Introduction

The relationship between land development and military growth has an extensive history worldwide. Military land acquisition and development can create tension between community members and installation personnel. The U.S. Navy Dairy Farm Solar Proposal in Gambrills, Maryland, is a recent example. Since both agriculture and the military demand large areas of land for operations, disagreements may arise with landowners who may feel displaced and attribute their concerns to the expanding military presence.

History of Military Land Acquisition and Relationships with Communities

Located in Gambrills, Maryland, the U.S. Naval Academy Dairy Farm occupies 857 acres. Originally purchased in 1909 by the Navy, the property is now managed by Naval Support Activity (NSA) Annapolis. The land’s original purpose was as a farm to supply the Brigade of Midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy with dairy products. At one time the farm sustained a staff of 15 individuals, around 300 cows, and provided 700 to 1,000 gallons of milk a day. The dairy farm milked around 175 to 250 Holstein cows and raised replacement calves. As of 1997, operations halted to reduce management costs, and Anne Arundel County now leases the farm.^[1],[2],[3]

Before the land was converted into a dairy farm, the U.S. Naval Academy used public sources to obtain milk. However, in the early 1900s an outbreak of typhoid fever affected the milk supply, prompting the Naval Academy to become self-sufficient and operate their dairy farm for nearly 90 years. A Naval officer managed the dairy and closely followed industry sanitary regulations. The farm consisted of 62 buildings, including a pasteurization building, cow barns, storage buildings, silos, chemical storage, grain elevators, feeding troughs, machine sheds, and homes for farm workers. The milk was originally packaged in glass bottles and eventually changed to paperboard milk containers in the 1970s.^[3],[4]

In 1967, the issue of whether the USNA should operate its own dairy farm was brought to the attention of Congress. Local milk producers filed complaints with their representatives about the presence of government-subsidized competition. While these concerns were present, the dairy farm improved community relations by hosting events for the public, including seasonal farm events, corn mazes, schools and group tours, and the Anne Arundel 4-H Dairy Leasing Club operation. However, the Department of Defense (DoD) suggested selling the farm due to continued community opposition and budget cuts. The House Armed Services Committee denied this effort and wrote an order into the Military Authorization Act of 1968 to keep the farm operational. The farm eventually closed in the late 1900s because of economic concerns. Afterward, the Navy-owned land was leased to Anne Arundel County and was later subleased as a private farm. Since that time, the land has been leased to multiple tenants, including the Horizon Organic Farm and Maryland Sunrise Farm.^[3],[4],[5]

As in the example above, military land acquisition can significantly shape economic and social dynamics in the community. These dynamics can simultaneously present the installation and the community with opportunities and obstacles. Generated employment opportunities, the businesses drawn to the area that cater to military personnel and their families, enhanced civic engagement, and the strengthening of public safety and disaster responses may all contribute to economic and social stability. Alternatively, acquisition may include land use changes, pollution, and subsidized competition. Community land use changes can also alter urban planning efforts and local geography.^[6]

Looking forward, increased environmental sustainability initiatives could provide a strong starting point for collaboration between the military and community members. By providing other energy generation technologies, like active farming and agrivoltaics, developers can help benefit installations and the community. Installations can also integrate available cultural resources, development activities, and environmental policy management requirements. As with the Naval Dairy Farm solar revamp, the community should continue to actively participate in future projects and discussions to improve efficiency. This transformation can lead to modified land use patterns, construction of training/operations facilities, and infrastructure expansion.^[6],[7]

Another example of military land acquisition and solar farm construction occurred in Georgia at SUBASE Kings Bay. As of 2015, the Department of the Navy (DoN) and Georgia Power signed a real estate outgrant moving forward with plans for large-scale solar generation at the installation. The plan was to create a 42 MW direct current (DC) facility to bolster DoN energy security and the portfolio of Georgia Power, along with decreasing fossil fuel demand. Since opening in 2016, the solar facility has provided cost-effective renewable energy for the installation and local community. This project has successfully improved solar power in the area, bolstered community investment, and strengthened bases in Georgia.^[8],[9]

The overarching theme surrounding these projects and possible encroachment issues involves the availability of suitable and expansive land. Encroachment near military installations is not a new problem, it is often seen when installations are not able to expand due to land restrictions. Both the military and communities require land to support their needs. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, these tracts of land are often farmlands. The yellow markings in Figure 1 demonstrate that the land around the dairy farm is comprised of deciduous forest, lightly developed land, woody wetlands, and grass/pasture areas.

Figure 1 – Land Use in Gambrills, Maryland^[10]

Figure 2 – Gambrills, Maryland Land Use Breakdown^[10]

Solar Farm Revamp Proposal

As of 2024, the Navy has made the land available for lease for the planned solar facility project. The end goal of the mixed-use energy generation project is to maximize overall energy generation. The Navy has taken steps to convert the 857-acre Gambrills property into an effective solar farm that would offset the electrical demand of NSA Annapolis and work toward the overarching goal of a net-zero Naval Academy. The Navy first conducted the request for information (RFI) period in February 2024 and gathered various ideas to move forward with the project, including concepts in solar energy generation and agrivoltaics. As of 12 September 2024, NSA Annapolis completed the request for proposal phase (RFP) to meet larger DoD Carbon Free Electricity (CFE) goals. Proposals were reviewed through the end of October 2024 and the Phase Two submission process lasted through January 2025.^{[11],[12],[13]}

The Navy has begun to review the Phase Two proposals. After this review, the Navy will select an appropriate developer whose proposal has similar environmental goals. Prior to reviewing these proposals, the Navy must complete an environmental assessment in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. This assessment will evaluate the project’s potential impacts on natural resources. After the assessment is completed, the chosen developer will sign a lease agreement. The project may be delayed further if a suitable developer is not selected. Overall, the renewable energy source has not been identified and the projected timeline for the project is uncertain, with construction possibly years away. It is uncertain what this will mean for the current leases and businesses that occupy the property at this time.^[14]

Possibility of Continued Public Pressure

As the solar farm project has progressed, the community has expressed some pushback. Citizens, many of them farmers, believe this loss of farmland may impact the entire community. Many are not opposed to solar energy or solar panels in general, they are just skeptical of how much the project may cost and how it may intensify agricultural production loss in the county. Uncertainty over land use can also be seen in previous military examples in the area, including Greenbury Point, which is a Navy property located in Anne Arundel County that is managed by NSA Annapolis. The area serves as a natural resources conservation space that simultaneously supports the installation’s mission and is a popular recreation spot for citizens. The land has remained open to the public, while supporting the installation’s needs. The land use of both the dairy farm and Greenbury Point bring up similar logistical concerns regarding shared land between the installation and the community.^[15],[16]

With concerns growing as the dairy farm project proceeds, continued public pressure is likely, which increases the possibility of protest activity. During Navy information sessions for the project, community members have critiqued the vagueness of the proposal and still have unanswered questions. For example, co-owner of De Novo Farm states that their business, and others in the community, depend on the green space to conduct lessons, boarding, training, and breeding. The community will have another opportunity to voice concerns during the public review process, where they can comment on the proposal.^[15],[17]

Community Implications Moving Forward

Future implications may include a decrease in profitable farming land, possible unrest, and a strained relationship between military personnel and the community. While the Navy plans to keep the community involved in this process, citizens are still asking for more clarity on decisions regarding the land. Moving forward, information sessions will be an important forum for citizens, local officials, and military personnel to share updates and concerns.

[1] Naval District Washington. (n.d.). U.S. Naval Academy Dairy Farm. Naval District Washington. Retrieved from https://ndw.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Annapolis/Operations-and-Management/Dairy-Farm/.

[2] Anne Arundel County Maryland. (n.d.). Dairy Farm. Anne Arundel County Maryland. Retrieved from https://www.aacounty.org/county-council/council-districts/district-5/district-5-blog/dairy-farm.

[3] Moore, S. (2019, September 19). Early 1900s: When the Navy ran a dairy farm. Farm and Dairy. Retrieved from https://www.farmanddairy.com/columns/early-1900s-when-the-navy-ran-a-dairy-farm/575536.html.

[4] Naval History and Heritage Command. (2023, January 24). Milk Carton from the United States Naval Academy Dairy Farm. Naval History and Heritage Command. Retrieved from https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/artifacts/Ashore/naval-academy/milk-carton–usna-dairy-farm.html.

[5] Enright, M. (2024, October 11). Navy Moves to Next Phase of Dairy Farm Solar Project. Lancaster Farming. Retrieved from https://www.lancasterfarming.com/farming-news/dairy/navy-moves-to-next-phase-of-dairy-farm-solar-project/article_c50eeece-872d-11ef-9487-abd6c85ba671.html.

[6] Editorial Team. (2024, July 19). The Impact of Military on Local Communities: An In-Depth Analysis. Total Military Insight. Retrieved from https://totalmilitaryinsight.com/impact-of-military-on-local-communities/.

[7] NAVFAC. (n.d.). Naval Academy Dairy Farm Renewable Energy Initiative Information Session & Community Conversation. NAVFAC. Retrieved from https://ndw.cnic.navy.mil/Portals/75/NSA_Annapolis/Documents/NSAA%20Dairy%20Farm%20Public%20Meeting_6AUG24.pdf.

[8] Department of the Navy. (2015, July 13). Navy and Georgia Power Ink Deal to Build 42 MW Solar Farm at SUBASE Kings Bay. Department of the Navy. Retrieved from https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2265286/navy-and-georgia-power-ink-deal-to-build-42-mw-solar-farm-at-subase-kings-bay/.

[9] Department of the Navy. (2016, September 19). SUBASE Kings Bay Celebrates Opening of 42 MW DC Solar Facility. Department of the Navy. Retrieved from https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/2256346/subase-kings-bay-celebrates-opening-of-42-mw-dc-solar-facility/.

[10] RMC. (n.d.). Landcover Summarizer. Retrieved from https://portal.geo.nga.mil/portal/apps/experiencebuilder/experience/?id=5921eed3776a466f864bf6e1faf92282.

[11] Enright, M. (2024, August  2). Planned Solar Facility on Former Navy Dairy Farm Has Ag Industry Concerned. Lancaster Farming. Retrieved from https://www.lancasterfarming.com/farming-news/news/planned-solar-facility-on-former-navy-dairy-farm-has-ag-industry-concerned/article_cb133334-4ea2-11ef-8b0b-cfb0ac43f267.html.

[12] Enright, M. (2024, October 11). Navy Moves to Next Phase of Dairy Farm Solar Project. Lancaster Farming. Retrieved from https://www.lancasterfarming.com/farming-news/dairy/navy-moves-to-next-phase-of-dairy-farm-solar-project/article_c50eeece-872d-11ef-9487-abd6c85ba671.html.

[13] Naval Support Activity Annapolis. (2024, May 17). Press Release. Naval Support Activity Annapolis. Retrieved from https://ndw.cnic.navy.mil/Portals/75/NSA_Annapolis/Documents/Dairy%20Farm/005-%20Dairy%20Farm%20RFP.pdf.

[14] Matheson, J. (2025, January 27). Plans for renewable energy at former Navy Dairy Farm inch along, questions remain. Capital Gazette. Retrieved from https://www.capitalgazette.com/2025/01/27/plans-for-renewable-energy-at-former-navy-dairy-farm-inch-along-questions-remain/.

[15] Enright, M. (2024, August 7). U.S. Navy Dairy Farm Solar Proposal Draws Deep Skepticism. Lancaster Farming. Retrieved from https://www.lancasterfarming.com/farming-news/news/u-s-navy-dairy-farm-solar-proposal-draws-deep-skepticism/article_e8472c4e-54dd-11ef-a9da-2334731e7682.html.

[16] Serna, Oliver. (2022, August 12). What You Need To Know About Greenbury Point. Respect The Rules And Stay Safe!. Naval District Washington. retrieved from https://ndw.cnic.navy.mil/News/News-Detail/Article/3125600/what-you-need-to-know-about-greenbury-point-respect-the-rules-and-stay-safe/.

[17] Cribbs, J. (2024, August 9). Reps face criticism over solar project. The Delmarva Farmer. Retrieved from https://americanfarm.com/articles/delmarvafarmer/reps-face-criticism-over-solar-project/.

