in the airport environment that has the capacity to injure airport or air carrier personnel and damage aircraft.” When FOD interferes with aviation operations in a manner that causes damage, it is often called foreign object damage (also abbreviated as FOD). This paper will utilize the former definition, although the terms can be used somewhat interchangeably. FOD has caused countless aviation-related incidents, including a significant number affecting Department of Defense (DoD) aircraft.1

This paper will provide a brief overview of FOD and the potential impacts to aviation operations. Additionally, this paper will briefly examine the policies, precautions, and equipment that are currently available in order to mitigate the effects of FOD. Finally, the paper will examine two (2) recent case studies involving FOD-related mishaps affecting DoD aircraft.

FOD Overview
FOD can come in a variety of forms. Tools, nuts/bolts, and other maintenance-related items are required for aircraft maintenance and are ubiquitous in hangars and throughout airfields. Maintainers, flight crew, and airfield personnel also have a number of personal items (such as cell phones, wallets, identification badges, hats, sunglasses, and pens) that could potentially be dropped/misplaced in airframes, maintenance areas, or on the flightline. Small FOD items can also be introduced to airfields via the treads of tires on vehicles entering the airfield area. Items located off of the airfield (such as vegetation or garbage) could also be blown onto the airfield, creating a FOD hazard.1

A primary FOD concern is the presence of birds and other wildlife. A well-publicized incident involving bird strikes was the 2009 water landing of US Airways Flight 1549 by pilot Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger on the Hudson River in New York. Prior to the water landing, the aircraft had struck a flock of geese, resulting in the loss of both of its engines. During a 24-year period from 1995 to 2019, the U.S. Air Force experienced over 100,000 wildlife strikes, resulting in 27 fatalities, the loss of 13 aircraft, and over $800 million in damages. Per the FAA, over 90% of reported bird strikes occur at or below 3,000 feet above ground level (AGL), though strikes at higher altitudes are common when birds are migrating, with ducks and geese frequently observed up to 7,000 feet AGL.2,3,4

A related emerging concern is the potential for events similar to bird strikes involving small drones which are frequently flown by hobbyists and commercial entities. In September 2017, the first confirmed incident of a drone colliding with an aircraft in the U.S. occurred in New York. In the incident, a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter was operating in support of security for the U.N. General Assembly when it collided with a DJI Phantom drone, resulting in damage to the helicopter’s rotor and one of its doors. Drone-related incidents are likely to continue and may increase in frequency as the technology continues to proliferate.5

Inadequate maintenance of paved surfaces on airfields (as well as the effects of geological and meteorological hazards) can lead to pavement degradation, creating FOD concerns. When concrete or asphalt ages and/or is subjected to hazards such as extreme heat/cold or flood events, it can crack and create fragments that can become a FOD hazard. DoD aircraft with vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capabilities such as the F-35B variant and the V-22 Osprey can accelerate the degradation of paved surfaces, exacerbating this hazard. By design, these aircraft create high heat and jet blast oriented toward paved surfaces in order to takeoff and/or land, requiring specialized concrete to mitigate pavement damage and related FOD concerns.6,7

Some meteorological factors can also be considered to be forms of FOD. Snow and ice can affect aircraft similarly to other types of FOD. Likewise, sandstorms/dust storms driven by high winds can create FOD concerns. Volcanic eruptions can create ash clouds that severely disrupt aviation activities due to safety concerns.1,8,9

While the above categories of FOD are not all-inclusive, they provide a basic overview of some of the primary sources of FOD.

FOD Impacts
FOD impacts may occur at various phases of flight, to include taxi, takeoff, mid-flight, and landing. Additionally, FOD-related incidents can occur during ground testing activities, or when an aircraft is being powered up or shut down.

Jet-powered aircraft may ingest FOD directly into engines or air intakes, while propeller-driven aircraft can sustain damage to propeller blades or other components. Helicopters can experience similar damage to rotors. FOD can damage windscreens/canopies on various types of aircraft, obstructing pilot visibility and potentially causing temperature or pressurization shifts that pose a risk to life safety. Flight control surfaces could potentially be affected by FOD, affecting the aircraft’s ability to properly and safely maneuver. FOD can also affect the landing gear assembly or tires on aircraft, preventing safe takeoff and landing.

Though the above list is not all-inclusive, it highlights some of the impacts FOD can have on various forms of aircraft. Any of these scenarios could result in damage to the airframe and/or loss of systems that directly affect flight safety, potentially leading to damage to aircraft/ground infrastructure, as well as injury and/or death.

FOD Mitigation
The DoD currently employs a number of different policies, precautions, and equipment in order to mitigate the hazard posed by FOD. During maintenance activities, it is advised that personnel remove personal items from pockets as well as worn items such as rings and watches. Tool/part accountability is also paramount during maintenance activities, as one of this paper’s case studies will show. Pens and other office supplies may also become FOD hazards in maintenance areas. “FOD walks,” in which personnel conduct a visual FOD sweep on foot, can be an effective practice. Additionally, FOD bins can placed in convenient areas in order to provide receptacles for safe disposal of FOD.10

