Introduction
In June 2023, RMC produced a White Paper entitled “China-Cuba Relations: Recent Developments and Implications for U.S. National Security.” This paper will be a continuation of the subject, providing a brief history of the longstanding relationship between China and Cuba and an update on their military and intelligence collaborations.
Background
China and Cuba’s relationship began in the mid-1800s, when Chinese laborers were brought to the island to work in the sugar industry. Following Fidel Castro’s rise to power in 1959, Cuba officially recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1960. Both revolutionary governments shared anti-imperialist views, implemented land reforms, and opposed American influence on the global stage. Over the decades, their relationship has expanded to include robust economic cooperation, with China becoming one of Cuba’s largest trading partners, along with that of other Latin America and Caribbean countries (for more information, see RMC White Paper, “Chinese Investment and Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean”). Huawei and ZTE, two (2) Chinese tech giants blacklisted by the U.S. due to concerns about espionage, serve as the foundation of Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure. In June 2023, U.S. officials observed personnel from the companies entering and leaving suspected Chinese intelligence facilities in Cuba. Ongoing technical collaborations between Cuban institutions and Chinese state-supported universities and tech companies have also promoted the transfer of technology.[1],[2],[3],[4],[5]
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Collection Facilities
Satellite imagery appearing on the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) website has identified SIGINT sites with suspected connections to China near Havana in Wajay, Bejucal, and Calabazar. The fourth site is in the southern part of Cuba in El Salao.[6]
Figure 1 – Locations of Cuban SIGINT Sites[6]
These facilities are equipped with sophisticated antenna arrays and radar systems designed to intercept electronic communications from both civilian and military sources. The densely populated southeastern U.S. coast is particularly vulnerable, as it is home to key military installations, launch sites, and strategic infrastructure.[7]
Bejucal (Near Havana)
The Bejucal facility is the country’s largest active SIGINT site, with historical ties to Cold War espionage and proximity to former Soviet nuclear positions. Since the Cold War, Bejucal has been suspected of supporting Chinese intelligence operations. This suspicion has been echoed in U.S. government reports and political discourse. The site has undergone significant modernization over the past decade, as satellite imagery reveals the expansion of antenna fields, underground facilities, and the addition of a radome in 2014, which is likely used for electronic surveillance.[8],[9],[10]
Recent imagery from April 2025 reveals major upgrades underway, including the removal of older antennas and construction of a large Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA), which is a Cold War-era system used for high-frequency direction finding. CDAAs can trace the origin of radio signals thousands of miles away, which could enable the monitoring of U.S. air and maritime activity. The new array at Bejucal is notably larger than the previous version on-site, increasing its potential for precision and reach.[11],[12]
Figure 2 – Bejucal SIGINT Facility[11]
While CDAAs have become less common in modern SIGINT due to technological advancements, they remain relevant, especially for military powers such as China, which deploys similar arrays in the South China Sea to monitor activity near contested areas. The upgraded Bejucal CDAA could enhance Cuba’s intelligence capabilities and provide valuable information to China or other adversaries, raising concerns about regional surveillance and U.S. national security.[11],[13]
El Salao (Southern Cuba)
Roughly 500 miles southeast of Bejucal, near El Salao on Cuba’s eastern side, is another CDAA facility. This site was first publicly identified in 2024 through satellite imagery found on the CSIS website, which showed a CDAA under construction. However, by April 2025, new imagery indicated that construction had halted. Only minimal activity, such as roofing support for buildings, has occurred since then. Vegetation is overtaking the graded area, suggesting that the site is no longer actively maintained.[11]
Figure 3 – El Salao CDAA Facility (April 2025)[11]
If completed, the El Salao CDAA would offer a strategic position for monitoring Atlantic air and maritime traffic, particularly near U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo, which is located just 40 miles away. The halt in development raises questions. While no direct evidence publicly links China to the El Salao or Bejucal sites, and Beijing denies involvement, U.S. officials have asserted that China has access to spy facilities in Cuba. These sites remain top candidates for supporting Chinese intelligence operations. As such, continued U.S. monitoring is likely, as changes at these SIGINT facilities could signal an increase in intelligence-gathering activity against U.S. interests.[11],[5]
Wajay (Near Havana)
A little more than six (6) miles north of Bejucal, the Wajay facility is a smaller but an expanding SIGINT site. Security fencing and guard posts indicate its use for military or sensitive operations. Since 2002, the compound has grown from a single antenna and a few buildings into a larger complex featuring 12 antennas, operations and support structures, and a small solar farm. While there is no direct evidence of China’s involvement, it is possible that Beijing is involved in the site’s development and recent upgrades. The absence of dish antennas suggests the facility is focused on terrestrial signal interception and transmission. The diversity of antenna types indicates that Wajay is engaged in a sophisticated SIGINT role.[6]