Introduction

In its Made In China 2025 initiative, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) detailed its plan to fully integrate itself into the global manufacturing chain and broaden control of strategic geographic locations. These plans are driving its expansion into the Arctic and Antarctic. On 19 November 2014, the PRC Party Secretary & Director of the State Oceanic Administration stated that China is destined to be a “great polar power” by 2030. China has launched expeditions and established research facilities in both the Arctic and Antarctic, strengthening their influence in polar affairs and shaping the evolving geopolitical landscape. Beyond scientific exploration, China’s growing presence in these remote frontiers aligns with its broader strategic and military objectives. In the Arctic, melting ice sheets pose global challenges, but Beijing also sees opportunities. China leverages scientific and commercial ventures to influence governance, access natural resources, and establish new shipping routes, despite lacking sovereign jurisdiction. Emerging shipping routes could shorten trade transit times and improve regional resource access. However, lacking sovereign territory in the Arctic, China relies on partnerships with other nations to advance its interests.^[1],[2],[3]

China’s expansion into the polar regions, as part of their Science of Military Strategy, reflects a calculated effort to enhance its global influence and military capabilities, posing significant challenges to U.S. national security and the Department of Defense (DoD). Tied to its military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy, China’s Arctic research raises security concerns. Arctic research enhances China’s knowledge of submarine operations, icebreaker navigation, and undersea communication cables, which are crucial for military strategy.^[4],[5]

China’s History and Strategy in the Antarctic

China’s growing presence in Antarctica is part of its broader polar strategy, combining scientific research and geopolitical influence, but it is also advancing the potential for dual-use infrastructure. In 1980, China began preparing for its Antarctic scientific research program, initially sending scientists to participate in foreign expeditions, and signed the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) on 09 June 1983. Since its first Antarctic expedition in 1984, China has methodically expanded its footprint, establishing multiple research stations, deployed advanced icebreakers, and leveraged its role within the ATS to increase its influence. This led to the construction of the Great Wall Station in 1985, located on King George Island off the Antarctic Peninsula. It was China’s first Antarctic research station and served as a logistics and research hub.^[2],[3]

As highlighted in Figure 1, China operates five (5) stations in the Antarctic. The graphic also illustrates the ice height change in meters per year.

Figure 1 – Map of Chinese Antarctic Stations^[6]

Zhongshan Station, built in 1989, is situated in East Antarctica’s Larsemann Hill and expanded China’s operational capabilities further inland. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, China had solidified its Antarctic presence, establishing itself as a Consultative Party to the ATS and securing voting rights on Antarctic governance. From 2001 through 2020, China transitioned from scientific research to strategic interests. This was China’s most significant pivot in the region. Kunlun and Taishan Stations, built in 2009, continued their inland-focused research stations, strengthening China’s ability to conduct year-round research and extending its strategic reach. Kunlun Station, built at Dome A, the highest point of the East Antarctic Ice Sheet, has ideal conditions for astronomical observations, climate research, and satellite tracking. Its remote location also raises concerns over potential dual-use applications, such as surveillance and space-based intelligence gathering.^[1],[2],[4]

In early 2024, China completed Qinling Station, its fifth permanent Antarctic research station on Inexpressible Island in Terra Nova Bay in the Ross Sea. This location is strategically significant because it is near McMurdo Sound, which is home to the U.S. McMurdo Station and New Zealand’s Scott Base, which are two (2) of Antarctica’s most important Western research hubs. Its proximity to major Antarctic shipping lanes, which have been cleared of ice by the Xuleong and Xuelong 2 icebreakers, suggests China intends to monitor and engage in long-term regional activities. While officially a scientific research station, Qinling Station’s infrastructure raises concerns about potential military applications, including satellite and electronic surveillance due to its location near key U.S. and allied research stations. Its locations allow for naval logistics support, providing a foothold near important sea routes that may become commercially viable as Antarctic ice melts. The deep-sea research facilities it has could also aid underwater surveillance, submarine warfare research, and oceanographic intelligence gathering.^[1],[6]

Figure 2 – The Icebreaker Xuleong 2 (‘Snow Dragon’),^[7]

Figure 3 – China’s Fifth Antarctic Research Station, Qinling Station^[1]

China is constructing a sixth Antarctic research station on the Amery Ice Shelf in East Antarctica, which is expected to be operational in 2025. The Amery Ice Shelf is a critical gateway for inland Antarctic expeditions, and its location offers strategic advantages for both scientific and potential military applications. When completed, China will have the second-largest presence in Antarctica after the U.S., further solidifying its long-term strategic ambitions in the region. The station could enhance China’s global satellite navigation system (BeiDou), which has applications for civilian and military operations. While the ATS bans new territorial claims, China’s expanding infrastructure suggests it is positioning itself for future negotiations, should the ATS be renegotiated or challenged. Open-source research indicates China has conducted seabed mapping and resource assessments, which could have implications for future Antarctic mineral and energy exploration and exploitation.^[5],[8],[9]

China’s Growing Presence in the Arctic

China has steadily increased its presence in the Arctic, despite not being an Arctic nation. It has pursued a multifaceted strategy to gain influence over Arctic governance, access natural resources, and leverage emerging shipping lanes to advance its economic and strategic interests. By branding itself as a “Near-Arctic State,” China has sought to legitimize its role in Arctic affairs, expanding scientific research, commercial partnerships, and infrastructure projects while also raising concerns over its potential strategic and military ambitions.^[10],[11]

In 2022, geopolitical shifts accelerated as PRC President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed their cooperation, including the Polar Silk Road (PSR), just before Russia invaded Ukraine. Initially announced in 2017, the PSR was seen as a key pillar of Russo-Chinese Arctic collaboration. Climate change is rapidly reducing Arctic Sea ice, making shipping lanes more viable for commercial transit. China views these routes as a shortcut that could significantly reduce shipping times and costs between Asia and Europe. In 2018, the PRC officially incorporated Arctic shipping routes into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).^{[12],[13],[14]}

• The Northern Sea Route runs along Russia’s Arctic coastline, reducing transit times between China and Europe by up to 40% compared to the Suez Canal. China has engaged in joint ventures with Russian companies to gain access to this route.^[12]
• The Transpolar Sea Route is a potential future route running directly across the Arctic Ocean, which would further reduce transit times but is currently too ice-covered to be fully operational.^[12]
• The Northwest Passage runs through Canada’s Arctic waters. However, China does not recognize Canada’s sovereignty over the passage. Beijing has sent research missions to assess the route’s feasibility.^[12]
• The Arctic Bridge Route is a seasonal route connecting the Russian port of Murmansk and the Canadian port of Churchill, Manitoba.^[12]

Figure 4 below illustrates a map of the Arctic Sea routes.

Figure 4 – Arctic Sea Routes^[15]

The links between China’s polar research programs and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have sparked concerns over potential security threats in the Arctic. A key example of this occurred with Sweden, where China established its first overseas satellite ground station at the Esrange Space Center near Kiruna in 2016. In 2020, the Swedish Space Corporation (SSC), which oversees Esrange, chose not to renew its contracts with China due to fears that the facility could support military intelligence and surveillance operations. This decision extended beyond Esrange, affecting China’s access to other SSC-managed ground stations in South America and Australia. However, the exact timeline for contract expirations and whether China’s access to the stations has been completely revoked remains uncertain. DoD leadership has echoed these security concerns. A 2019 DoD report warned that China’s civilian research could contribute to an expanded military presence in the Arctic, while the 2022 U.S. administration’s Arctic strategy highlighted China’s use of scientific activities for dual-use research with military and intelligence applications.^[1],[16]

China’s Science of Military Strategy asserts that military-civilian pursuits are the path to polar power, and implementing dual-use applications of polar science will assist in achieving it. For example, it is believed the polar observation satellites, under the auspices of providing polar ice assessments, are also being used to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to the PLA. Another example of this dual-use is the scientific application of weather balloons to provide data on upper atmospheric conditions, which the PLA also uses for ISR and command and control. Acknowledging these growing concerns, several countries and governmental bodies (Canada, the European Commission) have passed legislation and regulatory measures limiting (or ending) China’s investment in their regional infrastructure. The DoD published the 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy, nested under the 2022 National Security Strategy, addresses its intentions and potential moves to combat this growing area of concern.^{[10],[17],[18]}

China’s continued expansion into the Arctic has also created a geopolitical destabilizing alliance with Russia. China has long seen Russia as a key entry point into the Arctic, though the latter has historically resisted its growing presence due to national security concerns. Moscow initially opposed China’s observer status in the Arctic Council and restricted its research activities along the Northern Sea Route. However, the war in Ukraine has left Russia increasingly isolated, making it more dependent on Chinese investments in infrastructure and technology. As the Arctic Council faces uncertainty, China has deepened its strategic focus on Russian ports. In 2019, Chinese academics from two (2) state universities conducted studies to identify which Russian key access points along the Northern Sea Route gave the most access to the region. The report ranked 13 Russian ports based on five (5) primary factors: natural conditions, infrastructure, port operation, interior environment, and geographic location. Since the release of the report, Beijing has invested approximately $130 billion in the infrastructure of the ports.^[1],[19]

Conclusion

While China officially frames its Antarctic expansion as purely scientific, the dual-use potential of its research stations, logistical infrastructure, and technological capabilities raises questions about its broader ambitions. The completion of Qinling Station in 2024 and the upcoming sixth research station in 2025 are significant steps in China’s long-term Antarctic strategy, increasing its presence near key geopolitical locations. With growing tensions between Washington and Beijing and concerns over the future of the ATS, China’s Antarctic expansion represents a critical geopolitical development that will shape the future of polar governance, global strategic competition, and scientific research in one of the world’s last frontiers.^[20],[8]

The 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy states that climate change and shifts in the geostrategic environment propel the need for a new approach to the Arctic. China’s growing presence there is driven by long-term strategic objectives that go far beyond scientific research. By leveraging economic partnerships, scientific research, and infrastructure investments, Beijing is actively positioning itself as a major player in Arctic governance, resource extraction, and commercial shipping. However, its ambitions are increasingly met with resistance from Arctic nations, particularly the U.S., Canada, and Nordic countries. They fear China’s Arctic engagement may be a precursor to greater geopolitical and military involvement. As the Arctic continues to thaw, China’s role in shaping the future of the region will be a major point of contention in global politics, one that will likely escalate as competition over resources, trade routes, and strategic influence intensifies.^[10],[21]

[1] Funaiole, M. P., Hart, B., Powers-Riggs, A., Jun, J., & Bermudez, J. S., Jr.. (2024, December 19). China Makes Progress On Its Fifth Antarctic Research Station. Center For Strategic & International Studies. Retrieved from  https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-makes-progress-its-fifth-antarctic-research-station.

[2] Cigui, L. (2014, November 19). From A Polar Power to Great Polar Power. Chinese Ministry of Land & Resources. Retrieved from https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-11/19/content_2780849.htm.

[3] Institute for Security & Development Policy. (2018, June). Made In China 2025. Institute for Security & Development Policy. Retrieved from https://www.isdp.eu/wp- content/uploads/2018/06 /Made-in-China-Backgrounder.pdf

[4] Tianling, X., Yaoling, L., & Wuchao, K. (2020). The Science of Military Strategy. China Aerospace Studies Institute. Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Tra n slations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf

[5] Funaiole, M. P., Hart, B., Powers-Riggs, A., Jun, J., & Bermudez, J. S., Jr..)2023, April 18). Frozen Frontiers: China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions. Center For Strategic & International Studies. Retrieved from https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-polar-research-facility/.  

[6] Blesic, J. (2024, May 15). Chinese Presence in Antarctica as a New Geopolitical Challenge. The Center For Geostrategic Research & Terrorism (Poland). Retrieved from https://cegit.org/chinese-presence-in-antarctica-as-a-new-geopolitical-challenge/

[7] The Arctic Gateway. (2024). Xuelong 2. ArcticPortal.org. Retrieved from https://arcticportal.o  rg/shipping-portlet/icebreakers/snow-dragon.

[8] The People’s Republic of China. (2024, November 21). Cargo Vessel Sets Sail For China’s 41st Antarctic Expedition. The State Council of The People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202411/21/content_ WS673fcab9c6d0865f4e8ed4d7.html.

[9] The Antarctic Treaty. (n.d.). Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. Retrieved from https://www.a  ts.aq/dev  https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?lang=e

[10] Pechko, K. (2025, January 7). Rising Tensions and Shifting Strategies: The Evolving Dynamics of US Grand Strategy in the Arctic. The Arctic Institute Center For Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/rising-tensions-shifting-strategies-evolving-dynamics-us-grand-strategy-arctic/

[11] U.S. Secretary of Defense. (2024). 2024 Arctic Strategy. U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF

[12] Lamazhapov, E., Stensdal, I., & Heggelund, G. (2023, November 14). China’s Polar Silk Road: Long Game or Failed Strategy?. The Arctic Institute Center For Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-polar-silk-road-long-game-failed-strategy/

[13] Fleck, A. (2023, June 15). The Polar Silk Road. Statista. Retrieved from https://www.statista .com/chart/30201/major-maritime-routes-opening-up-in-the-arctic/

[14] Eiterjord, T. (2023, November 23).  What the 14th Five-Year Plan says about China’s Arctic Interests. The Arctic Institute Center For Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved from https://www. thearcticinstitute.org/14th-five-year-plan-chinas-arctic-interests/

[15] Drycrz, C. (2017, December). Safety of Navigation in the Arctic. Polish Naval Academy. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-Northwest-Passage-the-Northeast-Passage-and-the-Northern-Sea-Route-and-the_fig6_321687663

[16] Parsonson, A. (2025, January 4). Swedish Military to Serve as Anchor Customer for Esrange Space Center?. European Spaceflight. Retrieved from https://europeanspaceflight.com/swedish-military-to-serve-as-anchor-customer-for-esrange-space-center/

[17] U.S. House of Representatives. (2024, October 16). Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Congress of the U.S. House of Representatives. Retrieved from https://selectco mitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/10.16.24_PRC%20dual%20use%20research%20in%20the%20Arctic__.pdf

[18] Pezard, S., Chindea, I. A., Aoki, N., Lumpkin, D., & Shokh, Y. (2025, January 23) China’s Economic, Scientifc, & Information Activities In The Arctic – Benign Actvitites or Hidden Agenda. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2823-1.html.