The FAA encourages airfields to utilize land use planning, habitat management, and landscaping efforts in order to mitigate the hazard posed by birds and other wildlife. The U.S. Air Force utilizes weather radars to detect and monitor bird activity as a preventative measure. A variety of countermeasures are available to deter and/or disperse wildlife. Passive measures include decoy birds, bitter-tasting substances and audio broadcasts of bird distress calls. More active dispersal methods include the use of dogs, pyrotechnics/cannons, remote-controlled vehicles, and lasers. Some airfields use less-lethal methods such as paintballs and plastic projectiles in order to disperse wildlife, while some airports have employed live ammunition to hunt birds that pose a hazard to aviation.11, 12, 13, 14

Various commercial products are also available to mitigate FOD hazards. Towable runway sweeping devices are available. Vehicle-mounted blower devices utilize turbines to blow high-pressure air that removes FOD from surfaces. FOD mats are available to remove FOD from tires on vehicles entering the airfield perimeter.15, 16, 17

An effective FOD management program utilizes a combination of training, policies, and equipment in order to mitigate the hazard posed by FOD. Additionally, it should be noted that the acquisition and employment of aforementioned technologies can vary by installation and military branch. Moreover, DoD aircraft routinely utilize non-DoD airfields, which also may have varying FOD management programs. While no program or piece of technology is 100% effective, a multi-layered approach can address the various sources of FOD in order to achieve an acceptable level of FOD mitigation.

Case Study: 2023 F-35 Incident at Luke AFB, AZ
On 15 March 2023, an F-35 undergoing maintenance at Luke Air Force Base (AFB) in Arizona experienced FOD-related damage. In the incident, “abnormal noises” were heard during a ground engine test. Further investigation revealed that maintenance personnel left a handheld flashlight on the lip of an intake, which was then ingested into the engine. While no injuries were reported, damage was noted to the F-35’s “second stage rotor, third stage rotor, fifth stage rotor, sixth stage rotor, fuel nozzle, bypass duct, high pressure compressor, high pressure turbine and fan inlet variable vane,” resulting in nearly $4 million in damage. According to media reports, the damage was so extensive that the aircraft could not be repaired locally.18, 19

The investigation into the incident found that maintenance personnel had all necessary qualifications, and drug/alcohol testing of personnel came back negative. Instead, the incident was attributed to a failure to clear the inlet of foreign objects, as well as a failure to complete required checklists (to include tool accountability). The report also cast some blame on “complacency” related to the F-35’s “unnecessarily lengthy” maintenance checklists, as well as a lack of network connectivity on the flightline.18, 19

Case Study: 2022 T-38 Crash in Mississippi
On 07 November 2022, a T-38 trainer aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff near Columbus Air Force Base in Mississippi. The pilot ejected from the aircraft and was taken to a local hospital with minor injuries. A subsequent investigation revealed that a “large’” bird collided with the aircraft’s canopy. Fragments from the canopy (and potentially pieces of the bird) were then ingested into both of the T-38’s engines. One engine failed outright, while the other was only able to produce reduced thrust inadequate to safely maneuver the aircraft. The investigation found that the incident was “unavoidable,” and was handled well by the experienced pilot. Columbus AFB “was following regular bird strike prevention and awareness protocols at the time of the mishap, and the pilot knew the risk that birds posed to his jet,” according to the Air Force’s report on the incident.20, 21

Outlook
FOD-related incidents will continue to affect DoD aviation activities due to the various causes and sources of FOD, the unpredictability of such incidents, and the varying effectiveness of countermeasures. RMC’s Intelligence and Climate Analysis Division continues to monitor and assess aircraft mishaps involving the DoD, to include those caused by FOD hazards. Additionally, RMC’s transportation subject matter experts maintain the capability to conduct detailed assessments of airfield infrastructure, to include potential FOD hazards.

Sources

1. The Basics of Foreign Object Debris. (2023, May 10). Aviation Pros. Retrieved from https://www.aviationpros.com/aoa/runway-management/snow-ice-foreign-object-debris-fod-removal/article/21293164/the-basics-of-foreign-object-debris.

2. Stephey, M.J. (2009, January 16). The US Airways Crash: A Growing Bird Hazard. Time Magazine. Retrieved from https://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1872175,00.html.

3. Losey, S. (2019, May 23). This is the Hefty Toll Bird Strikes Have Inflicted on the Air Force Since 1995. Air Force Times. Retrieved from https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/05/23/this-is-the-hefty-toll-bird-strikes-have-inflicted-on-the-air-force-since-1995/.

4. Aeronautical Information Manual: Chapter 7 (Safety of Flight) Section 5: Bird Hazards and Flight Over National Refuges, Parks, and Forests. (2023, October 05). Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim_html/chap7_section_5.html#:~:text=While%20over%2090%20percent%20of,at%20lower%20altitudes%20during%20migration.

5. Wright, T. (2017, September 27). Army Blackhawk Collides With Drone Over NYC. Smithsonian Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/army-blackhawk-hits-drone-180965047/.

6. Sweetman, B. (2017, April 14). Why Can’t America’s Newest Stealth Jet Land Like It’s Supposed To? The Daily Beast. Retrieved from https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-cant-americas-newest-stealth-jet-land-like-its-supposed-to.

7. High-Temperature Concrete Takes Flight at Miramar Marine Air Station. (2014, August 04). For Construction Pros. Retrieved from https://www.forconstructionpros.com/concrete/equipment-products/article/11347425/hightemperature-concrete-takes-flight-at-miramar-marine-air-station.