Figure 4 – Wajay SIGINT Site (March 2024)[6]
Calabazar (Near Havana)
Near the town of Calabazar, a small Cuban military complex exhibits clear signs of SIGINT activity. The secured site features over a dozen dish antennas of various sizes and two (2) pole antenna arrays. Consistent with typical military intelligence operations, the configuration of antennas has changed over time, reflecting shifts in the site’s mission. The most recent addition, a new dish antenna, was installed in 2016.[6],[14]
Figure 5 – Calabazar SIGINT Site (April 2024)[6]
Strategically, China’s access to SIGINT sites in Cuba allows it to close longstanding gaps in its global intelligence network, especially in the Western Hemisphere. These facilities enable China to monitor encrypted and unencrypted U.S. military and commercial communications, observe space launches at Cape Canaveral, and collect economic and technological data from key southern U.S. industries. Even without deciphering message contents, metadata from signals, such as their origin, timing, and frequency, can reveal valuable insights about U.S. military posture and capabilities. These developments mark a Cold War-style resurgence of foreign intelligence operations against the U.S., now powered by modern surveillance technologies.[15],[16]
Outlook
The combination of China’s significant financial investment in Cuba’s infrastructure and the appearance of the two (2) countries collaborating on intelligence and military facilities, just 100 miles from Florida, represents a significant threat to national security due to their proximity to sensitive U.S. military and civilian infrastructure. The southeastern U.S. is home to critical Department of Defense (DoD) assets, including CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, Cape Canaveral, Kennedy Space Center, and multiple submarine bases. By intercepting signals in this region, China could build a clearer picture of U.S. force posture, military exercises, and potentially even response times, which would be valuable in any future conflict or geopolitical standoff.
If China uses these signal-collecting sites, it marks a shift in Beijing’s intelligence capabilities. Historically limited in the Western Hemisphere, China is now closing that gap through access to Cuban infrastructure. This gives Beijing greater reach to monitor U.S. satellite launches and strategic communications. It also allows for telemetry and tracking of space-based assets, potentially compromising American advantage in space and near-Earth surveillance. This would also force the DoD to contend with not only Chinese military modernization in Asia but also a persistent surveillance threat near U.S. shores. It also raises the stakes for diplomatic and intelligence efforts to monitor, contain, or counter China’s intelligence infrastructure buildup in the Americas.
[1]Council on Foreign Relations. (2022, June 3). U.S.-Cuba Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgr ounder/us-cuba-relations.
[2]Center for Strategic & International Studies. (2018, February 28). Cuba’s Changing of the Guard and Sino-Cuban Relations. https://www.csis.org/analysis/cubas-changing-guard-and-sino-cuban-relations.
[3]Defense News. (2023, July 7). China’s Ties To Cuba, Growing Presence In Latin America Raises Concerns. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/07/07/chinas-ties-to-cuba-growing-presence-in-latin-america-raise-concerns/.
[4]The Wall Street Journal. (2023, June 21). U.S. Tracked Huawei, ZTE Workers at Suspected Chinese Spy Sites in Cuba. https://www.wsj.com/politics/u-s-tracked-huawei-zte-workers-at-suspected-chinese-spy-sites-in-cuba-355caddc?mod=article_inline.
[5]Fox News. (2024, December 12). China Denies New Report Linking CCP To Four Sites In Cuba Allegedly Used To Spy On The US. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/china-denies-new-report-linking-ccp-four-sites-cuba-allegedly-used-spy-us.
[6]Center for Strategic & International Studies. (2024, July 1). Secret Signals Decoding China’s Intelligence Activities in Cuba. https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.
[7]Federation of American Scientists. (2022, April 27). AN/FLR-9. https://irp.fas.org/program/collect/an-flr-9.htm.
[8]The Diplomat. (2018, June 08). Satellite Images: A (Worrying) Cuban Mystery – The New Radome In Cuba Is Unprecedented. Who’s Behind It? https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/satellite-images-a-worrying-cuban-mystery/.
[9]Bustle. (2016, March 10). Marco Rubio’s Cuba Answer Brought The House Down. https://www.bustle.com/articles/147319-marco-rubios-cuba-answer-at-the-gop-debate-brought-the-house-down.
[10]The National Security Archive. (2008, June 18). One Minute To Midnight Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/dobbs/warheads.htm.
[11] enter for Strategic & International Studies. (2025, May 6). At The Doorstep A Snapshot of New Activity at Cuban Spy Sites. https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/snapshots/cuba-china-cdaa-base/.
[12]National Photographic Interpretation Center (2010, August 11). Lourdes Central Sigint Complex (S). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T01782R000100710001-8.pdf.
[13]Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. (2018, February 16). Comparing Aerial & Satellite Images Of China’s Spratly Outposts. https://amti.csis.org/comparing-aerial-satellite-images-chinas-spratly-outposts/.
[14]Newsweek. (2024, December 9). Map Shows China’s Suspected Spy Bases In Cuba. https://www.newsweek.com/china-news-map-shows-suspected-spy-bases-cuba-1997464.
[15]Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2024, February 5). 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
[16]Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2025, March). 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