[19] Zhang, J. (2024, December 9). Russia Clears Path for China in the Arctic. Geopolitical Intelligence Services. Retrieved from https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/china-arctic-russia/

[20] The Antarctic Treaty. (n.d.). The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. Retrieved from https://www.ats.aq/e/protocol.html

[21] Menchew, B., Mahle, L., Ghosh, P., & Sistla, M. (2024, December 10). Polar Infrastructure And Science For National Security: A Federal Agenda To Promote Glacier Resilience And Strengthen American Competitiveness. Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved from https://fas.org/pub lication/polar-infrastructure/

Introduction

RMC’s White Paper “China-Cuba Relations: Recent Developments and Implications for U.S. National Security” in June 2023 detailed the diplomatic relations and economic cooperation between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Cuba. As the paper highlights, China’s investments in Cuba’s economy and infrastructure, military cooperation between the two (2) nations, and joint intelligence efforts present potential national security implications for the U.S. Over the past 18 months, China has continued investment and influence activities in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The U.S. and its allies are concerned that the PRC is utilizing its economic leverage and relationships with nations in LAC to pursue geopolitical objectives, potentially expand its military capabilities, and bolster authoritarian regimes. The following White Paper highlights China’s growing influence in LAC by offering investment examples in Peru, Brazil, Mexico, and The Bahamas and associated U.S. national security concerns.

Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean

Since taking power in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping has launched significant infrastructure projects worldwide as part of China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI). Xi’s vision of this “New Silk Road,” a reference to the original Silk Road during the westward expansion of China’s Han Dynasty, includes developing a significant network of railways, energy pipelines, highways, and streamlined border crossings westward and southward. At the same time, China’s leader seeks to establish a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road by investing in port development worldwide to accommodate increasing maritime trade. Many scholars and analysts recognize that the BRI’s effort to bolster “connectivity and communication” with states in Eurasia and Africa is a primary component of China’s strategy to advance its economic and political ties with the rest of the world.^[1],[2]

A few years after launching the initiative, China’s President Xi referred to Latin America as a “natural extension of BRI.” LAC is home to valuable raw materials and agricultural goods, such as petroleum, soybeans, and lithium, and provides potential international shipping connectivity across the Pacific Ocean. As a result, the People’s Republic of China has increasingly engaged in trade, investment opportunities, and development projects with various nations in the region over the past 20 years. Furthermore, China looks to accrue soft power in LAC through educational and cultural exchanges and technological advancements.^{[1],[2],[3],[4]}

From 2003 to 2022, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled $187.5 billion in LAC. While data highlights the decreasing value of Chinese investment in LAC in recent years, Chinese interest in information and communication technology (ICT), renewable energy, and other emerging industries is increasing. In addition, China remains committed to infrastructure investments at ports throughout the region, including flooding LAC with crane exports. Chinese customs data reveals that crane exports to Latin America increased by 47% year-on-year from January to October 2024.^[5],[6],[7]

Experts studying malign Chinese influence worldwide remain concerned about Chinese technology corporations, such as Huawei and ZTE, exponentially capturing LAC’s telecommunications markets.  Huawei’s success in LAC is attributed to leveraging China’s foreign policy and diplomatic ties, the company’s quality customer service, and building access networks at low cost or free of charge in remote, mountainous, and rural areas where developing telecommunications infrastructure is expensive. While Huawei equipment cannot be sold or imported in the U.S. as of November 2022 due to national security concerns, the company now works with every large mobile and internet service provider in LAC. Also, the company is rapidly developing LAC’s 5G infrastructure. Experts fear that long-term dependencies on 5G developed by Huawei could amplify the CCP’s surveillance initiatives and control over the region’s communications, infrastructure, and sensitive technology. Though China’s economic interests are the primary driver for its activities in LAC, some analysts indicate that the PRC also seeks to expand its political influence in the region to counterattack the U.S.’s containment of China’s rise. In addition, China looks for governmental support in LAC for its positions on Taiwan, human rights, internet governance, and other affairs.^{[8],[9],[10],[11]}

Peru

In November 2024, China continued expanding its investments and influence in Peru. From 15 to 16 November, Chinese President Xi Jinping, U.S. President Joe Biden, and leaders worldwide attended the 2024 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Summit in Lima. During the two-day summit, China and Peru updated their free trade agreement (FTA), which was initially signed in 2009. While the two (2) countries engaged in almost $36 billion in bilateral trade last year, Peru’s foreign minister indicated that the updated agreement would increase commerce by at least 50% between the nations. Earlier in November, China and Peru also agreed to a memorandum of understanding to increase bilateral cooperation on food security, food product regulation, and education.^[12],[13]

China has significant mining and infrastructure projects in Peru, including the $3.6 billion Port of Chancay. The Chinese-funded megaport inaugurated on 15 November 2024 anticipates decreasing trans-Pacific transit times and logistics costs. Furthermore, the port is the first location in South America with the capacity to host carrier ships too large to fit through the Panama Canal. According to open-source reports, Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries supplies the port’s automated cargo cranes, while China-based shipping company Cosco will operate the port exclusively. Analysts highlight that the Port of Chancay’s location could significantly impact supply chains. For example, Peru is South America’s second-largest producer of raw copper, a critical resource for manufacturing electronic and clean-energy technologies. China has invested $11.4 billion in the Peruvian mining sector, where most resources are devoted to ensuring access to copper.^[12],[14]

Some security experts, including General Laura Richardson, the former Commander of U.S. Southern Command, warn that the Port of Chancay presents potential security risks to the Homeland. According to General Richardson, the port could be a dual-use facility for China’s Navy. While China states the project is motivated by commercial interests, the U.S. remains concerned that the port could enhance China’s military capabilities due to its size, depth, and strategic location.^[14],[15]

Brazil

In November 2024, China and Brazil took significant steps in strengthening economic ties. Following the G20 Leaders’ Summit hosted in Brazil, that country’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva hosted Xi Jinping for a state visit. On 20 November, China and Brazil signed 37 agreements on trade, technology, and the environment. While Brazil declined to join China’s BRI, Brazil “recognized the relevance” of the BRI in one (1) of the agreements and looks to pursue smaller bilateral deals with China. The package of 37 agreements also included a deal between China Development Bank and Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). China Development Bank loaned BNDES an equivalent of $690 million USD (¥5 billion) to support a variety of projects and expand alternatives to the U.S. dollar.^{[12],[16],[17]}

The idea of reducing reliance on the American dollar is also a priority of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) economic coalition. In 2015, the BRICS coalition established the New Development Bank. The newly-founded bank represents an alternative to Western-backed initiatives such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. During President Lula’s visit to China in April 2023, former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff was sworn in as head of the New Development Bank. According to Rousseff, the New Development Bank has allocated about $6.1 billion to Brazil since its inception to December 2023, financing 21 projects.^{[18],[19],[20]}

The relationship between China and Brazil is primarily economic, although the two (2) nations have engaged in various military cooperation agreements since mid-2000. Chinese companies have invested about $71 billion in Brazil from 2007 to 2023, more than any other nation in Latin America. In addition to concerns surrounding China’s increasing economic presence, open-source research analysis highlights potential risks associated with China’s satellite cooperation with Brazil. From 1984 to 2022, the two (2) nations signed 24 bilateral diplomatic agreements formalizing cooperation in the satellite sector. Furthermore, since China launched the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite program’s first collaboratively developed satellite in 1999, the two (2) countries have worked together to launch six (6) satellites and seek to launch a seventh in early 2025. According to some U.S. national security experts, space facilities accessible to China in the region could potentially be utilized to intercept data transmitted by Western satellites. Furthermore, space facilities in the Western Hemisphere could potentially offer China telemetry or communication in support of kinetic attacks.^{[21],[22],[23]}

Mexico

On 14 February 1972, Mexico and China established diplomatic and trade relations. Chinese direct investment in Mexico began in the late 1990s and accelerated in the 2010s as part of China’s global economic strategy. China targets Mexico’s manufacturing sector, capitalizing on the nation’s proximity to the U.S., skilled labor, and tariff-free access to North American markets through the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). China also benefits from Mexico’s strategic position along key North American trade routes. However, many Mexican citizens view the PRC as a competitor, since both China and Mexico are established manufacturing exporters. Therefore, Mexico has not signed China’s BRI and is not a participant in the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). However, China’s investments in Mexico, particularly in infrastructure and manufacturing, align with some BRI goals. These investments bolster Chinese companies’ supply chain resilience, reduce costs, and mitigate geopolitical risks.^{[24],[25],[26],[27],[28]}

Some experts indicate that China’s growing economic influence in Mexico poses significant challenges to U.S. regional dominance, domestic manufacturing resilience, and economic security. For example, the proximity of Chinese-funded manufacturing operations to the U.S., particularly in industries such as computer equipment and electronics, raises critical national security risks. Open-source reports highlight that factories producing semiconductors or telecommunications components near the U.S. border could enable covert surveillance, data theft, or the insertion of compromised technology into critical infrastructure. These fears are amplified when such operations involve components used in U.S. defense systems, cloud computing, or smart technologies integral to national infrastructure. Furthermore, integrating Chinese companies into North American supply chains risks creating dependencies that Beijing could exploit during geopolitical conflicts, disrupting essential goods or imposing economic leverage. China’s strategic investments in Mexico may also diminish the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions and trade policies by providing Beijing with alternative economic footholds in the region.^{[29],[30],[31]}

The Bahamas

China and The Bahamas established formal relations on 23 May 1997. Trade between China and The Bahamas, plus five (5) other Caribbean countries, has grown steadily over the past few decades. In 2022, China’s exports to The Bahamas totaled approximately $405 million, whereas Bahamian exports to China amounted to around $9 million. In addition, China has significantly invested in Bahamian infrastructure over the past 15 years, including a $30 million grant to develop a national stadium, preferential loans to construct a $3 billion megaport at Freeport, and $40 million to create a port off the island of Abaco. On 28 March 2024, the Bahamian Prime Minister endorsed China’s Global Development Initiative and reaffirmed the Bahamas’ commitment to the “One-China” policy.^{[32],[33],[34]}

In 2021, the USNORTHCOM Commander testified before the U.S. Senate about concerns regarding China’s growing influence in the Caribbean, particularly in The Bahamas, as part of its broader strategy to undermine U.S. dominance. For example, while China’s investments have helped to bolster local economic recovery from Hurricane Dorian and the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. officials warn that The Bahamas offers China a strategic foothold near critical U.S. infrastructure. In addition, Huawei has established a dominant presence in The Bahamas’ telecommunications market. In 2014, Bahamas Telecommunications Company (BTC) partnered with Huawei to upgrade the nation’s network to 4G LTE. Similarly, BTC’s main competitor, Aliv, relies heavily on Huawei for its infrastructure. Concerns about Huawei’s near monopoly in The Bahamas gained international attention in 2020, as an open-source report revealed evidence that Huawei equipment supplied to BTC had been used for cyberespionage targeting U.S. citizens.^{[35],[36],[37],[38],[39]}

Conclusion

China is rapidly expanding its economic and political influence in LAC by serving as South America’s top trading partner and a significant foreign direct investment and lending provider in essential industries. As highlighted above, many American security experts remain concerned that Chinese investments in LAC’s critical infrastructure, such as deep-water ports and space facilities, pose potential national security threats to the U.S. As the PRC continues investing in critical infrastructure sectors in the region, some American analysts argue that the United States Congress, in coordination with the Executive Branch, should explore innovative trade, industrial, and development policies that bolster economic cooperation, address supply chain concerns, and enhance U.S. financial and nonfinancial assistance to LAC countries.^[40],[41]

[1] Lei, Y. (2024, October 23). China–Latin America relations in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. Wiley. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dpr.12814.

[2] McBride, J., Berman, N., and Chatzky, A. (2023, February 2). China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.

[3] U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (2021). China’s Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_1_Section_2–Chinas_Influence_in_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf.