8. Veillette, P., PhD. (2020, October 23). Winter Ops: Freezing Temps, Precip Can Have Serious Consequences. Aviation Week Network. Retrieved from https://aviationweek.com/business-aviation/winter-ops-freezing-temps-precip-can-have-serious-consequences.

9. What Can You Do About Aircraft Engine FOD?. (2017, August 28). Pratt & Whitney. Retrieved from https://www.prattwhitney.com/en/blogs/airtime/2017/08/28/what-can-you-do-about-aircraft-engine-fod.

10. FOD…Foreign Object Debris Leads to Foreign Object Damage. (2019, October). Flightfax: Online Newsletter of Army Aircraft Accident Prevention. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2019/Dec/19/2002227452/-1/-1/1/FLIGHTFAX%2082_OCTOBER%202019_PAGES7-10.PDF.

11. Wildlife Management. (n.d.). Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/wildlife/management.

12. Bird/Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard. (n.d.). Air Force Safety Center. Retrieved from https://www.safety.af.mil/Divisions/Aviation-Safety-Division/BASH/.

13. 9 Ways to Deter Birds at Airports. (2020). Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from https://medium.com/faa/9-ways-to-get-rid-of-birds-at-airports-555582625363.

14. Stock, S., Villlarreal, M., & Nious, K. (2015, September 4). Birds Shot Daily by Bay Area Airport Workers. NBC Bay Area. Retrieved from https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/birds-shot-by-bay-area-airports/1942485/.

15. The FOD Boss Ultimate Airfield Sweeper (n.d.). AeroSweep. Retrieved from https://www.aerosweep.com/airport-runway-sweeper.

16. V10 Blower. (2022, June 2). Aviation Pros. Retrieved from https://www.aviationpros.com/aoa/runway-management/snow-ice-foreign-object-debris-fod-removal/product/21072612/buffalo-turbine-llc-v10-blower.

17. Aviation FOD Control Mats (n.d.). FODS Trackout Control System. Retrieved from https://getfods.com/industries/aviation.

18. Svan, J. (2024, January 22). Flashlight Left Inside Air Force F-35 Engine Causes $4 Million in Damage. Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/branches/air_force/2024-01-22/flashlight-aircraft-damage-millions-12755446.html.

19. Sicard, S. (2024, January 22). Misplaced Flashlight in F-35 Engine Results in $4 Million in Damage. Air Force Times. Retrieved from https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2024/01/19/misplaced-flashlight-in-f-35-engine-results-in-4-million-in-damage/.

20. Mitchell, E. (2022, November 8). Pilot Ejects Ahead of T-38 Training Jet Crash in Mississippi. The Hill. https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3725385-pilot-ejects-ahead-of-t-38-training-jet-crash-in-mississippi/

21. Cohen, R. (2023, July 26). Bird Strike Caused T-38 Jet Crash Last November, Investigators Say. Air Force Times. Retrieved from https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2023/07/26/bird-strike-caused-t-38-jet-crash-last-november-investigators-say/.

Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) and the Force Protection Threat to DoD

Introduction
The proliferation of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), also known colloquially as “drones” has drastically expanded in recent years. SUAS are widely utilized by hobbyists for purposes such as aerial photography/videography and competitive racing events. Additionally, sUAS are widely used for commercial purposes (such as media, agriculture, and mapping/surveying), as well as government purposes (to include law enforcement and firefighting). However, threat actors utilizing sUAS also pose a unique force protection concern for Department of Defense (DoD) installations. This paper will examine potential threat actor uses of sUAS, as well as an overview of sUAS characteristics and capabilities. This paper will then examine the legal framework and various capabilities available to counter potential sUAS threats. Finally, the paper will detail DoD-specific sUAS case studies, as well as additional examples of sUAS threat activity from around the world.

sUAS Threat Overview
Threat actors may seek to utilize sUAS for activities for a variety of malicious purposes. Individuals seeking to collect intelligence on DoD facilities or operations could use sUAS (and associated cameras/sensors) to gather imagery/video and other information. Terrorist actors (both foreign and domestic) could utilize sUAS to carry a weaponized payload (such as explosives or chemical/biological agents). Individuals intent on interfering with aviation operations could fly sUAS near airfields or testing/training ranges in order to disrupt or potentially damage aircraft. Furthermore, protestors opposing the DoD could utilize sUAS for various messaging efforts, for harassment, or to collect imagery/video in furtherance of their causes.

The nature of modern sUAS platforms allows for significant standoff distance, which can allow threat actors to conduct malicious activities from off-installation locations which may be more difficult to identify and/or access. This complicates security forces’ ability to identify and apprehend malicious sUAS operators. Additionally, it should be noted that even non-malicious actors (such as a young or misinformed sUAS operator) could have similar effects on operations as a malicious actor. Security forces responses and other protective measures could be implemented following an sUAS incursion, temporarily disrupting operations regardless of the sUAS operator’s intent.

sUAS Capabilities
The DoD classifies UAS into five groups based on maximum gross takeoff weight (MGTW), normal operating altitude, and airspeed. Group one is the smallest UAS with an MGTW of 20 pounds or less, normal operating altitude of 1,200 ft and airspeed less than 100 knots. Group 2 has an MGTW of 55 pounds or less, fitting the FAA definition of sUAS, with a normal operating altitude of less than 3,500 feet and airspeed of less than 250 knots. Group 3 has an MGTW of less than 1,320 pounds, operating altitude of less than 18,000 ft and an airspeed of less than 250 knots. DoD considers groups 1-3 as sUAS, although group 3 has significantly greater capabilities and would generally be operated by government agencies or commercial enterprises. This white paper will focus on groups one and two with an MGTW of 55 pounds or less.1,2