[4] Congressional Research Service. (2023, June 23). China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10982.

[5] Pettus, E. L. (2023, October 5). The Expanding Leverage of the People’s Republic of China in Latin America: Implications for US National Security and Global Order. Indo-Pacific Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3540614/the-expanding-leverage-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-in-latin-america-implic/.

[6] Myers, M., Melguizo, A., and Wang, Y. (2024, January). Emerging Trends in Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Dialogue. Retrieved from https://thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Emerging-Trends-in-Chinese-Foreign-Direct-Investment-in-LAC-4.pdf.

[7] The Latin American Post Staff. (2024, December 02). China Expands Maritime Influence Across Latin America. Retrieved from https://latinamericanpost.com/business-and-finance/china-expands-maritime-influence-across-latin-america/.

[8] Delgado, J. (2023, March 07). China, 5G, and the Security Threat in Latin America. Diálogo. Retrieved from https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-5g-and-the-security-threat-in-latin-america/.

[9] Myers, M. (2023, August 25). China’s Increasing Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-increasing-involvement-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.

[10] Alvarado, P. D. (2024, April). Huawei’s Expansion in Latin America and the Caribbean: Views from the Region. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/sr-529_huaweis-expansion-latin-america-caribbean-views-region.pdf.

[11] Berg, R.C. (2024, February 12). China and Russia engage Latin America and the Caribbean differently. Both threaten US interests. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/china-and-russia-engage-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-differently-both-threaten-us-interests/.

[12] Holmes, S., and Huesa, J. (2024, November 26). China in Latin America: November 2024. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/article/china-latin-america-november-2024.

[13] Aquino, M. (2024, November 11). Exclusive: Peru and China to sign strengthened free-trade agreement in Xi’s APEC visit. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/peru-china-sign-strengthened-free-trade-agreement-xis-apec-visit-2024-11-08/.

[14] Stepherd, C., and Li, L. (2024, November 14). China opens huge port in Peru to extend its reach in Latin America. Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/theaters/americas/2024-11-14/china-peru-port-latin-america-foothold-warship-15849859.html.

[15] Stott, M. (2024, November 4). Chinese warships could use Peru’s big new port, US general warns. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/f6589d13-6014-47d0-8cc5-e98a0b7ad0bc.

[16] Hughes, E. (2024, November 20). Brazil’s Lula welcomes China’s Xi for state visit as ties between countries strengthen. AP. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/brazil-china-xi-lula-b979f2f78530c917b37c47f97f24d96a.

[17] Paraguassu, L. (2024, November 20). Brazil development bank gets $690 million loan from China. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/brazil-development-bank-gets-690-million-loan-china-2024-11-20/.

[18] Associated Press. (2023, April 14). China’s Xi and Brazil’s Lula meet in Beijing to boost ties. NBC News. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-xi-jinping-brazil-lula-beijing-meeting-trading-partners-economy-rcna79732.

[19] Ferragamo, M. (2024, December 12). What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding#chapter-title-0-2.

[20] New Development Bank. (2023, December 8). Brazil Receives USD 1.7 Billion from New Development Bank. Retrieved from https://www.ndb.int/news/brazil-receives-usd-1-7-billion-from-new-development-bank/.

[21] Soliz de Stange, A. (2023, June 14). China and Brazil’s Cooperation in the Satellite Sector: Implications for the United States? Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3428204/china-and-brazils-cooperation-in-the-satellite-sector-implications-for-the-unit/.

[22] Chivvis, C.S. and Geaghan-Beinerm, B. (2023, December 13). Brazil in the Emerging World Order. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/brazil-in-the-emerging-world-order?lang=en.

[23] Ellis, R. E. (2024, February 16). China-Latin America Space Cooperation: An Overview. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/china-latin-america-space-cooperation-an-overview/.

[24] French, H.W. (2024, February 9). Mexico Is America’s Answer to China’s Belt and Road. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/09/united-states-mexico-immigration-border-china-trade-bri/.

[25] Ellis, R.E. (2023, August 11). Mexico’s Engagement with China and Choices for its Future. US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3495410/mexicos-engagement-with-china-and-choices-for-its-future/.

[26] Reuters. (2023, December 5). China and Mexico officials vow to strengthen cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/china-mexico-officials-vow-strengthen-cooperation-2023-12-05/.

[27] Goodman, P.S. (2023, June 20). Why Chinese Companies Are Investing Billions in Mexico. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/03/business/china-mexico-trade.html.

[28] Ezrarti, M. (2024, October 26). Mexico Also Wants To Decouple From China. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2024/10/26/mexico-also-wants-to-decouple-from-china/.

[29] Kuttner, R. (2022, February 1). China: Epicenter of the Supply Chain Crisis. The American Prospect. Retrieved from https://prospect.org/economy/china-epicenter-of-the-supply-chain-crisis/.

[30] Escobado, R. (2024, December 18). U.S. begins to retaliate against China over hack of telecom networks. CBS News. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-retaliates-against-china-hack-telecom-networks/.

[31] Industrial Cyber. (2024, October 7). Chinese cyberattack reportedly compromised US broadband providers, possibly accessing federal court data. Retrieved from https://industrialcyber.co/threats-attacks/chinese-cyberattack-reportedly-compromised-us-broadband-providers-possibly-accessing-federal-court-data/.

[32] The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). (2024, October). Bilateral Trade Profile: Chain & the Bahamas. Retrieved by https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/bhs.

[33] Griffin, P. J., and Danvers, W. (2021, November 15). A strategic challenge for the US: China and The Bahamas. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/581017-a-strategic-challenge-for-the-us-china-and-the-bahamas/.

[34] Office of The Prime Minister, Commonwealth of The Bahamas. (2024, April 23). Prime Minister Philip Davis’s Remarks for the Official Visit of His Excellency Mao Weiming, Governor of Hunan Province, People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from https://opm.gov.bs/prime-minister-davis-governor-mao-weiming-official-visit-remarks/.

[35] Ward, J. (2023, October 11). US general warns of China’s plan for influence in Bahamas, region. The Nassau Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.thenassauguardian.com/home/us-general-warns-of-china-s-plan-for-influence-in-bahamas-region/article_af712826-0100-530f-8915-153a8a851903.html.

[36] Brown, O. (2024, August 10). China’s Ambassador Strengthening Ties Between The Bahamas And China. Bahamas Chronicle. Retrieved from https://bahamaschronicle.com/chinas-ambassador-strengthening-ties-between-the-bahamas-and-china/.

[37] The Nassau Guardian. (2023, October 12). A strategic challenge for the US: China and The Bahamas. Retrieved from https://www.thenassauguardian.com/opinion/a-strategic-challenge-for-the-us-china-and-the-bahamas/article_5077ad78-a3c0-5a7b-936f-f4bf279b5273.html

[38] Foreign Affairs Committee. (2022, November 14). China Regional Snapshot: The Caribbean. Retrieved from https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-snapshot-project-the-caribbean/#:~:text=China%20is%20a%20member%20of,Tobago%2C%20Guyana%2C%20and%20Suriname.

[39] Ellis, R.E. (2023, August 2). PRC Engagement in The Bahamas. US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3495418/prc-engagement-in-the-bahamas/.

[40] Roy, D. (2023, June 15). China’s Growing Influence in Latin America. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri.

[41] Zhang, P. (2024, May). Pepe Zhang provides testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/testimony/pepe-zhang-provides-testimony-to-the-us-china-economic-and-security-review-commission/.

Introduction

In February 2024, RMC’s White Paper “Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) and the Force Protection Threat to DoD” outlined the potential uses, characteristics, and capabilities of sUAS. As highlighted in the paper, the Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledges that an adversary employing sUAS could challenge American military advantage and degrade the Joint Force’s freedom of maneuver across multiple domains. At the same time, civilians and private organizations use drones for filmmaking, law enforcement, utility inspections, emergency response, agriculture, and delivery. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), forecasts highlight the possibilities for as many as 1.92 million small recreational UAS units by 2028.^[1],[2],[3]

Over the past decade, Chinese drone companies, especially Da Jiang Innovations (DJI), have dominated the global commercial UAS market. While Shenzhen-based DJI controls a majority of the sUAS market share throughout the U.S. and the world, the “DoD’s Statement on DJI Systems” explicitly indicates that DJI poses “potential threats to national security.” The following white paper will outline DJI’s popularity in the drone market, examples of state and non-state actors employing DJI sUAS, potential security concerns associated with the company, and restrictions and legislation addressing Chinese-manufactured drones.^[4]

DJI’s Founding and Evolution

In 2006, Frank Wang founded DJI as a student at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology to develop a flying toy that would not crash most of the time. While DJI released its first quadcopters in 2011, its introduction of the first Phantom drone in 2013 revolutionized the market by providing an inexpensive model with straightforward controls. In 2016, DJI offered new imaging and flight capabilities in the Mavic Pro. The drone’s efficient design enabled consumers to transport the units easily and proved essential for future improvements to DJI’s designs and functionality. Furthermore, in 2018, the Mavic Air’s release introduced a lightweight model with new preprogrammed flight modes, autonomous operation, and unique features. Following these aerial innovations, DJI debuted its flagship Mavic 2 Pro and Zoom to provide high-end camera options, safety features, and simple operating and flying mechanisms. DJI Mavic 3’s release in 2022 included significant capability improvements, including approximately 45 minutes of flight time, omnidirectional obstacle sensing, and a transmission range of 15 km. The cost-to-flight ratio between the DJI Phantom and DJI Mavic 3 models, released almost 10 years apart, increased by 17.5%.^{[5],[6],[7],[8],[9]}

Figure 1 illustrates the DJI Mavic 3 Pro’s estimated transmission range within the setting of Washington, D.C.

Figure 1
DJI Mavic 3 Pro: Transmission Ranges to and from the Washington Monument

These developments and further innovations helped DJI capture approximately 77% of the American hobby drone market and 90% of the global commercial drone service provider market, according to estimates from 2020. More recent estimates concur that DJI continues to control most of the market. DJI drones also have been widely used by American public-safety agencies. According to open-source reports released in 2023, DJI drones comprised a majority of sUAS units registered by local governments and police departments in New Jersey and systems used for official operation in the State of New York. Furthermore, before a recent ban was initiated in Florida, almost half of the drones registered by state and local governments and police departments there were manufactured by DJI. In addition, security forces and government agencies of allies of the U.S. rely on DJI systems. For example, as of 2023, DJI products comprise more than two-thirds of drones operated by police forces in the United Kingdom.^[9],[10]

Employment of DJI Drones

DJI drones used in the Russian-Ukraine conflict highlight the platform’s capabilities. Small recreational UAS models like the DJI Mavic quadcopter have assisted both armies in reconnaissance missions and delivering bombs. For example, in March 2023, Ukraine obtained 300 DJI Mavic 3T UAVs through its “Army of Drones” program. According to a Ukrainian press release, each aerial vehicle included a thermal sensor and a high-powered zoom camera that allows an operator to conduct reconnaissance, artillery, and night operations. An unclassified report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence also revealed that China had shipped more than $12 million in drones and components to Russia as of March 2023. While DJI announced in 2022 that it would suspend all sales in Ukraine and Russia, a study of at least 1,000 cases of drones used for reconnaissance and attacks in the conflict from March 2022 to March 2023 found that DJI platforms accounted for more than half of identifiable units.^{[11],[12],[13],[14],[15],[16],[17]}

Open-source reporting also reveals the use of DJI drones in the Israel-Hamas conflict. Expert analysis of the 07 October 2023 attack indicates that Hamas employed modified commercial quadcopter drones, including aerial vehicles manufactured by DJI, to drop explosives onto Israel’s observation towers. These attacks successfully disrupted sensors, communications, and weapons systems along the border of Gaza. Footage from one of the attacks shows an armed DJI quadcopter drone taking out an Israeli Merkava tank. The IDF has also used DJI platforms for their operations, including the DJI Avata, to explore tunnels constructed by Hamas.^{[18],[19],[20],[21],[22]}

Finally, analysis from the assassination attempt of former President Trump in Butler, PA, on 13 July 2024 indicates that the gunman surveyed the area using a DJI drone. Roughly two (2) hours before the rally, the 20-year-old gunman flew the drone about 200 yards from the stage for approximately 11 minutes. Investigators also found the drone in the shooter’s car after the attempt on the former president’s life.^[23],[24]

Security Concerns and Bans on DJI Drones

In 2015, China initiated its “Made in China 2025” strategic plan, which is a ten-year effort to invest in key industries and maintain its global leadership and market dominance. China has promoted sophisticated market mechanisms and minimized red tape to initiate rapid growth as part of this effort. Furthermore, the PRC’s “Military-Civil Fusion” and “The National Security Law of the PRC” indicate that citizens and private organizations in China are required to assist the government and intelligence services with security issues. The Chinese Community Party remains committed to these strategies and laws within the commercial drone industry, directing companies to invest significantly in drones and components, develop domestic supply chains, and acquire and transfer western technology. For example, open-source reports reveal that at least four (4) Chinese investment companies with close ties to the PRC are investors in DJI. These investors include the China Chengtong Holdings Group, Shanghai Venture Capital Guidance Fund, Guangdong Hengjian Investment Holding, and the State Development & Investment Corporation. With the PRC’s strong backing of its drone industry over the past decade, DJI and other Chinese companies have been able to flood the worldwide market with lower-cost drones that have more advanced capabilities.^{[25],[8],[26]}

Figure 2 illustrates China’s extensive global UAS exports in 2023.

Figure 2
Chinese UAS Exports and Imports, 2023^[27]

Given the PRC’s expanded control of companies and data within China, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a “Cybersecurity Guidance” document in January 2024 addressing Chinese-manufactured UAS. According to CISA and the FBI, “the use of Chinese-manufactured UAS in critical infrastructure operations risks exposing sensitive information to PRC authorities, jeopardizing U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.” The document highlights that the many points of connections associated with UAS can present exploitation opportunities. For example, updates managed by Chinese entities can lead to unknown data collection and transmission capabilities without the owner’s knowledge.^[28]

On 24 May 2017, the Department of the Navy released an internal memo citing the operational risks of using the “DJI Family of Products.” According to the memo (released under the Freedom of Information Act), DJI systems have potential cyber vulnerabilities, particularly involving the data link between the aircraft and the ground station. On 02 August 2017, the U.S. Army issued a memo ordering all personnel to stop using DJI drones due to cyber vulnerabilities. In June 2019, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2020, which prohibits the operation or procurement of UAS manufactured in a “covered foreign country” (defined as China by Public Law 116-92) by the DoD for military activities and the Department of Energy for defense activities. In addition, the Department of Commerce added DJI to its Entity List on 21 December 2020, terminating DJI’s access to American technology, suppliers, and markets.^{[29],[30],[31]}

In January 2021, Executive Order 13981 and the passing of Senate Bill 73 prohibited the federal government from procuring or using UAS models manufactured or assembled by entities based in China or subject to influence or control by the PRC. Two (2) years later, the U.S. Senate passed a similar bill, the American Secure Drone Act of 2023, which was incorporated into the NDAA for FY2024. A few states also have banned DJI products, including Florida and Mississippi. Mississippi’s Senate Bill 2853, passed in 2023, requires all sUAS units acquired by the state or any agency or political subdivision to be purchased from a manufacturing company incorporated and headquartered in the U.S.^{[32],[33],[34]}

Countering Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Drones Act Overview

In February 2022, Congresswoman Elise Stefanik (R-NY) introduced the “Countering CCP Drones Act,” which passed the House of Representatives on 09 September 2024. The bill requires telecommunications and video surveillance equipment or services produced by DJI to be included on a “list of communications equipment or services determined by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security.” Other companies on the “Covered List” include Huawei Technologies Company, ZTE Corporation, and Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company. Proponents of the bill cite national security concerns and indicate that banning DJI drones from operating on American communications infrastructure will foster the growth of a competitive domestic drone industry. The Countering CCP Drones Act now sits with the Senate, with some predicting the Senate version of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) could incorporate the bill.^{[35],[36],[37]}

While the Countering CCP Drones Act has earned bipartisan support, many companies and industry representatives oppose the bill. Critics claim banning DJI drones could limit commercial options and increase costs for companies and consumers. They also assert that a ban on DJI drones could disrupt the operations of law enforcement agencies, first responders, and farmers who rely on the company’s products. DJI states that lawmakers therein “reference inaccurate and unsubstantiated allegations regarding DJI’s operations” and denies that their drones “collect flight logs, photos, or video by default.” DJI continues to fight against market restrictions by sponsoring and maintaining the Drone Advocacy Alliance website.^[35],[38]

Ongoing Developments

In 2022, the DoD included DJI on its list of “Chinese military companies” (CMC) operating directly or indirectly in the U.S. in accordance with the statutory requirement of Section 1260H of the NDAA for FY2021. On 18 October 2024, a former U.S. Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the DoD on behalf of DJI for including the company. In the lawsuit, DJI argues that it is “neither owned nor controlled by the Chinese military.” DJI claims that it has “lost business deals, been stigmatized as a national security threat, and been banned from contracting with multiple federal government agencies” due to the DoD’s decision. This lawsuit shortly follows open-source media reports that DJI informed distributors that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection is citing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) to withhold some sUAS units from being imported. The UFLPA prohibits importation of goods produced entirely or partly in the Xinjiang region in response to what the U.S. government details as forced labor abuses directed at Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups.^[39],[40]

Conclusion

In the “Cybersecurity Guidance” referenced above, CISA and the FBI encourage public and private sector organizations to reference the DoD’s Blue UAS Cleared List for models compliant with federal cybersecurity policies. After the FY2020 NDAA was signed into law, in which section 848 prohibited specific components from covered countries, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) started the Blue UAS initiative in August 2020. Blue UAS maintains and includes a list of policy-approved commercial UAS models for DoD and government users that are validated by the DIU as “cyber-secure” and “safe to fly.”  As of May 2024, the Blue UAS Cleared List includes at least 26 platforms manufactured by 14 different entities. A platform added to the list requires a DoD customer to sponsor its inclusion or has the capability to meet a DoD customer’s needs when the DIU initiates a “Commercial Solutions Opening.” As DJI and other Chinese drone companies encounter increasing market restrictions within the U.S., public and private entities could consult the DIU’s evolving Blue UAS Cleared List to meet their commercial drone needs.^[41]

[1] Shaikh, S., Karako, T., and McLoughlin, M. (2023, November). Countering Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems: Air Defense by and for the Joint Force. CSIS. Retrieved from https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-11/231114_Shaikh_Countering_sUAS.pdf?VersionId= qJtlCY3Z071CXL0Dt8_wD5ul9UIdmUFj.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense. (2021, January). Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/07/2002561080/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-COUNTER-SMALL-UNMANNED-AIRCRAFT-SYSTEMS-STRATEGY.PDF.

[3] FAA. (n.d). Emerging Aviation Entrants: Unmanned Aircraft System and Advanced Air Mobility. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/unmanned_ aircraft_systems.pdf.

[4] U.S. Department of Defense. (2021). Department Statement on DJI Systems. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2706082/department-statement-on-dji-systems/.

[5] Santo, B. (2018, December 27). The Consumer Electronics Hall of Fame: DJI Phantom Drone. IEEE Spectrum. Retrieved from https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-consumer-electronics-hall-of-fame-dji-phantom-drone.

[6] Chiu, Karen. (2018, October 2). The story of drone pioneer DJI. SCMP. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/abacus/who-what/what/article/3028241/story-drone-pioneer-dji.

[7] Vox Creative. (2020, March 23). The evolution of the DJI Mavic Series, from an ambitious idea to the world’s flagship drone to a tool for crisis. The Verge. Retrieved from https://www.theverge.com/ ad/21167685/dji-mavic-drone-series-evolution.

[8] Kroenig, M., and Bayoumi, I. (2024, June 27). A Global Strategy to Secure UAS Supply Chains. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-global-strategy-to-secure-uas-supply-chains/.

[9] AUVSI. (2024, September). Whitepaper: AUVSI Partnership for Drone Competitiveness. Partnership for Drone Competitiveness. Retrieved from https://www.auvsi.org/sites/default/files/AUVSI-Partnership-for-Drone-Competitiveness-White-Paper.pdf.

[10] Brewster, T. (2023, June). US States Fly Thousands Of Chinese Drones Across the East Coast. Marco Rubio is Furious. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/ 2023/06/01/american-states-fly-thousands-of-chinese-drones-across-east-coast/.

[11] Myre, G. (2023, March 28). A Chinese drone for hobbyists plays a crucial role in the Russia-Ukraine war. NPR. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2023/03/21/1164977056/a-chinese-drone-for-hobbyists-plays-a-crucial-role-in-the-russia-ukraine-war.

[12] Zafra, M., Hunder, M., Rao, A., & Kiyada, S. (2024, March 26). How Drone Combat In Ukraine Is Changing Warfare. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/.

[13] Bertrand, N. (2023, July 27). US intel report details increasing importance of Chinese technology to Russia’s war in Ukraine. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/27/politics/us-intelligence-report-russia-china-ukraine/index.html.

[14] Ross. P.E. (2023, May 17). Budget Drones in Ukraine Are Redefining Warfare. Spectrum. Retrieved from https://spectrum.ieee.org/drone-warfare-ukraine.

[15] Luzin, P. (2023, November 23).  Russian Military Drones: Past, Present, and Future of the UAV Industry. FPRI. Retrieved from https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/11/russian-military-drones-past-present-and-future-of-the-uav-industry/

[16] Crumley, B. (2024, March 31). Ukraine sends 300 DJI Mavic 3T drones to battle Russians ahead of expected offensive. Drone DJ. Retrieved from https://dronedj.com/2023/03/31/ukraine-sends-300-dji-mavic-3t-drones-to-battle-russians-ahead-of-expected-offensive/.

[17] Vallance, C. (2022, April 27). Chinese drone firm DJI pauses operations in Russia and Ukraine. BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-61179022.

[18] Kaniewski, D. (2023, October 20). Hamas: Learning about drone warfare from the war in Ukraine. DW. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/hamas-learning-about-drone-warfare-from-the-war-in-ukraine/a-67169578.

[19] Byman, D., McCabe, R., Palmer, A., Doxsee C., Holtz, M., and Duff, D. (2023, December 19). Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Data. CSIS. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/ analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data.

[20] Armitage, R. (2023, November 05). The skies over Gaza are abuzz with drones. Some are Israeli, some are American, and some are flying bombs made by Hamas. ABC. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-06/drones-flying-over-and-within-gaza/103067280.

[21] Jankowicz, M. (2023, October 10). How Hamas likely used rudimentary drones to ‘blind and deafen’ Israel’s border and pave the way for its onslaught. Business Insider. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/hamas-drones-take-out-comms-towers-ambush-israel-2023-10.

[22] Kesteloo, H. (2023, November 20). DJI Avata Drones: A New Tool in IDF Military Operations. Drone XL. Retrieved from https://dronexl.co/2023/11/20/dji-avata-drones-idf-military-operations/.

[23] Kosnar, M., & Dilanian, K. (2024, July 19). Trump shooter flew drone over venue hours before attempted assassination, source says. NBC News. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-shooter-flew-drone-venue-hours-attempted-assassination-source-sa-rcna162817.

[24] Lybrand, H., Rabinowitz, H., and Cole, D. (2024, July 24). Takeaways from FBI testimony: Trump shooter searched details of JFK assassination and flew drone near rally site. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/24/politics/fbi-wray-house-hearing-trump-shooting/index.html.

[25] PRC State Council. (2022, March 08). Notice of the State Council on the Publication of “Made in China 2025.” Center for Security and Emerging Technology. Retrieved from https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0432_made_in_china_2025_EN.pdf.

[26] Cadell, C. (2022, February 1). Drone Company DJI Obscured Ties to Chinese State Funding, Documents Show. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2706082/department-statement-on-dji-systems/.

[27] UN Comtrade Database. (n.d). Trade Data. Retrieved from https://comtradeplus.un.org/ TradeFlow.

[28] CISA and FBI. (2024, January). Cybersecurity Guidance: Chinese-Manufactured UAS. Retrieved from https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/Cybersecurity%20Guidance%20Chinese-Manufactured%20UAS.pdf.

[29] National Security Archive. (n.d.). Department of the Navy Memorandum raised possibility of cyber vulnerabilities, susceptibility to electromagnetic interference. National Security Archive. Retrieved from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/cyber-vault/2019-12-16/military-concerns-over-chinese-dji-drones.

[30] U.S. Congress. (2019, December 20). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/.

[31] National Archives. (2020). Addition of Entities to the Entity List, Revision of Entry on the Entity List, and Removal of Entities From the Entity List. Retrieved from https://www.federalregister.gov/ documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-entry-on-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-entities.

[32] U.S. Congress. (2021). S.73 – American Security Drone Act of 2021. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/73/text.

[33] National Archives. (2021). S.73 – American Security Drone Act of 2021. Retrieved from https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/22/2021-01646/protecting-the-united-states-from-certain-unmanned-aircraft-systems.

[34] Mississippi Legislature. (2023). Mississippi Senate Bill 2853. Retrieved from https://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2023/html/SB/2800-2899/SB2853IN.htm

[35] Govtrack.us. (n.d.). H.R. 2864: Countering CCP Drones Act. Retrieved from https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/118/hr2864/text.

[36] Federal Communications Commission. (2024, September). List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act. Retrieved from https://www.fcc.gov/ supplychain/coveredlist.