The sUAS market is growing rapidly. There are more than 600 manufacturers producing over 1,700 different systems built for purposes which include recreational, imaging, disaster response, agriculture, mining, research prototypes, and military applications. The majority of sUAS platforms are fixed wing or rotorcraft with a small minority of platforms being a hybrid design or lighter than air design. Most rotorcraft sUAS are multicopter designs. Hobbyist sUAS are the easiest to procure and provide threat actors the most anonymity when making the purchase. More capable sUAS can be found at high-end hobby shops and industrial suppliers. These purchases are more expensive, require more interpersonal contact and involve record keeping requirements which complicate and may deter threat actors from purchasing these systems. With the proliferation of online communities, do-it-yourself sUAS are being built by hobbyists. Online sources educate builders on designs, and where to purchase components and systems from online retailers. 3D printing technology including metals and composite materials, allows the construction of airframes and other sUAS parts with designs being available on the internet. These custom built sUAS offer threat actors increased anonymity in procurement while allowing them to design and build sUAS to fit their specific needs.3,4

Rotary-wing battery electric sUAS make up approximately 41% of the total sUAS variants currently on the market. The most commonly purchased sUAS variants have a mean endurance of 21 minutes, mean maximum range of 1.8 miles, and mean payload weight of 4.6 lbs. While this represents the capability of the most likely sUAS that may be encountered it is worth noting that hybrid-wing hybrid-propulsion sUAS platforms have a range of up to 419 miles and endurance of up to 520 minutes. These hybrid platforms have fixed wing surfaces that produce lift along with quadrotor multicoptor rotors. Rotary-wing internal platforms that use internal combustion engines have the highest mean payload of 13.6 pounds. While these platforms are less likely to be utilized by a threat actor, they represent the most dangerous platforms due to their increased capabilities. Advances in battery technology including Li-Metal, Flow and Solid-State batteries could double sUAS endurance and range as early as 2028.3

Other types of sUAS exist that are uncommon but may present viable options for threat actor use. Powered parachute sUAS use a propeller while a parachute produces lift, just like manned paraplanes. Inexpensive and easy to control, these sUAS are easily deployed and can be packed into very small spaces for transport. There are some tiltrotor sUAS designs that operate like the U.S. military’s V-22 Osprey. These provide vertical take off and landing capability while possessing fixed wing speed and endurance. Lighter than air sUAS operate much like a blimp and radio-controlled blimps are easily converted into this type of sUAS. Although they operate at low speed, they are capable of long endurance.3

The command, control and communication capabilities of sUAS are also developing rapidly. Drones are no longer fully dependent on human input for their controls for all aspects of flight. Many sUAS platforms have proven capable of path-following, follow-me, obstacle avoidance, small-team coordination, and swarm formations. Path-following, sometimes referred to as self-flying or autopilot, requires the sUAS operator to pre-program the flight path, often using waypoints to adjust altitude, direction and speed. Follow-me flight uses remote control bracelets or a phone app that emits a global navigation satellite (GNSS) signal for the sUAS to follow. Some sUAS with high quality visual sensors can track an object or person that has been selected in the user interface. Small-team coordination and swarm formations require pre-programmed flight patterns and is basically a complex version of path-following control. All of these types of flight are precursors to fully autonomous sUAS flight where the machine itself is capable of adaptive autonomous control. The rapid growth of Artificial Intelligence (AI) will likely aid and hasten the development of such flight technologies. Autonomous flight capability removes the requirement of a signal to control the aircraft making it radio silent and much more difficult to detect and intercept.3,5

Frequencies used to control sUAS are relatively broad and multiple frequencies are required to control the sUAS in flight, broadcast telemetry and communicate with any potential payload. Most sUAS are controlled on spread-spectrum bands such as 2.4 gigaherz (GHz), 5.8 GHz and other GHz bands that offer significantly reduced interference and detectability. Controlling sUAS using 3G, 4G, or 5G cell phone signals is also possible. Although this form of control is more likely to have lag in the control response, using cell phone signals makes detecting the source of the signal more difficult as it is mixed in with normal cell phone transmission traffic. Some sUAS can be controlled by satellite communications (SATCOM). SATCOM options are currently limited and expensive making their use by threat actors less likely. However, projects such as OneWeb and Space X’s Starlink are building microsatellite constellations that will reduce the cost of SATCOM and reduce the latency of the signals.3

The rapid proliferation and miniaturization of various technologies give sUAS sensing payloads significant capabilities that could be exploited by threat actors. Sensing payload types can include:

  • Still and Video Cameras: Current cameras are capable of 4k resolution, however communication bandwidth generally limits real time image transmission to 2k resolution. Some cameras are so small and lightweight that a second payload can be carried on some sUAS. Infrared (IR) cameras are less common and more expensive, however their use in agriculture and other industries makes them readily available. The capability of still and video cameras give threat actors the ability to gather images and information at greater distance and in low light conditions.3
  • Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR): LIDAR allows for highly accurate 3D imaging and measuring. There are multiple commercial applications making this technology available albeit expensive. Highly accurate 3D imaging produced by LIDAR can be used for mapping, determining line of sight, target tracking and detection, and navigation including the autonomous navigation of unmanned vehicles.3,6
  • Hyperspectral Sensing: Hyperspectral sensing is becoming more widely used in agriculture for their ability to inspect crops quickly and accurately, providing information on soil quality, water stress and early detection of crop diseases. Hyperspectral sensing can simultaneously collect hundreds of narrow and contiguously spaced spectral bands of data including visible light, near infrared, shortwave infrared, mediumwave infrared and longwave infrared radiation. Not all Hyperspectral cameras can cover his entire range of the spectrum. In military applications, Hyperspectral sensing can be used to support reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting. It can also be used for defensive purposes as it can detect threats from incoming missiles to chemical agents.3
  • Radar: Miniaturized radar systems as small as 1.65 lbs with a three (3) km range. Developments in autonomous flight are causing changes in regulations which now require radar navigation of aircraft in certain situations. This will likely drive further research and development into the miniaturization of radar making it more suitable for use on sUAS.3
  • Electronic Intelligence (ELINT): The freedom of movement and agility of sUAS make them a superb platform for cataloging electronic signals. This collection could be passive, active, or possibly the disruption or spoofing of electronic signals.3
  • Electronic Jamming: Radio Frequency (RF) electronic payloads could be used to jam air traffic control signals as well as Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) and Global Navigation Satellite (GNSS). The mobility of sUAS gives the threat actor the ability to affect receivers over a wider area than a ground-based jammer. Although the use of this technology is illegal in the U.S., jammers as small as a few inches long and weighing only a few ounces can be purchased on the internet.3
  • Acoustic Sensors: Currently, the use of acoustic sensors is mainly theoretical, but work is being done to develop the ability of acoustic sensors to detect obstacles and other sUAS to aid in autonomous flight.3
  • Radiation Sensors: sUAS have been fitted with radiation sensors to detect gamma, X-ray, alpha and beta particle radiation.3

Non-sensing payloads carried by sUAS range from propaganda leaflets, nuisance and noisemaking devices, illegal drugs, conventional weapons and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Below are examples of payload delivery methods:

  • Kamikaze / Suicide / One-Way Attack Drone: An explosive payload is attached to the sUAS and both the payload and UAS are crashed into the target. Most often, there is an associated video feed allowing the sUAS to gather information prior to selecting the target.3
  • Payload Release: Releasable payloads vary depending upon the mission. Explosive devices, often hand grenades and small mortars are used to conduct kinetic attacks. Cyber-enabled devices (such as Wi-Fi sniffers) and unmanned ground sensors can be released, increasing the reconnaissance and surveillance capability of sUAS. Illegal narcotics, weapons, or other contraband can be flown over borders and released at predetermined drop points.3
  • Sprayers: Lawful use of sprayers for commercial and agricultural use is growing. Threat actors could use this type of delivery method for attacks utilizing chemical or biological agents.3

Counter-UAS Legal Framework
The legal environment surrounding counter-UAS (C-UAS) capability employment is in its early stages and continues to evolve. With DoD installations located worldwide, it is important to note that legal frameworks vary by jurisdiction.
Within the United States, the DoD’s C-UAS efforts are largely governed by Chapter 3 of U.S. Code Title 10, Section 130i. Section 130i authorizes DoD installations “to take certain actions with respect to unmanned aircraft systems, including using reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy them.” While the exact DoD policies authorizing such actions remain classified, Section 130i mentions specific “covered facilities or assets” which may warrant protection. These facilities/assets must be “identified by the Secretary of Defense,” must be “located in the United States (including the territories and possessions of the United States)” and must relate to various national security missions, to include “nuclear command and control, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, and continuity of government; the missile defense mission of the Department; or the national security space mission of the Department.”7

In host nation environments where the DoD has installations/assets located outside of U.S. jurisdiction, legalities regarding C-UAS vary widely. Per the DoD’s 2021 Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy, “host nation environments have a diverse array of statutes and regulations that could inhibit effective force protection efforts.” The Strategy further notes that “[DoD] bases and operations in host nations must work with local airspace control authorities while complying with local laws and obligations of treaties or other agreements.”8

In contingency environments where DoD personnel are forward-deployed and engaging in active military operations, C-UAS legalities defer toward the laws of war and self-defense. Per the aforementioned 2021 DoD Strategy, “contingency locations are generally the least restrictive operating environment but potentially carry the highest risk.” Since active hostilities may be present, commanders will ensure that appropriate roles of engagement are utilized for C-UAS issues.

Counter-sUAS Capabilities
Counter-sUAS (C-sUAS) systems are specifically designed for the detection, tracking, identification, and defeat of group one (1) and two (2) sUAS. Several technologies including radar, RF scanners, electro-optical sensors and infrared cameras are commonly used for detection. Options to defeat sUAS include jamming sUAS RF control or payload links, jamming sUAS GNSS signals, or kinetic attacks such as lasers, projectiles, or interception with another sUAS. The most effective fixed site systems use multiple detection methods, increasing the likelihood of detection and have multiple defeat methods giving commanders and operators more options based on circumstances. Mobile systems generally have limited detection and defeat methods, but can provide C-sUAS capability during movement, in austere environments, and fill gaps not covered by fixed site systems.9,10