[37] Howe, S. (2024, September 24). Who’s Opposed to the Proposed DJI Ban? Commercial UAV News. Retrieved from https://www.commercialuavnews.com/who-s-opposed-to-the-proposed-dji-ban.

[38] DJI ViewPoints Team. (2024, March 1). The Countering CCP Drones Act (An Attempt To Ban DJI). Retrieved from https://viewpoints.dji.com/blog/get-the-facts-countering-ccp-drones-act.

[39] Shepardson, D. (2024, October 21). Drone Maker DJI Sues Pentagon Over Chinese Military Listing. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/legal/chinese-dronemaker-dji-sues-pentagon-over-chinese-military-listing-2024-10-19/

[40] Martina, M., and Shepardson, D. (2024, October 16). US Customs halts some drone imports from Chinese manufacturer DJI, company says. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-customs-halting-some-drone-imports-chinese-manufacturer-dji-company-says-2024-10-16/.

[41] Defense Innovation Unit. (2024, May). About Blue UAS. Retrieved from https://www.diu.mil/blue-uas.

Introduction

This white paper is the second of RMC’s 2024 Election Series focused on potential threats to this election cycle. This paper will provide detailed information on domestic threats to the 2024 elections. Threat actors from the extreme left- and right-wing of the American political spectrum are likely to protest, create civil disturbances, and commit acts of political violence as the November elections approach. Misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation on both sides serve to fuel the heated environment. This paper is not an all-inclusive assessment of potential threats but is intended to highlight the potential for election related protests, civil disturbances, domestic terrorism, and political violence.

 Current Domestic Extremism Environment in the U.S.

The domestic extremism environment in the U.S. is marked by a range of ideologically-driven groups and individuals who pose various threat levels. These groups and individuals often have religious, racial, or ethnic causes that push them to acts of violence. Some actors use the Constitutional right to free speech, expression, and assembly to incite conflict and later justify their actions. Furthermore, since the incident at the U.S. Capitol Building on 06 January 2021, domestic extremists have evolved and adapted their strategies. Several groups have been trying to affect changes at the local level, including hosting conferences, and challenging local school district policies. They hope to embed their concerns into mainstream conservative discourse with minimal scrutiny. This has allowed them to initiate conflicts at the local level and made it more difficult for law enforcement to mitigate future potential incidents.^[1],[2]

The Founding Fathers intended for the American system of government to be slow and deliberate, with checks and balances. However, society promotes an increasingly fast pace via technology and modern conveniences. This leads to an expectation that the federal government can operate at the same pace and immediately change with the times. This leads to frustration on both ends of the political spectrum. The ease of spreading extremist ideologies has intensified political and social divisions, making it more difficult for diverse groups to find common ground. This can lead to gridlock in political institutions and exacerbate conflicts over policy and governance.^[1],[3],[4]

As the presidential election approaches, it is likely that the presence of violent extremists will increase, as evidenced by the 13 July 2024 assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump at a campaign rally. Domestic extremist groups are relatively easy to monitor as they often publish their ideologies and recruit new members online. Lone actors are more difficult to identify and target because they often lack the interactions and indicators that law enforcement uses to investigate threat groups. Because they carry out attacks by themselves, it is much more difficult to disrupt their plans. The threats posed by groups and individuals on both sides of the political spectrum must be understood to properly defend against them while still protecting and upholding Constitutional rights.^[1],[5]

Issues Driving Political Discourse in the 2024 Election

The issues deepening the political division between left- and right-wing groups are diverse. Abortion, crime, border security, foreign policy, and election integrity all have the potential to spark unrest and violence. Both sides have deep-seated beliefs and are unlikely to find middle ground on these issues.^[6]

The Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturned Roe v. Wade and sent the legality of abortion back to the states. Since then, conservative states have significantly limited access to the procedure, ranging from total bans, some of which include exclusions (for rape, incest, and saving the life of the mother), to bans after certain timeframes, usually between six (6) and 15 weeks of pregnancy. More liberal states still allow access to abortion up to 24 weeks of pregnancy while others allow abortions to take place until birth. These varied polices, while welcomed within their states, continue to drive a broader national argument.^[7],[8],[9]

The debate surrounding border security includes questions about how to humanely treat migrants unlawfully entering the country. The political left generally believes that they should be welcomed and supported, including a path to citizenship and, in some jurisdictions, the right to vote. The right has raised concerns over the economic impact and the idea tacitly rewarding those who have broken the law. The idea of “America First” opposes taking care of non-citizens before fixing domestic issues like the national debt, education, veteran’s issues, and homelessness.^[7],[8]

Closely related to the border security issues is crime. The political right points to rising crime rates, particularly in large cities, which it blames on liberal policies. This often includes emphasizing violence committed by illegal immigrants against American citizens. The political left claims that crime rates are not increasing and, therefore, wants to deemphasize the issue. In reality, crime reporting to the U.S. Department of Justice has been incomplete since 2020, with many jurisdictions choosing not to furnish yearly statistics. Both sides of the political aisle have been accused of selectively emphasizing data that supports their arguments.^[7],[8]

Foreign policy, particularly support for the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, also creates division. The right, historically supportive of overseas military intervention, questions the cost and if American interests are truly at stake. The left, historically critical of such intervention, is now supporting Ukraine’s fight against Russia, while remaining divided on Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza. The Jewish community in the U.S. has historically supported the Democratic party. However, left-wing protestors supporting Palestinian issues (and even outright championing Hamas) also generally align themselves with the Democratic party. This dichotomy in an election year complicates the issue on the left. The two (2) major political parties’ evolution here has both created internal division and enflamed tensions across the aisle.^[7],[8]

Election integrity is another issue exacerbating the political divide in America. Lawsuits regarding election integrity have been filed nationwide by both sides of the political spectrum. Texas recently reported removing over one (1) million voters from their rolls in the last three (3) years. Most were deceased voters, and the rest were removed for not being current residents, including approximately 1,900 illegal immigrants. Michigan, on the other hand, recently passed a bill limiting the ability to contest election results and initiate recounts post-election. Multiple investigations and lawsuits regarding electronic voting machines, ballot harvesting, irregularities, and claims of election fraud during the 2020 election have produced mixed results. As a result of these issues, the political right tends to be highly suspicious of the different voting systems and laws that govern each states’ elections while the political left is tends to be supportive of current voting systems. The Constitution holds that each state has authority over election administration.^[7],[8]

Left-Wing Threat Actors

The most significant left-wing threat actors in the U.S. include groups and movements motivated by anti-capitalist, anarchist, and communist or socialist ideologies. Among the most prominent in recent years is Antifa, a loosely organized movement that opposes what it deems to be fascism, white supremacy, and/or far-right ideologies, often using violence (“direct action”) to further its goals. Although not a centralized group, Antifa cells and their members have been involved in street-level confrontations, property damage, and counterprotests, particularly during periods of heightened political tension.  Black Lives Matter (BLM) is primarily a social and political movement, with multiple national and local nonprofits adopting the moniker, along with unaffiliated supporters who identify with the movement online. BLM has been associated with a wide range of protest activities, some of which have been controversial. While many BLM-related actions are peaceful, there have been several instances where protests have escalated into violence and property damage.^[10],[11]

The potential for unrest on the part of left-wing groups may be heightened depending upon several factors. Incidents involving law enforcement and those involving alleged “racial injustice” have historically triggered protests. Additionally, the outcome of the upcoming U.S. presidential election, particularly if former President Trump is reelected, may lead to widespread demonstrations. The involvement of more radical left-wing elements may result in confrontations, property damage, or other forms of civil disturbance. Law enforcement and security agencies typically prepare for such possibilities in the lead-up to major elections.^[11]

Left-wing activists may mobilize if they believe that the election outcome threatens democratic principles, social justice, or civil rights. The potential for clashes with right-wing groups or for confrontations with law enforcement is high. The situation may be further exacerbated by misinformation, inflammatory rhetoric, and the mobilization of extremist elements. As such, authorities must continue to prepare for a range of scenarios to manage and mitigate potential post-election violence.^[12]

Right-Wing Threat Actors

Right-wing extremist organizations continue to recruit, train and plan for actions before, during, and after the election. Actions prior to the election may include assassination threats against candidates and public officials, the targeting of large voter gatherings, and domestic disturbances at key dates associated with former President Trump’s ongoing legal cases. Actions during the election may include threats against polling offices, election workers, and collection points. The post-election phase may include attacks against government buildings, law enforcement, or directly against officials deemed responsible for real or perceived malfeasance and corruption.^[13]

Organizations that may be significant sources for the right-wing extremism groups include the accelerationist Boogaloo movement, the neo-fascist skullmask movement, the Oath Keepers, and the Proud Boys. In 2019, a top Federal Bureau of Investigation official told Congress that the agency only devoted a small amount of resources to combat the domestic threat, at an estimated 20%. Members of several right-wing organizations have traveled to conflict zones, including the war in Ukraine, for training and to seek the mentorship of veteran fighters. Right-wing threat actors vary in ideology and are constantly evolving. Some are decentralized ideological networks rather than clear hierarchical organizations. They organize themselves into local groups or chapters ensuring there is no national organization to coordinate their activity. These right-wing threat actors will continue to demonstrate an ability and willingness to capitalize on socially divisive situations to advance their anti-government aims. The threat of violence is likely to increase during periods of political unrest as its members may attempt to hijack public demonstrations and social and/or racial justice rallies to sow chaos.^[14],[15]

The threat of violence from far-right threat actors in the U.S. will remain high, marked by lone offenders or small group attacks that occur with little warning. These actors will continue to be inspired by a mix of conspiracy theories, personal grievances, and enduring racial, ethnic, religious, and anti-government ideologies. Since 2022, there have been three (3) fatal attacks in the U.S., resulting in 21 deaths. Multiple non-lethal attacks have been documented as well. Law enforcement has disrupted over a half-dozen plots during the same period targeting law enforcement, government institutions, faith-based organizations, retail locations, ethnic and religious minorities, healthcare infrastructure, transportation services, and the energy sector. While violent extremists will likely continue to use accessible, easy-to-use weapons for these attacks, they also will leverage social media and encrypted communications platforms to share novel tactics and techniques. Communication and planning online will likely grow as they continue to spread their views, recruit followers, and inspire future attacks. Some have improved the quality of their video and written content online, which may help them to recruit new followers and inspire attacks.^[16]

Conclusion

Left- and right-wing extremist groups are as varied as the issues driving the political divide in the U.S. Finding middle ground is more difficult now than any other time in modern history. Extremist groups on both sides are using technology to spread their ideological views and propaganda to garner support for their causes. While political campaigns distance themselves from these groups, they still tread lightly for fear of losing their votes. Many, if not most, people involved in extremist movements are also highly motivated voters. These groups may even deescalate their rhetoric, protests (both nonviolent and otherwise), or other public activities leading up to the election to curry favor with moderate voters who may vote for the same candidate.

The U.S. has become increasingly polarized, with deep divisions across political, social, and cultural lines. If the election results are close, contested, or perceived as illegitimate by a significant portion of the population, the likelihood of unrest increases. Protests, demonstrations, and other forms of civil disturbance may arise, driven by both left-wing and right-wing groups. However, the groups at either end of the political spectrum continue to issue both real and implied threats, only time will tell if they intend to act on them.

[1] National Security Council. (2021, June). National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. National Security Council. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf.

[2] Holt, J. (n.d.). How Domestic Extremism Adapted and Evolved After the January 6 US Capitol Attack. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/after-the-insurrection-how-domestic-extremists-adapted-and-evolved-after-the-january-6-us-capitol-attack/.

[3] Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2021, June 15). White House Unveils Strategy to Combat Domestic Extremism. NY Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/us/politics/biden-domestic-terrorism-extremists.html.

[4] Department of Treasury (n.d.). Domestic Violent Extremism. Department of Treasury. Retrieved from https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/terrorism-and-illicit-finance/domestic-violent-extremism.

[5] Department of Homeland Security. (2022, March 11). DHS Releases Report on Internal Review of Domestic Violent Extremism. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/03/11/dhs-releases-report-internal-review-domestic-violent-extremism.

[6] Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis. (2023, September). Homeland Threat Assessment. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf.

[7] Pew Research Center. (2024, February 29). Americans’ Top Policy Priority for 2024: Strengthening the Economy. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/29/americans-top-policy-priority-for-2024-strengthening-the-economy/.

[8] Pew Research Center. (2024, June 6). Cultural Issues and the 2024 Election. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/06/cultural-issues-and-the-2024-election/.

[9] Hensley, E and Washington, J. (2024, May 1) How Major Abortion Laws Compare, State by State. The Fuller Project. Retrieved from fullerproject.org/story/how-major-abortion-laws-compare-state-by-state-map/.

[10] Goff, K and McCarthy, J. (2022, February 8) No, antifa didn’t ‘infiltrate’ Black Lives Matter during the 2020 protests. But did it increase violence? Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/08/antifa-blm-extremism-violence/.

[11] 118^th Congress. (2023, March 7). H.Res.202 – Deeming certain conduct of members of Antifa as domestic terrorism and designating Antifa as a domestic terrorist organization. U.S. Congress. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-resolution/202/text.

[12] Hoffman, B and Ware, J. (2024, June 28). How Bad Will Political Violence in the U.S. Get? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/28/civil-war-political-violence-u-s-2024-election/.

[13] Council on Foreign Relations. (2024, April 23). There Is a Risk of Extremist Violence Around the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. CFR. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/news-releases/there-risk-extremist-violence-around-2024-us-presidential-election-warns-new-cfr.

[14] Rotella, S. (2021, January 22). Global Right-Wing Extremism Networks Are Growing. The U.S. is Just Now Catching Up. ProPublica. Retrieved from https://www.propublica.org/article/global-right-wing-extremism-networks-are-growing-the-u-s-is-just-now-catching-up.

[15] George Washington University. (2024). Domestic Extremism. GW. Retrieved from https://extremism.gwu.edu/domestic-extremism

[16] Homeland Security. (2024). Homeland Threat Assessment. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf

Introduction

The 2024 U.S. presidential election will be held on Tuesday, 05 November 2024, amid myriad domestic issues and the most significant political polarization in decades. The worldwide great power competition, wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and Chinese aggression towards Taiwan have escalated tension in ways that are reminiscent of the 1968 election cycle. Incumbent President Joe Biden (a Democrat) has decided to not seek reelection, leaving the Democrat nomination open for the time being, despite widespread endorsements for Vice President Kamala Harris. Former President Donald Trump (a Republican) has officially received his party’s nomination. The race also features at least three (3) notable third-party candidates who may influence the election outcome. This complex situation is likely conducive to a variety of threat actors, both foreign and domestic.

This white paper is the first in RMC’s 2024 Election Series that will examine potential threats associated with the current landscape. This paper will provide historical precedent and a top-level overview of the threats from foreign and domestic actors. Future papers will examine the involved parties and their activities in-depth, including coverage of follow-on events.

 The 1968 Presidential Election Cycle: Precedent for 2024

The term “unprecedented” has become common across media sources to describe the current political climate. However, the 1960s and 1970s were also time of great turmoil, with the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, and worldwide nuclear proliferation. Concerns over communist influence and espionage were rampant. The country was also at the height of several protest movements for civil rights, withdrawal from Vietnam (and the end of the Selective Service draft), women’s rights, and environmentalism. There was also a growing sexual revolution and emergent drug culture. Crime was on the rise nationally.^[1],[2]

This tumultuous climate led to regular demonstrations, particularly on college campuses. Many turned violent, with injuries and property damage. Clashes between police and protesters were common. In November 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. In April 1968, civil rights pioneer Dr. Marting Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in Memphis. In November of that same year, President Kennedy’s brother and likely presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy was also shot and killed in Los Angeles.^[1],[2]

During the 1968 presidential election, many voters were concerned for the nation’s future. War, inflation, unemployment, crime, and protest activity fostered a contentious environment that caused President Lyndon Johnson (a Democrat), amid primary challenges, to not seek reelection. Following the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, Hubert Humphries to become the Democratic nominee. Richard Nixon returned from virtual political exile to become the Republican nominee, running on a platform of improving the economy, America’s inner cities, crime, education, healthcare, immigration, Middle East stability, and European security against the Soviet-Union. He also sought a progressive de-Americanization of the Vietnam War.^{[1],[2],[3],[4]}

Nixon would go on to win the election with a thin majority of the popular vote (0.7%). His election would not bring an end to the unrest. In 1970, National Guard troops opened fire at an anti-war protest at Kent State University, wounding nine (9) and killing (4). The Students for a Democratic Society, a college organization founded in 1962, lead to the radical offshoot the Weather Underground in 1969. The organization would go on to conduct bombings, murders and kidnapping, mostly against U.S. government targets and individuals deemed to be part of “the establishment.” Other groups such as the Black Liberation Army, Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, New World Liberation Front, and Symbionese Liberation Army would also conduct violent political action on American soil.^[5],[6],[7]

Commonalities between the 1968 and 2024 election cycle include overseas wars, tensions in the Middle East, competition with China, inflation, economic issues, abortion, crime, immigration, and political violence, including the recent assassination attempt on former President (and now Candidate) Donald Trump. Understanding this historical context aids in predictive analysis of potential threats in relation to the 2024 election, which is the first step in mitigation.

2024 Presidential Election Outlook

The Department of Homeland Security’s 2024 Homeland Threat Assessment indicates that U.S. electoral processes remain an attractive target for adversaries, many of whom will likely seek to influence or interfere with the 2024 election. Some Domestic Violent Extremists (DVE) may attempt to disrupt civic and democratic processes, mobilized by their perceptions of the upcoming election cycle. Nation-state threat actors will likely use novel technologies and cyber tools to undermine national confidence in a free and fair election. Cyber actors likely will seek to exploit election-related systems, including state, local, and political parties’ networks, as well as election officials’ personal devices and e-mail accounts. DHS assesses that civil disturbances, targeted political violence, and foreign influence efforts are likely during the 2024 election cycle.^[8]

Domestic Threats

The 2020 Presidential Election was one of the most contested and disputed elections in history, which led to the riot at the U.S. Capitol on 06 January 2021. Misinformation and disinformation reached new heights as technology agitated online discourse, which manifested in the real world. The political divide of the 2020 election cycle remains unresolved and new issues have emerged. Some DVEs, particularly those motivated by conspiracy theories and anti-government or partisan grievances, may seek to disrupt electoral processes. Threats and violence could be directed at government officials, voters, and election infrastructure, including polling places, ballot drop box locations, voter registration sites, campaign events, political party offices, and vote counting sites.^[8]

Divisive issues that may incite protests and violence include:^[9],[10]

• American financial support to Ukraine and Israel, especially considering rising inflation and economic issues in the U.S.
• Protests against Israel’s war against Hamas, including the use of antisemitic rhetoric, which has resulted in counter protests.
• Foreign policy, particularly regarding China, Russia, Ukraine, NATO expansion and Israel.
• The U.S. Southern Border and illegal immigration, which have escalated concerns over the integrity of the 2024 election.
• Election integrity, including the security of voting machines and the use of mail-in ballots and drop boxes, along with potentially outdated voter rolls.
• Abortion, which was sent back to the states by the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2022 decision overturning Roe v. Wade.
• National crime rates, with divides between those who believe in stricter enforcement and those who feel law enforcement unjustifiably targets marginalized socioeconomic groups.

Recent Domestic Developments

The recent assassination attempt on former President Trump highlights the potential for political violence in this election season. While the incident seems to have unified the right, bipartisan calls to deescalate rhetoric only lasted a few days. The investigation into the circumstances that permitted the attempt are ongoing.

On Sunday, 21 July, President Biden announced that he will not seek reelection. He is now endorsing Vice President Kamala Harris. President Biden’s delegates to the Democratic National Convention will ultimately decide the Democrat nominee based on party guidelines. While conventional wisdom suggests they will vote for Vice President Harris, they are not strictly bound by President Biden’s endorsement. However unlikely, if she does not win a majority of support from delegates there could be a contested Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The last time this happened in 1968, Chicago experienced violent protests that resulted in clashes with the police, later fueling complaints of brutality by law enforcement officers.

Foreign Threats

Russia, China, and Iran likely view the 2024 election cycle as an opportunity to conduct overt and covert influence campaigns aimed at shaping favorable US policy outcomes and undermining American stability. These adversarial states are likely to use artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies to improve the quality and reach of their influence operations, spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to undermine trust in institutions, social cohesion, and election integrity. These efforts will likely increase as November approaches.^[8],[11]

According to the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Russia has considered elections as opportunities to conduct influence operations for decades. In 2024, Russia’s primary concern is the effect U.S. election outcomes may have on their war in Ukraine and will likely attempt to influence them in support of its goals.^[11]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the primary pacing threat to the U.S. While tensions over China’s intent for the reunification of Taiwan may be the PRC’s primary concern, their long-term goal is to replace the U.S. as the dominant world power. During the U.S. midterm elections in 2022, its propaganda targeted candidates from both political parties. PRC influence activities are increasing in sophistication, including with the use of generative AI. The PRC will also actively exploit societal divisions in the U.S. in a manner similar to previous Russian influence operations.^[11]

Iran has conducted malign influence operations across the Middle East, Israel, and the U.S., leveraging its growing technical expertise and an opportunistic approach to cyber operations. The ODNI assess that Iran is likely to attempt influence operations targeting the 2024 U.S. elections. Additionally, reports indicate that Iran is influencing and financing Pro-Palestinian and Pro-Hamas protests across the U.S., which could lead to civil disturbances and violence.^[11],[12]

Cyber actors, both government‑affiliated and cyber criminals, likely will remain opportunistic in their targeting of election-related networks and data, routinely attempting to exploit misconfigured or vulnerable public‑facing websites, webservers, and election‑related information technology systems. These actors are likely to engage in social engineering campaigns, including spearphishing and phishing/smishing government officials.^[11]

Conclusion

The threat landscape surrounding the 2024 presidential election is still developing, but there are historical precedents that inform some predictive analysis. While the outcome of the election is far from certain, it is safe to say that the political tensions in the U.S. will not be quelled by the election of either candidate. Protest activity, civil unrest, and even targeted political violence are likely. Foreign actors will attempt to use social engineering techniques, malicious cyber activity, and financial ties to influence elections and fan the flames of political and social tensions. While this paper provides a baseline overview of the threats associated with the 2024 election, RMC’s white paper series will continue to examine the threats posed by both foreign and domestic actors in greater detail both before and during the election. Post-election papers will also address significant follow-on threat activity and scenarios that may occur.

[1] Nichter, L. (2023, 01 August). The Year that Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968. Yale University Press.

[2] Converse, P. et al. (2014, 01 August). Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election. Cambridge University Press

[3] Peters, G and Wooley, J. (1968, August 05). Republican Party Platform of 1968. The American Presidency Project. Retrieved from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1968.

[4] Humphrey, H. (1968) Hubert H. Humphries Papers: An Inventory of His 1968 Presidential Campaign Files. Minnesota Historical Society Manuscript Collections. Retrieved from http://www2.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00720/pdf/hhh41.pdf.

[5] Wooley, J and Peters, G. (n.d.). 1968 Election Statistics. The American Presidency Project. Retrieved from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/elections/1968.

[6] Chard, D. (2021, September). Nixon’s War at Home: The FBI, Leftist Guerrillas, and the Origins of Counterterrorism. The University of North Carolina Press.

[7] Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). Weather Underground Bombings. FBI. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/weather-underground-bombings.

[8] Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis. (2023, September). Homeland Threat Assessment. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf.

[9] Pew Research Center. (2024, February 29). Americans’ Top Policy Priority for 2024: Strengthening the Economy. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/29/americans-top-policy-priority-for-2024-strengthening-the-economy/.

[10] Pew Research Center. (2024, June 6). Cultural Issues and the 2024 Election. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/06/cultural-issues-and-the-2024-election/.

[11] Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2024, February 5). Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. ODNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

[12] Quinn, J. (2024, July 9). Iran Finances U.S. Campus Protests: Top Intel Official. National Review. Retrieved from https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/iran-finances-u-s-campus-protests-top-intel-official/.

Introduction

Over the past 20 years, the United States military has accumulated the most combat experience of any armed force in the world. Foreign powers in competition with the U.S. are aware of this operational advantage and actively seek to close the experience gap. Many Department of Defense (DoD) servicemembers who joined the military early in the Global War on Terror have either retired or will be retiring soon. They are being recruited by other nations and corporations with lucrative job offers that leverage their experience both on and off the battlefield. In many cases, the companies they are working for appear to be American or affiliated with countries allied with the U.S. However, veteran servicemembers may also be taking jobs with nation-state threat actors.