Detection of sUAS systems is difficult due to the myriad of factors involved. Differences in sUAS size, speed, transmission frequencies, and operational environments impact the effectiveness of the different sensors used by C-sUAS systems. Sensor types include electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR), ELINT, acoustics and LIDAR. Each has a range of capabilities with unique strengths and weaknesses, and all can have issues with false alarms based on the environment in which they are deployed.3

  • Radar: The effectiveness of radar as a detection method is dependent upon the shape, surface material and motion of the object the radar is attempting to detect. Many sUAS are being built with plastics and carbon-based materials for their strength, flexibility, and reduced weight. However, these materials can reduce an objects radar signature. Doppler radars can separate moving target signatures from other background clutter. Rotor blades used on sUAS produce unique Doppler signatures that can aid in detection and identification. As sUAS control and navigation capabilities improve, threat actors may have more ability to use terrain to mask the movement of sUAS, particularly in crowded urban environments. Radars with wider bandwidths, advance digital signal processing and agility with respect to frequency and waveform are likely to be the most effective for the detection of sUAS.3,11
  • EO/IR Sensors: Like radar, EO/IR sensors are affected by atmospheric effects, and the shape, surface material and motion of the object the sensor is attempting to detect. These sensors operate at much higher frequencies in the electromagnetic domain and generally fall into two broad classes, imaging and non-imaging.
    • Imaging Sensors: These sensors can create still or full motion images to detect, identify and track targets depending on the resolution of the sensor. Imaging sensors have a smaller field of view and are most effective when being cued by other detection sensors.3
    • Non-imaging Sensors: These sensors do not have the resolution required to produce an image. However, they can detect and track targets as point targets. The advantage is the increased field of view allowing for more efficient searches of larger areas. Battery powered sUAS have lower radiant intensities than internal combustion or jet powered counterparts making them more difficult to decipher from the environment by non-imaging sensors. Reduced battery temperature can improve battery life, providing incentive for manufacturers to use cooler batteries, leading to reduced thermal signatures in the future for sUAS.3
  • ELINT Sensors: ELINT sensors passively detect signals of interest emitted from both the controller and the sUAS. Signal identification relies on prior knowledge of the signal of interest. ELINT sensors use digital libraries containing waveform parameters of threat emitters. When a signal is detected, it is compared to the signals in the library for identification. If a threat actor uses a signal not in the library of the ELINT sensor it will be ignored. ELINT sensors can also produce false alarms from other emitters such as wireless hotspots or GoPro cameras. While one ELINT sensor can provide relatively accurate bearing to the source of the signal, multiple ELINT sensors can work together to triangulate a signal. The more sensors and wider angular spread increase the accuracy of location finding capability. ELINT sensors can be largely defeated by reducing signals emitted. This can be accomplished by sUAS flying preplanned routes and recording data onboard the sensor instead of transmitting data. Threat actors can also use decoy sUAS or swarming techniques to overwhelm ELINT sensors. Lastly, the use of cell signal controls make ELINT detection difficult as the signals are mixed amongst other cell signals.3
  • Acoustic Sensors: These sensors are most effective at closer ranges as sound power decreases by six (6) decibels for each doubling of distance between the source and receiver. There is market demand for quieter sUAS systems, particularly for commercial use in urban areas. As a result, C-UAS manufacturers are beginning to turn away from acoustic sensors as a primary method of detection.3
  • LIDAR Sensors: These sensors use pulsed laser light to illuminate a target and then collect the reflected pulses to accurately measure distance to target. LIDAR sensors typically use ultraviolet, visible or near-IR light to illuminate targets. LIDAR sensors can quickly and precisely locate targets, providing range and azimuth during both day and night. LIDAR is also very effective at separating targets from other foreground and background clutter. Atmospheric conditions such as rain, fog and haze negatively affect LIDAR because of the two-way transmission of the pulsed lasers. When used near people, the maximum laser power should be limited to make the lasers eye-safe, decreasing its potential capability. Research has indicated that LIDAR has the ability to detect sUAS at ranges out to 30 meters. Future research and development being conducted is likely to make LIDAR more effective C-sUAS option in the future.3

Since each of the above sensors have different strengths and weaknesses, a “system of systems” approach to C-sUAS is likely to provide the most effective results. This is especially true for installations where fixed site systems can be employed and tailored to the environment and potential threats. Since all systems produce false alarms, training of operators and technicians is critical to the overall effectiveness of the systems.3

Case Study: NAS JRB Fort Worth
At Naval Air Station (NAS) Joint Reserve Base (JRB) Fort Worth in Texas, leadership has expressed concerns regarding the installation’s encounters with unauthorized sUAS in their airspace. Open-source reporting indicates that drone reports have increased from approximately 100 encounters to more than 300 monthly. In addition, including sUAS maneuvering through their airspace multiple times, the installation has reported more than 700 incidents a month. According to a former Commanding Officer of NAS JRB Fort Worth, most observed drone operators are younger individuals unintentionally flying recreationally in the area. However, these unauthorized sUAS are considered hazardous for aircraft at NAS JRB Fort Worth, as there have been two (2) incidents in which DoD aircraft had to maneuver around unauthorized drones to avoid a crash. Furthermore, a crash in September 2021 involving a bird flying into an aircraft’s engine, which damaged three (3) houses in the Lake Worth neighborhood, highlights the potential damage unauthorized objects pose to NAS JRB Fort Worth’s single-engine aircraft.12