Historical Context

Historically, the U.S. has supported other nations prior to wars with diplomatic, economic, and military assistance. Active and veteran personnel have a history of supporting, advising, and training foreign militaries. For example, in 1914, before the U.S. entered World War I, Americans began crossing into Canada to receive military training and volunteer to fight for foreign militaries, including the French Foreign Legion. After Japan attacked China in 1937, Americans served as observers, advisors, and recruiters for foreign air forces. There were also DoD and Department of State civilian employees and contractors who assisted with logistics, policymaking, and training for the fledgling Republic of Vietnam before American involvement in the war.^[1],[2],[3]

The current wars in Ukraine and Israel have seen veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces traveling overseas to take part in these conflicts. American veterans have also supported foreign nations on their own through various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), volunteer efforts, initiatives aimed at humanitarian aid, community development, and educational programs.^{[4],[5],[6],[7],[8],[9]}

A Legal Perspective

Before a retired or veteran servicemember can begin working for a foreign government, they are required to receive approval from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. This is covered under the Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and federal law. The Emoluments Clause states that, to preserve national security and prevent conflicts of interest, this approval is required before the servicemember takes a job with a foreign government. The filing and approval requirements must be followed closely, or the DoD may withhold benefits and retirement pay. Statutory enforcement is limited, and there is still a lack of internal policing on this matter. Individuals are expected to act in a manner that would not risk operational security, but they are not required to report their work after the initial background investigation. As a result, once former servicemembers acquire approval permitting them to work for foreign powers, the U.S. Government has no awareness of what may be shared. This creates an obvious and difficult-to-detect national security risk.^{[10],[11],[12]}

Often, former servicemembers work for U.S. companies that support foreign governments or corporations and educational institutions that are controlled, owned, or operated by a foreign government. This requires the same waiver process by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the servicemember’s military branch. In this manner, hundreds of retired servicemembers have received approval to work for foreign governments.^{[10],[11],[12]}

There are several other laws that apply to foreign military service. The Neutrality Act of 1794 prohibits persons within the jurisdiction of the U.S. from enlisting in foreign militaries. Violations of the Neutrality Act are punishable by fines, imprisonment of not more than three (3) years, or both. While the law applies to those within the U.S., it does not apply to those who enlist while they are in another country. Treason (18 U.S.C. 2381) would apply to a U.S. citizen who supports a foreign entity at war or in conflict with the U.S. American citizens can be expatriated for voluntarily committing acts designated by Congress. Voluntary service in the armed forces of a foreign state is an expatriating act, resulting in the loss of U.S. citizenship if those armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or the individual. serves as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer. Notably, these laws have rarely been enforced.^[10]

During the Global War on Terror, including the War in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military became dependent on civilian contractors at levels never before seen. By October 2020, 43,800 contractors were serving in the CENTCOM area of operations, compared to 15,000 DoD personnel. Many contractors were prior servicemembers who had already deployed and who returned under lucrative contracts as instructors, security personnel, and technical support. However, some contractors have decided to work for other nations, not all of whom are allied with American interests.^[13],[14]

Virtually all retirees and most veterans have clearances prior to beginning work for a foreign entity. This creates an opportunity for unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Clearance holders are responsible for safeguarding classified information, including its transmittal, destruction, storage, distribution, handling, and accounting thereof. Once veterans are no longer associated with the department or agency that granted their clearance, there is no oversight or reporting process for the U.S. government to track mishandlings or unauthorized disclosures. Even if a robust system were in place, it would likely be reactive in nature as preventative measures would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Veterans also have broad experience and skillsets that may or may not be explicitly classified, but these tactics, techniques, and procedures can be leveraged by foreign nations and used against American interests.^[15]

Case Study: U.S. Veterans in Middle East

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contracted many American veterans of the Global War on Terror to advise and train its personnel. Between 2015 and 2022, some 280 military retirees sought federal authorization to work there. At the time, requests to work for the UAE exceeded those for any other nation in the world. Many were retired General and Flag Officers. There were also an estimated hundreds more veterans already employed by the UAE and by state-owned companies. Most of these veterans did not serve until retirement and did not have to seek federal permission. They are often given double or triple what similar jobs would have earned in the U.S.^[16]

Improvements in the martial proficiency of the UAE’s military may have helped the country to send troops into civil wars in Yemen and Libya. These conflicts led to questions about human rights violations. The armed forces of the UAE have imprisoned journalists, human rights activists, and other critics in show trials widely condemned by the international community. At the same time, U.S. veterans were being authorized by the Department of State and DoD to work for the UAE, the Emiratis joined OPEC efforts to reduce global oil production, contrary to American interests. UAE has also been scrutinized by the Justice Department for allegedly interfering in U.S. elections and politics. In 2022, a U.S. intelligence report showed that the UAE made extensive efforts to influence U.S. politics via lobbying firms and to exploit lax and unenforced disclosure laws.^{[16],[17],[18]}

Case Study: China Seeks U.S. Military Experience.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to aggressively recruit U.S. veterans. The PRC aims to recruit personnel to “train the trainer” and bolster its doctrinal shortcomings. China’s last major military campaign was approximately 45 years ago, during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, in which its air and naval forces played little to no role. Pending a possible major military conflict in Taiwan, China understands that its key military forces have not had any combat experience or any effective overhaul in doctrine and tactics in decades. Despite its buildup of forces and the looming possibility of an invasion of Taiwan, Beijing continues to struggle with air operations, pilot proficiency, and tactics that would help it to circumvent U.S. forces, should they directly support Taiwan. This makes the experience of veteran U.S. pilots a much-desired skillset that is essential to overcoming experience gaps.^{[19],[20],[21]}

In June 2024, the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing coalition released a joint threat bulletin highlighting the PLA’s recruitment of current and former military personnel from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and other Western countries to help improve China’s military capabilities. Air operations personnel, flight engineers, and former military pilots are the most in-demand targets. According to the coalition of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., the PLA uses private firms or professional networking sites to conceal their relationship, paying exorbitant salaries, and offering recruits the opportunity to fly “exotic aircraft.” China also sends its servicemembers to private defense and aerospace companies worldwide. These entities, such as the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA), Beijing China Aviation Technology Co. (BCAT), Paramount Group, and Stratos, train in a multitude of disciplines in land, air, and sea operations.^[22],[23]

A recent extradition ruling in Australia involving a former U.S. Marine highlights China’s initiative to gain insight into American military tactics and deploy a more robust fleet of aircraft carriers amid increasing aggression toward Taiwan and tensions in the South China Sea. In May 2024, an Australian magistrate ruled that a former U.S. Marine, a naturalized Australian citizen, could be extradited to the U.S. to face charges related to training Chinese military pilots. In October 2022, the former servicemember was arrested by Australian federal police for training Chinese military pilots to land on aircraft carriers between November 2009 and November 2012. According to a 2017 indictment, he conspired with the TFASA to export defense services. Open-source reporting indicates that potential charges in the U.S. include money laundering and breaking arms control law.^{[19],[24],[25],[26]}

Outlook

Historical precedence for U.S. veterans supporting militaries and wartime efforts of other nations date back to the nation’s founding. The Global War on Terror saw a sharp rise in the widespread use of contractors, creating an environment where American veterans commanded high salaries in the U.S. and abroad. The terrorist groups in that conflict were not and are not near-peer competitors. There was less concerns of the illicit sharing of information and experience with other nations. However, this new era of great power competition has near-peer nation-state militaries seeking to challenge the U.S. as the last remaining superpower.

While technology, equipment and doctrine can all be developed, experience can only be earned. The U.S. military has paid the high price to earn the most combat experience in the world. Foreign actors will continue to aggressively seek out this knowledge and experience to close the gap with the U.S. military. The large amounts of money involved creates a potential conflict of interest, with American military experience being sold to the highest bidder. The legally and ethically gray area created by contractors over the last two (2) decades has fostered confusion about support for foreign governments. Greater oversight and enforcement of current laws can ensure that information is not being shared with foreign governments that are or may become competitors to the U.S. As a cleared contracting firm, RMC’s team is trained to meet and exceed the information and operational security requirements to protect the information of our government and commercial clients.  RMC’s Intelligence and Climate Analysis Division will continue to monitor relevant developments and the implications for U.S. national security.

[1] The National World War I Museum. (n.d.) The Volunteers: Americans Join World War I, 1914-1919. Retrieved from https://www.theworldwar.org/exhibitions/volunteers-americans-join-world-war-i-1914-1919.

[2] National Archives and Records Administration. (n.d.) A Prelude to War: The Flying Tigers. Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/a_people_at_war/prelude_to_war/flying_tigers.html.

[3] Nelson, A. (2013, July). Just Good Advice: The American Advisors in the Vietnam War. The University of Southern Mississippi. Retrieved from https://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1187&context=honors_theses.

[4] Southards, C. (2023, November 29). Ukraine, Israel, Yemen…American Veterans Increasingly Serving in Overseas Conflicts. Department of California American Legion. Retrieved from https://calegion.org/ukraine-israel-yemenamerican-veterans-are-increasingly-serving-in-overseas-conflicts/.

[5] Cook, E. (2024, February 22). Americans Can Now Join Ukraine’s National Guard Zelensky Says. Newsweek. Retrieved from https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-americans-fighters-military-russia-zelensky-1872314.

[6] Israeli Defense Forces. (n.d.) How to Join Us and Voluntary Programs. Retrieved from https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/how-to-join-us-and-voluntary-programs/how-to-join/.

[7] Fautre, W. (2024, March 29). HRWF. Retrieved from https://hrwf.eu/world-the-role-of-ngos-to-protect-civilians-in-armed-conflicts/.

[8] Stowe, C. (2022, July 11). U.S. – Vietnam Relations, the Legacy of War, and the Role of NGOs. GlobalWA. Retrieved from https://globalwa.org/2022/07/u-s-vietnam-relations-the-legacy-of-war-and-the-role-of-ngos/.

[9] Team Rubicon. (2020, January 13). Veteran-Led Disaster Response and Humanitarian Group Team Rubicon Commemorates “A Decade of Service and Grit”. PR Newswire. Retrieved from https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/veteran-led-disaster-response-and-humanitarian-group-team-rubicon-commemorates-a-decade-of-service-and-grit-300985302.html.

[10] Congressional Research Service. (2022, March 28). U.S. Nationals and Foreign Military Service. CRS. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12068.

[11] Mitchell, E. (2023, June 20). Senators Introduce Bill Restricting Retired Troops’ Work for Foreign Governments. The Hill. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4059497-senators-introduce-bill-restricting-retired-troops-work-for-foreign-governments/.

[12] Kness, R. (2017, June 30). Working for a Contractor or Foreign Government after Military Service. ClearanceJobs.com. Retrieved from https://news.clearancejobs.com/2017/06/30/working-contractor-foreign-government-military-service/.

[13] Cancian, M. (2021, August 30). In Afghanistan, Contractors were Unsung Heroes of US Efforts. Breaking Defense. Retrieved from https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/in-afghanistan-contractors-were-unsung-heroes-of-us-efforts/.

[14] Mazzarino, A. (2023, May 16). The Unseen Soldiers of America’s Privatized Wars. The Nation Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/world/private-contract-soldiers/.

[15] Congressional Research Service. (2023, February 2). The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21900.

[16] Whitlock, C and Jones, N. (2022, October 18). UAE Relied on Expertise of Retired U.S. Troops to Beef up its Military. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/uae-military-us-veterans/.

[17] HRW. (2021, January 13). UAE: Reality of Abuses Contradicts Tolerance Rhetoric. HRW. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/uae-reality-abuses-contradicts-tolerance-rhetoric.

[18] Middle East Eye. (2022, November 13). US intelligence report claims UAE ‘meddled in American politics’. MEE. Retrieved from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-meddled-american-politics-us-intelligence-report-claims.

[19] Perez, Z. (2024, June 07). US, Allied Intel Agencies Warn Pilots to Avoid Chinese Recruitment. Military Times. Retrieved from https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/06/07/us-allied-intel-agencies-warn-pilots-to-avoid-chinese-recruitment/.

[20] Gin, C. M. (2016). How China Wins: A Case Study of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. US Army Command and General Staff College Press. Retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/how-china-wins.pdf.

[21] Lillis, K. B. (2024, June 05). US and Allies Warn China is Intensifying its Efforts to Recruit Western Military Pilots. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/05/politics/us-and-allies-warn-china-recruit-pilots/index.html.

[22] Novelly, T. (2024, June 06). China is ‘Aggressively Recruiting’ Pilots from the US and NATO Countries, Intelligence Agencies Warn. Military.com. Retrieved from https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/06/06/china-aggressively-recruiting-pilots-us-and-nato-countries-intelligence-agencies-warn.html.

[23] The National Counterintelligence and Security Center. (2024, June 5). Safeguarding Our Military Expertise: Foreign Companies Continue to Recruit Current and Former Western Service Members to Bolster the PRC’s Military. DNI. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/products/Safeguarding_Our_Military_Expertise.pdf.

[24] Bennett, B. (2024, June 5). U.S. Cracks Down on Former ‘Top Gun’ Pilots Found to Be Training China’s Air Force. Time. Retrieved from https://time.com/6985561/top-gun-pilots-china/.

[25] Whiteman, H. (2024, May 24). Ex-US Marines fighter pilot loses bid to block extradition to the United States over China training allegations. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/24/australia/daniel-duggan-us-extradition-hearing-intl-hnk/index.html.

[26] Needham, K. (2024, May 24). Former US Marine pilot can be extradited, Australian magistrate rules. Stars and Stripes. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2024-05-24/former-marine-pilot-extradition-13960410.html.