While the former Commanding Officer indicated that leadership does not believe the unauthorized drone flights in NAS JRB Fort Worth’s airspace demonstrate “hostile intent,” sUAS in the vicinity of the installation could pose potential surveillance concerns. NAS JRB Fort Worth hosts dozens of units, including the Air Force’s 301st Fighter Wing. In January 2021, the Secretary of the Air Force named the 301st Fighter Wing, NAS JRB Fort Worth, the first Air Force Reserve Command F-35 unit-equipped wing. According to the press release announcing the decision, the F-35s are being assembled at the Fort Worth Lockheed Martin Plant, across the runway from the 301st Fighter Wing. At the time of the announcement, the wing was expected to receive the first F-35A aircraft in summer 2024, replacing its aging fleet of F-16 Fighting Falcons. In November 2023, a few F-35s with interim software flew for the first time at NAS JRB Fort Worth. Any unauthorized sUAS surveillance into the production or testing of F-35s (which are designed with stealth technology, advanced aerodynamic performance and integrated avionics to bolster U.S. air dominance) could potentially disrupt U.S. defense advantages.13,14,15,16

Case Study: NAVBASE Kitsap
Naval Base (NAVBASE) Kitsap is the third largest U.S. Navy installation in the United States. It is home to all types of U.S. Navy submarines, two Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and the largest fuel depot in the Continental U.S. NAVBASE Kitsap is located on the Kitsap Peninsula, approximately 20 miles West-Northwest of Seattle, WA and is composed of multiple installations including Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Naval Submarine Base Bangor, Keyport Underwater Warfare Center, Naval Hospital Bremerton and the Manchester Fuel Depot. The sensitive and strategic nature of NAVBASE Kitsap makes foreign intelligence activities a legitimate concern. After repeated flights of private drones over these installations, the U.S. Navy requested the Kitsap County Board of Commissioners pass legislation to prevent such flights. On 10 September 2019, Ordinance 571-2019 went into effect, requiring operators to notify the U.S. Navy in advance of UAS operations within 3000 feet of these installations. Notification is made through an online form located on the Kitsap County website. Requirements include the location, time, drone description, FAA registration number and contact information of the operator.17

While the FAA continues to adapt regulations regarding recreational and commercial operation of sUAS to fit the rapid growth of technology, their efforts cannot address the specific concerns of individual military installations. A myriad of factors including the environment around an installation, civilian encroachment, signals encroachment, installation and tenant missions, and the equipment and technology aboard the installation must all be taken into account when determining the risk associated with sUAS operations near an installation. The communication and cooperation between Naval Base Kitsap and the Kitsap County government is a good example of how installations can partner with local governments to mitigate the threats associated with sUAS while balancing the rights of law-abiding citizens. C-sUAS programs are bolstered by such efforts because they provide insight to the installation on expected honest and legal use of sUAS in the area, making identification of potential threat actor use of sUAS easier.

Additional Examples
There have also been a number of significant sUAS kinetic attacks across the Middle East. Installations across Syria and Iraq as well as U.S. Navy warships in the Red Sea have been targeted numerous times since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war on 07 October 2023.18

Open-source reporting on the attacks against U.S. interests in Iraq and Syria indicate the majority of attacks involved drones, indirect fires (rockets or mortars), or a combination of the two. Very little reporting on the types of drones used is available, however two sUAS systems identified in the attacks were the Qasef-2K and the Shahed-101. The Qasef-2K is an Iranian attack drone with a range of 150 km, endurance of two (02) hours, ceiling of 9,800 feet and can carry a 66-pound payload. The Shahed-101 is a larger Iranian attack drone with a delta wing design. It is usually guided by a preprogrammed flight path to a predetermined target, eliminating the need for a constant control signal and reducing it’s ELINT signature. This design has been copied by Russia and China and has been used often by Russia against Ukraine. Some of these variants have been observed with carbon fiber components and a black coating. These changes are likely attempts to reduce the radar signature and engine heat signature.19,20,21

Houthi rebels in Yemen have also utilized one-way attack drones to target merchant ships in the Red Sea shipping lanes. While information on what types of drones are being used to carry out these attacks, two of the most common one-way attack drones used by the Houthi’s are the KAS-04 and the Shahed-136. The KAS-04 is produced at by Iran’s Kimia Part Sivan Company, has a range of 1,700 km. The Shahed-136 is also Iranian produced and is a loitering munition or suicide / kamikaze drone capable of drone swarm attacks with a range estimated between 1,000 km and 2,500 km.18

Hamas used multirotor sUAS to great effect during their 07 October 2023 attack on Israel. The majority of these sUAS would be categorized as Group two (02) sUAS by DoD standards. Small explosive munitions were dropped on Israeli border security towers which housed cameras, communication and machine gun emplacements. One video released by Hamas shoed a commercially available quadcopter attacking an Israeli tank. Targets deeper into Israeli territory were attacked with larger one-way attack drones of various types.22

The contrast between the kinetic attacks conducted using Group two (02) and Group three (03) sUAS show the limited capability for kinetic attacks by the smaller Group two (02) sUAS. However, kinetic attacks by smalls sUAS can be highly effective when coordinated against softer targets such as camera systems and communications equipment. Even an attack on a main battle tank can render the electro-optical sighting systems and communications equipment inoperable, making the tank significantly less effective. Group three (03) sUAS carry larger, more powerful payloads over much larger distances making them more effective in kinetic attacks against larger targets. Technology is being applied to make them more difficult to detect by C-UAS systems, further increasing their lethality. In depth study of these sUAS attacks across the Middle East, along with the wars in Ukraine and Azerbaijan is critical for the future of C-UAS systems to keep up with emerging technology.

Outlook
The widespread proliferation of sUAS will continue to pose a force protection challenge for the DoD. Threat actors will almost certainly continue to utilize sUAS for malicious activities around the world, to include areas with a DoD presence. While there is currently limited publicly available evidence suggesting a specific sUAS threat to the DoD outside of active conflict zones, the continued evolution of sUAS systems and ongoing challenges regarding C-UAS legal frameworks and C-sUAS capabilities creates an environment conducive to future threat activity. RMC’s Intelligence & Climate Analysis Division continues to monitor relevant developments related to threat actor use of sUAS platforms, as well as potential threats to DoD installations, assets, and personnel worldwide.

Sources

1. U.S. Air Force. (2022, March 14) Air Force Small-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Guide and Reporting Procedures. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/14/2002956786/-1/-1/1/SUAS%20IDENTIFICATION%20AND%20REPORTING%20GUIDE.PDF.

2. Penn State University. (n.d.). Classification of the Unmanned Aerial Systems. Retrieved from https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog892/node/5.

3. Wilson, B. et al. (2020). Small Unmanned Aerial System Adversary Capabilities. Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3023.html.

4. Smith, C. (2018, October 10). 3D Printing Trends to Watch in 2018. CADCrowd.com. Retrieved from https://www.cadcrowd.com/blog/3d-printing-trends-to-watch-in-2018.

5. Mastrola, M. (2023, October 9). As Drone Traffic Increases, Researchers Turn to AI to Help Avoid Collisions. Retrieved from https://hub.jhu.edu/2023/10/09/artificial-intelligence-safer-skies/.

6. Ball, M. (2023, February 27). Military LiDAR Solutions. Defense Advancement. Retrieved from https://www.defenseadvancement.com/suppliers/military-lidar/.

7. The military can now use force to “Disable” Pesky drones near bases. (2017, November 28). Military.com. Retrieved from https://www.military.com/defensetech/2017/08/07/military-can-now-use-force-disable-pesky-drones-near-bases.

8. Department of Defense. (2021). Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/07/2002561080/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-COUNTER-SMALL-UNMANNED-AIRCRAFT-SYSTEMS-STRATEGY.PDF.

9. Director Operational Test and Evaluation. (2020). Counter-Small Unmanned Aerial Systems. Retrieved from https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2020/army/2020csuas.pdf.

10. Board on Army Science and Technology. (2018). Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (CUAS) Capability for Battalion and Below Operations. Retrieved from https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/24747/chapter/1.

11. Ruiz-Perez, F. et al. (2022, September). Carbon-based Radar Absorbing Materials: A Critical Review. Journal of Science: Advanced Materials and Devices. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2468217922000387.

12. Rahman, T. (2023, November 15). Drones are messing with training at Fort Worth military installation. NBCDFW. Retrieved from https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/drones-are-messing-with-training-at-fort-worth-military-installation/3388626/.

13. Commander, Navy Region Southeast. (n.d.). NAS JRB Fort Worth Tenant Commands. Commander, Navy Region Southeast. Retrieved from https://cnrse.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NAS-JRB-Fort-Worth/About/Tenant-Commands/.

14. 301st Fighter Wing Public Affairs Office. (2021, January 8). 301 FW Selected to Receive F-35A. 301st Fighter Wing. Retrieved from https://www.301fw.afrc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2466375/301-fw-selected-to-receive-f-35a/.

15. Owens, S. (2023, January 19). Aircraft Mishap Highlights NAS JRB Partnership with Lockheed Martin. DVIDS. Retrieved from https://www.dvidshub.net/news/436943/aircraft-mishap-highlights-nas-jrb-partnership-with-lockheed-martin.

16. Losey, S. (2023, December 30). New in 2024: F-35 program eyes key upgrade, delivery restart. Defense News. Retrieved from https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/12/30/f-35-program-eyes-key-upgrade-delivery-restart/.

17. Kitsap County, Washington. (2019, September 10). Drone / Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Regulations. Retrieved from https://www.kitsapgov.com/BOC_p/Pages/Drone-UAS-Regs.aspx.

18. Lagrone, S. (2023, December 18). ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’ Set to Protect Ships in the Red Sea, Carrier IKE in Gulf of Aden. USNI News. Retrieved from https://news.usni.org/2023/12/18/operation-prosperity-guardian-set-to-protect-ships-in-the-red-sea-carrier-ike-in-gulf-of-aden.

19. Knights, M et al. (2024, January 11). Tracking Anti-U.S. Strikes in Iraq and Syria During the Gaza Crisis. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis.

20. Kyiv Post staff. (2023, December 10). A Technophile’s Guide to the Evolution of Russian Shahed Drones. Kyiv Post. Retrieved from https://www.kyivpost.com/post/25204.

21. Hanna, A. (2021, June 30). Iran’s Drone Transfer to Proxies. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jun/30/iran%E2%80%99s-drone-transfers-proxies.

22. Jankowicz, Mia. (2023, October 10). How Hamas likely used rudimentary drones to ‘blind and deafen’ Israel’s border and pave the way for its onslaught. Business Insider. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/hamas-drones-take-out-comms-towers-ambush-israel-2023-10.